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i 
Abstract 
The classical networks for broadcast, telephony and data are converging to services on 
the Next Generation Networks (NGN), which are introduced by all major Service Providers 
(SP). Major requirements on the future IP network are security and mobility, which are 
reflection of the Internet’s importance and wide use of portable smart devices. 
Secure IP mobility is the focus of this thesis, i.e. how the user can move through different 
access networks whilst maintaining uninterrupted and secure IP communication. In particular, 
the remote access (corporate access) is the prime task, thus remote clients connect to central 
gateway, where corporate IP address or LAN segments are assigned. The corporate access 
requires naturally high level of security to protect against competitors. The security must 
cover the application data and mobile protocol signalling. This thesis targets an 
implementable solution for IPv4 and IPv6. It must integrate in the existing Service Provider 
infrastructure, like tunnelling devices (BRAS), AAA, Load Sharing, High Availability, 
Firewalls, PKI, monitoring, and administration etc. 
The existing approaches, like for example: Mobile IP with IPSec, MOBIKE, Proxy 
Mobile IP, are presented and analysed at first stage. The existing solutions fall short in many 
areas like: not considering NAT devices, not compatible to multi-homed hosts, without 
session tracking protection, problems with anti-spoofing rules performed by Internet 
Providers etc. A major deficit of all existing solutions is that the network parameters are 
updated at constant intervals. Neither the frequency of the host movements nor the network 
properties are considered by the update. This leads to underperformance regarding to the 
network load and convergence time due to disconnection. 
In this thesis, a new protocol family is developed, called Mobile VPN (M-VPN). The M-
VPN consists of three sub protocols: Mobile Key Exchange (M-KE), Mobile Secure 
Encapsulation (M-SE), Mobile Location Update (M-LU).  
There are two major parts in this work: (1) engineering development of M-SE and M-KE 
for mobile IP security, and (2) mathematical algorithms (M-LU) for optimisation of the 
updates in mobile networks. Both parts build a complete view of the remote corporate access 
in mobile environments.  
The M-KE and M-SE have novel characteristics like mobility during the session 
negotiation through polling and caching, protection against location tracking through pseudo 
random header values and overlay dynamic topologies through network resources discovery.  
The principal idea in M-LU is to make the update interval proportional to the probability 
of disconnection. The updates are frequent in the timeframe with a high probability of 
disconnection and vice versa. The probability density function is built using the history of 
past changes in the parameters. The classical estimation methods cannot be used in a 
straightforward way in M-LU, since they require numerical values as result from a 
measurement. Unfortunately, the update procedure delivers only Boolean values and namely 
if the IP/UDP parameters have changed. 
The developed M-LU protocol creates three novel frameworks representing 
comprehensive and primitive solutions of the problem, thus stochastic, subjective and 
analytical. They are based on (1) sequential Monte Carlo in Particle filter, (2) Adaptive Fuzzy 
controller and (3) extended Kalman filter. 
A proof of concept on Mobile Location Update protocol is achieved through simulation 
on Matlab 7.0. The results show clear outperformance of new methods against the constant 
interval. The novel framework can also be implemented in various protocols like IPSec, SIP 
or Mobile IP etc. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Sichere Mobilität in IP Netze ist das Hauptthema dieser Dissertationsarbeit und zwar wie 
ein Benutzer eine sichere Kommunikation während seiner IP Adresse sich ändert betreiben 
kann? Der Fokus liegt auf mobilen Firmennetzzugriff (Remote access), da er naturgemäß eine 
höhere Anforderung an der Sicherheit verlangt. Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit 
anwendbaren Lösungen für IPv4 und IPv6. Eine anwendbare Lösung muss sich in der 
existierenden Infrastrukturen und Methoden bei den Service Providern, wie Tunneling Geräte 
(BRAS), AAA, Firewalls, Lastverteilung, Verfügbarkeit, Management, usw, integrieren. 
Die Lösungsansätze, wie zum Beispiel Mobile IP mit IPSec, MOBIKE, Proxy Mobile IP, 
sind zuerst in der Arbeit analysiert. Diese haben Defizite in mehreren Bereichen, wie zum 
Beispiel: nicht kompatibel zu NAT und Multi-Homed Hosts, keinen Schutz gegen das 
Verfolgen der Aufenthaltsorte. Zentraler Defizit ist, dass alle Lösungen die Netzparameter in 
konstanten Intervallen aktualisieren. Weder der Bewegung des mobilen Hosts noch die 
Netzparameter sind dabei berücksichtigt. Das führt zu regelmäßigen Verbindungsabbrüchen 
und/oder Netzüberlastung durch nutzlose Paketen. 
In dieser Arbeit wird eine neue Protokollsammlung, genannt Mobile VPN (M-VPN), 
entwickelt. Das M-VPN teilt sich in drei Unterprotokolle auf: Mobile Key Exchange (M-KE), 
Mobile Secure Encapsulation (M-SE) und Mobile Location Update (M-LU).  
Die Dissertation hat zwei Hauptziele: (1) eine Ingenieuraufgabe zur Protokollentwicklung 
für mobile IP Sicherheit und zwar M-SE und M-KE. (2) Die zweite Aufgabe (M-LU) ist die 
mathematische Optimierung von Netzparameteraktualisierung für reduzierten Netzlast und 
Verbindungsabbruche. Beide Teile beschreiben alle Aspekten des Firmennetzzugriffs in einer 
mobilen Umgebung.  
Die M-KE und M-SE führen neue Methoden in die mobilen Sicherheit ein und zwar: 
Durch Polling und Caching wird IP Änderung während einer Sitzungsaushandlung 
ermöglicht. Pseudozufallswerte im Header sorgen für einen Schutz gegen das Verfolgen der 
Aufenthaltsorte. Der Aufbau von dynamischen Netztopologien wird durch das Annoncieren 
von weiteren Mobilen Servern ermöglicht. 
Die grundlegende Idee im M-LU besteht darin, die Aktualisierungsfrequenz proportional 
zu der Wahrscheinlichkeit des Verbindungsabbruchs einzustellen. Wenn es eine höhere 
Wahrscheinlichkeit für IP Änderung gibt, werden die Netzparameter öfter aktualisiert und 
vice versa. Die Wahrscheinlichkeitsdichtefunktion wird anhand der Verbindungsabbrüche in 
der Vergangenheit konstruiert.  
Die klassischen Methoden der Signaltheorie können nicht direkt in M-LU verwendet 
werden, da diese Zahlenwerte einer Messung verlangen. Im Gegensatz liefert die Prozedur 
für die IP/Port Aktualisierung ein einfaches Booleschen Ergebnis und zwar, ob sich die 
Netzparameter geändert haben. Die Booleschen Werte können nicht in den klassischen 
Algorithmen eingesetzt werden. Der Zeitpunkt der Änderung liegt in dem Intervall zwischen 
zwei Aktualisierungen. 
Drei mathematische Algorithmen werden für M-LU entwickelt. Diese decken die 
grundlegenden Ansätze für eine Lösung und zwar stochastischer, subjektiver und analytischer 
Ansatz. Diese basieren auf: (1) Sequentielles Monte Carlo mit Particle Filter, (2) Adaptive 
Fuzzy Kontroller, (3) erweiterten Kalman Filter. 
Das M-LU Protokoll wurde mit Matlab 7.0 simuliert, um die Qualität der Methoden zu 
prüfen. Das neue Verfahren hat eine deutlich bessere Effektivität und Genauigkeit verglichen 
mit den konstanten Intervallen. Die hier entwickelten Verfahren können in einer Reihe von 
weiteren Protokollen, wie zum Beispiel SIP, IPSec oder Mobile IP, implementiert werden. 
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1 Introduction 
The Next Generation Networks (NGN) [21] are currently rolled out by all carriers around 
the world. The classical broadcast, telephony and data networks converge to services over the 
Internet. The global IP network becomes the dominating medium for modern 
communications. An important requirement of the new services, like VoIP, messaging, Web 
services, is the mobile usage, for example on smart devices with WiFi or 3G connections. In 
parallel to the requirement for mobility, security plays a tremendous role for the new services 
since the information and intellectual property are decisive for whole business branches. The 
demand for security and mobility is increasing in the NGN networks. 
1.1 Goals 
This thesis targets a solution for providing secure IP mobility in the context of remote 
corporate access. The IP mobility means keeping constant IP address from the application 
perspective whilst changing to different access networks. Security means protecting the 
application data1 and the signalling2 of the mobile protocol. The Figure 1.1 shows this 
primary target scenario. 
 
The Mobile Host is a device frequently changing the access network and keeping secure 
connection to the Mobile Gateway. The Mobile Host is part of the corporate network, thus it 
has single IP or LAN segment of the corporate LAN. The Mobile Host hast two IPs: (1) The 
first one is temporary for communication through Internet to Mobile Gateway. The IP 
changes frequently depending on the access network. The second IP (or LAN) is used for 
intranet communication in the corporate network and it is constant. The Mobile Gateway 
assigns and maintains the corporate parameters and therefore, it has administrative right over 
the Mobile Host.  
Generally speaking, the scenario is an overlay topology of two networks: one public and 
one private. The overlay network is not restricted only to corporate deployment. It is question 
of abstraction to higher layer to deploy this model also for applications working on peer-to-
peer principle. 
There are engineering and mathematical scopes in this work. The engineering part is to 
design solution implementable in the current IPv4 and future global IPv6 network. The 
solution must be carrier grade, which means: First, it must be implementable in the current 
Service Provider (SP) infrastructures, thus we are not staring on green field (protection of 
investment). Second, it must satisfy provider operation requirements. These conditions can be 
summarized as: Load Balancing, High Availability, using current AAA implementations, 
easy integration in existing tunneling devices (like BRAS), using standard cryptographic 
algorithms, routing protocols integration, fast auto reconfiguration, possibility for existing 
Firewall integration. 
                                                     
1
 Application data is the messages generated by the applications and not related to secure IP mobility. 
2
 The term “signalling” refers to the packets for maintaining a mobile connection, like negotiation, updates etc. 
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Figure 1.1: Mobile remote access 
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The mathematical scope of this work is to optimize the signalling with respect to less 
disconnection because of change of IP address and at the same time to keep the transmitted 
packets minimal. The signalling in a network with hundreds of thousands of hosts, like the 
current Service Providers networks, should not to be underestimated and its reduction directly 
reflects to less energy consumption. The reduction of energy reflects in less operation cost 
and it is friendly to earth’s natural resources. This part is relevant not only in the scope of this 
thesis, but also to other network problems where the signalling can be reduced, like VoIP 
(SIP), routing protocols etc.  
1.2 State of the art 
There are numerous protocols focusing separately on mobility or on security described in 
2.10. They can be combined in potential solutions for secure IP mobility. The candidates can 
be classified in three major groups: (1) In the first group, there are two layer solutions 
consisting of one protocol for mobility and another for security, for example: IPSec [20] over 
Mobile IP [17, 18]. The mobile layer delivers constant IP connectivity and the security layer 
protects the data on top of it. Both protocols act independent from each other. (2) The second 
group of possible solutions attempts to integrate mobility in current security protocols, like 
MOBIKE [19]. The original core protocol is kept static1 and some extensions are added in 
order to enable mobility. (3) The third group contains research projects, like ENABLE [22] 
and SMA [23]. They target mobility in Intranet environments or are based on IPv6 networks. 
This thesis targets mobility and security in IPv4 and IPv6 networks. The solution must not 
require changes on the Internet’s intermediate devices, like routers and switches. 
1.3 Motivation 
Enabling secure IP mobility is not a trivial task: on the one hand, the Internet (IPv4) was 
not designed to provide host’s mobility. The IP addresses are assigned static to physical 
access network. Physical movement means change of the access network and therefore the IP 
address. On the other hand, the existing security protocols, like IPSec (see 1.7), require static 
network parameters and any change of the IP leads to disconnection.  
The motivation for this work is that the current solutions (see 1.2) do not meet the 
requirements for secure connection in mobile environments and optimisation of the signalling 
regarding disconnection and network load. In the following paragraph, the reasons are briefly 
described.  
1.3.1 Engineering issues 
The Internet structures evolve steadily bringing additional issues to the mobility. There 
are two assumptions related to mobility made decades ago, which are not met in the current 
Internet. First, there is no transparent bidirectional IP connection between the host because of 
the Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT, for terminology see 1.7) [11, 12 and 13]. 
Second, the hosts are often multi-homed because of multiple IP interfaces, and thus can have 
more than one IP address (see 2.5).  
The broadband access uses NAPT in the Customer Premises Equipment (CPE, see A.1) 
for enabling multiple hosts to share the same public IP address. The host behind NAPT 
reaches Internet through the public IP of the CPE and not its local IP address. The result of it 
is that the host is not aware of its public IP. This has a tremendous impact on the mobility 
because the mobile host is not notified by change of its public IP on the NAPT router. From 
                                                     
1
 The word “static” means constant IP and port parameters during one session. 
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an Internet perspective, every change of the public IP is host moving1. The host moves 
although he keeps the same local parameter and access network. This was not considered in 
the existing mobile protocols, like Mobile IP [17]. These protocols are not compatible with 
NAPT and therefore, cannot work in the current Internet.  
The similar issue occurs on multi-homed hosts having multiple active IP interfaces, like 
3G, WiFi etc. The application is not aware of the outgoing interfaces in dynamic mobile 
environments (see 2.5). The outgoing interface is decisive for the source IP address and not 
knowing the outgoing interface means not knowing the source IP. 
The research on mobility and security tasks must be carried out together since there are 
security aspects on the mobility protocol. The signalling of the mobile protocols must be 
protected and not only the application data. Tracing the physical movements of the host is 
security relevant and not considered in the specifications (see 2.6). In the secure protocols 
integrated in the mobility solution, like IPSec [20], the session IDs (SPI) can be easily 
mapped to the used IPs during the session and therefore, to physical locations of the mobile 
host. 
1.3.2 Mathematical optimization issues 
The frequency of the signalling messages in mobile environment is very critical for the 
packet losses due to an undetected disconnection (host movement) [4, 5]. Practically, there is 
no research on how the updates frequency of the IP can be optimized with respect to 
minimum disconnection time and network resources. The classical estimation methods 
cannot be directly applied since they require numerical values. The update of IP/port delivers 
Boolean result, thus if the IP/port has changed or not. The time point of disconnection 
(change) is unknown. It is somewhere between the updates. The Boolean result cannot be 
used in the classical estimation methods. There is trade off between the updates (resources) 
and disconnection interval. More updates mean more resource and may reduce the 
disconnection. The current applications use constant update intervals regardless of the 
network or host properties. The result of this is wasted resources in unnecessary updates and 
long disconnection intervals. The situation escalates in mobile environment where frequent 
changes in network are typical. This can lead to collapse of network because of overloaded 
links with useless update messages. The effect will be also long disconnection of the mobile 
devices. The update frequency is a significant topic, which is not considered in the current 
protocols. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the requirements on secure IP mobility and the candidates. The focus 
of this section is an analysis of the properties and opened issues of the existing potential 
solutions. The requirements for mobility and security in the context of this thesis are not met 
by the existing solutions and therefore, a new protocol, called Mobile Virtual Private 
Network (M-VPN), is developed. The M-VPN introduces novel features and covers the 
opened issues described in chapter 2. Its structure and properties are described in chapter 3. 
The M-VPN is protocols family consists of three sub protocols, which together deliver secure 
IP mobility: 
• Mobile Key Exchange (M-KE) is a protocol for the negotiation of session 
parameters in mobile environments. The peers are identified, authenticated 
and authorized during the negotiation. The protocol delivers crypto 
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 The term “move” refers to change of the IP address and/or port. It must not be directly related to physical relocation. 
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algorithms, session key, session ID etc, for the following protection protocol 
M-SE. The protocol is fully specified in chapter 4.  
• Mobile Secure Encapsulation (M-SE) protects the communication in mobile 
environments. The protocol secures the application data and mobile 
signalling through encryption, authentication, integrity check and replay 
protection. The M-SE has an anti-tracing mechanism, thus the session cannot 
be matched to IP addresses. The protocol itself works on an application layer 
and delivers transparent transport layer. The applications can use the 
transport layer (TCP/UDP) directly or can implement an IP tunnel. The 
protocol itself does not have tunnel properties. It integrates existing tunnel 
protocols, like L2TP or GRE. Chapter 5 gives the technical specification. The 
security of M-SE and M-KE protocols is analysed in chapter 6. 
• Mobile Location Update (M-LU) is a mathematical algorithms description 
rather than a technical specification. The protocol optimises the update 
intervals regarding minimal disconnection and network signalling. The 
structure of the M-LU is presented in chapter 7. Three novel algorithms for 
M-LU are developed in this thesis using approaches of statistics, analytics 
and fuzzy logic. These three conceptual methods show different view points 
at the problem and build together comprehensive and primitive solution: 
- Stochastic solution using Sequential Monte Carlo is the first method 
presented in chapter 8. The method represents a solution of the 
Bayesian equation using the statistic of past events. The method is 
known as Particle filter.  
- Adaptive Fuzzy controller using expert knowledge and training 
methods is the second method described in chapter 9. Fuzzy logic 
deals with subjective knowledge equivalent to verbal descriptions 
with multivalent values. The training of the controller is made 
thought One Pass (OP) method. The rules are optimised with 
Recursive Least Square (RLS) method. 
- Analytical solution based on extended Kalman filter is the last 
method developed in chapter 10. The famous Kalman filter [24] 
solves analytically the Wiener problem [26]. Unfortunately, the 
Kalman filter can by applied only to linear and Gaussian models. 
Linear models cannot describe the movement of Mobile Node. A 
common solution presents the extended Kalman filter (EKF) [25], 
which basically approximates a non-linear system to a linear one.  
A proof of concept of M-LU algorithms is achieved through simulation with real and 
pseudo random data in chapters 8, 9 and 10. The results are compared to each other and to the 
constant update intervals. There is a clear outperformance of the new methods regarding the 
disconnection time using the same resources. Chapter 11 shows that the new algorithm can be 
used in variety of algorithms, like SIP [15] and Mobile IP [17]. Appendix A gives a technical 
overview of the Internet access types and relevant Internet protocols 
1.5 Properties and ideas of M-VPN  
The key idea in M-LU protocols is to set the update time points proportional to the 
probability of disconnection. The updates are frequent if the probability of connection drop is 
high and vice versa. The Probability Density Function (PDF) is constructed from the history 
of IP changes (disconnections). The classical estimation methods cannot be directly applied 
1.6 Contributions 5  
as already mentioned. These methods require numerical values of measurement but the 
update procedure is delivering Boolean ones. M-LU creates new models for the movements 
of the mobile node, which can be used with the classical estimation methods. Three novel 
approaches are precisely derived in M-LU for solving the optimisation task: based on Particle 
filter, adaptive Fuzzy controller and extended Kalman Filter. 
The M-SE builds dynamic overlay topologies allowing discovery of new resources and 
auto-reconfiguration by network failures. The M-SE uses semi random header values for 
protection against tracing of the host’s movement. Furthermore, the dual purpose of IP, thus 
for identification and transport, is split between the M-SE and network layer. The new 
protocol is friendly to NAPT and multi-homed environments.  
The M-KE is designed to work in fast changing networks, where the processing time at 
the host may exceed the movement interval. Circular dependencies are the big issue for these 
networks, where the hosts cannot finish a negotiation even if they communicate physically. 
For example: the mobile host is changing its IP every 2 seconds and the server needs 10 
Seconds for the generation of the response message. The server cannot answer in time to the 
right client’s address. M-VPN introduces polling for solving these circular dependencies.  
The M-KE and M-SE are innovative because of their structure for working in mobile 
environment. They rely on well-established and common cryptographic algorithms, which are 
independent from the secure mobility topic and out of scope of this thesis. The synergy 
through using common cryptographic algorithms in the M-VPN ensures easy and fast 
deployment with minimum resources.  
1.6 Contributions 
This thesis contains many scientific contributions by the author, which are enumerated 
here in the order of occurrence in the text. In the first place, it is the analysis of the existing 
potential solutions for secure IP mobility regarding the influence of NAPT and multi-homed 
hosts. In the second place, a novel M-VPN protocol is created fulfilling the NGN 
requirements. The secure protocol has new features for building dynamic overlay networks 
(see 3.3.3), anti-tracing mechanism for the host’s movements (see 3.7), polling procedure for 
negotiation in fast changing networks (see 3.5), the Mappers (see 3.6.1) enable physical 
separation of mobility and tunnel node. 
An important contribution to protocols working in mobile environment and not limited to 
M-VPN is the creation of M-LU. The protocol minimises disconnection time through 
optimisation of the update frequency based on the history of host’s movements. There are 
many innovations in M-LU overviewed separately for Particle filter in 8.1, for Fuzzy 
controller in 9.1 and for extended Kalman filter in 10.1. A practical contribution is the 
simulation showing the qualities of the new methods. 
The author has published papers directly related to this work. The method based on Fuzzy 
logic has been published by IEEE [4, 5]. The method on Particle and Kalman filter has been 
published [8, 9] and presented to the IEEE conferences. There is author’s IETF draft on 
Mobile VPNs using Mobile IP [1]. The author has published further papers not related to 
mobile security in areas of PKI [3, 6], WAP [2], VoIP [7] and security benchmarking [10]. 
1.7 Background information 
This chapter gives general information on Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) 
since it is required for understanding this work. More details can be found in A.2.  
There is no consensus about the exact terminology, so clarification of the notation shall 
be provided first. The Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) is synonym for other 
popular notations such as NAT (Network Address Translation), PAT (Port Address 
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Translation), Masquerading, Port forwarding, dynamic NAT or static NAT. The NAPT is a 
more general term and covers all facets of translation, thus with or without port translation 
and static or dynamic. It is used in this thesis. 
NAPT [11, 12, 13] is a widespread technology for connecting different IP realms, which 
are not directly routable. Through the translation of the IP/UDP header, both realms are able 
to establish indirect IP connection. The common implementation is the translation of private 
IP addresses used in LAN to public IP routable on the Internet. Translations of public IP to 
public IP or private IP to private IP are also possible. 
The NAPT device intercepts the IP packets and replaces the header and payload values, 
so that the IP packet can be forwarded to/from certain host. The common case is the dynamic 
translation private IP to public IP in the common DSL Router access scenario. The example 
in Figure 1.2, the NAPT device intercepts the packets from A to B and translates the private 
IP 10.0.0.1 in public IP 82.0.0.1. The new IP (82.0.0.1) address must be routable to the NAPT 
device from the Internet. The host B has public IP, thus 192.1.1.1. 
 
A NAPT table entry, called mapping or binding, is created for every session. The 
mapping (binding) is protocols dependent and can contain the IP and port parameters. The 
information in the entry (binding) must be sufficient for de-multiplexing the received packets 
to the right session. The combination of all parameters in the mapping entry must result in a 
unique session. Otherwise, the packet coming from the Internet cannot be mapped to the 
private IP.  
The NAPT is implemented in all Internet capable devices and operating systems: MS 
Windows XP/2K, Linux (ip tables), DSL routers and firewalls. The majority of the Internet 
access is using NAPT, like broadband, WLAN Hotspots, Cable Internet etc. For this reason, 
it is significant for this thesis. 
1.7.1 The controversy of NAPT  
NAPT is a very controversial function. It helps the network administrators and ISPs 
(Internet Service Providers) to grow their networks without changing the routing tables and 
without providing more IP addresses. This keeps the resources and investments very low. 
Furthermore, the end customers are no longer restricted to having just one computer, since 
the ISP assigns just one IP. Most DSL customers have multiple devices, like laptops, PCs, 
PDAs etc. 
NAPT brings enormous restrictions to IP communication. The end host is unaware of its 
communication address. Many IETF standards are drifted away from the reality, since the 
assumed transparent bi-directional connectivity is not present. Some of the protocols, like 
FTP, SIP, H323 etc, were redesigned. There are many documents written about NAPT 
properties [11, 12, 13, 14]. The major influences of NAPT can be summarised as follows:  
Figure 1.2: An example of NAPT 
Host A
10.0.0.1
10.0.0.0/2410.0.0.0/24
InternetInternet
Dst: 192.1.1.1
Src:   10.0.0.1
NAPT
Dst: 192.1.1.1
Src:   82.0.0.1
Binding 82.0.0.1 ~ 10.0.0.1
Host B
192.1.1.1
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• The translation at the NAPT device is unknown to the participants. The hosts 
are unaware of their translated IP/port. The IP/port changes without any 
notification. 
• Bundled sessions require payload translation, which is not always supported 
by the devices.  
• Dynamical NAPT does not support applications where the initiator is outside. 
Peer-to-peer services, like VoIP, cannot function in an NAPT environment. 
• The P2P applications are forced to deploy different architectures with 
external proxy. This leads to some further centralisation of services and 
leaving the P2P principles at network layer. 
• The behaviour of NAPT varies dramatically from one implementation to 
another. It is very difficult for the applications to predict or expose the 
precise behaviour of NAPT, which may exist in between. 
• Robust security in IP environments typically operates on an end-to-end 
model, where both ends include additional information in the packet to detect 
manipulation of the packets. NAPT changes the IP and TCP/UDP header 
values. If the security protocol protects against manipulation of the IP and the 
TCP/UDP headers, then the NAPT device translation will be treated as an 
attack. It is not possible to use protection of IP and TCP/UDP in an NAPT 
environment. 
• NAPT has no inherent failover. NAPT is an active in-band mechanism that 
cannot fail into a safe operating fallback mode. When a NAPT goes offline, 
all traffic through the device is dropped. An NAPT device is a single point of 
failure.  
• NAPT sits on the data path and attempt to process every packet. Obviously, 
there are issues regarding the bandwidth scaling. 
• With NAPT there is no clear, coherent, and stable concept of network 
identity. From outside, these NAPT-filtered interior devices are visible only 
as transient entities. 
• Policy-based mechanisms based on network identity, like Policy Quality of 
Service (QoS), cannot work through NAPT. 
• NAPT may drop IP fragments in either direction: without complete 
TCP/UDP headers, the NAPT may not have sufficient stored states to 
undertake the correct header translation. 
The major influence of NAPT in the Internet cannot be denied or underestimated. 
Currently, the NAPT feature is implemented in all customer routers (CPEs) and firewalls. 
Because of the slow migration to IPv6, it can be expected that NAPT will be present further 
in next decade. The Internet protocols and network architectures must be NAPT friendly in 
order to work properly. 
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2 Secure IP mobility 
This chapter focuses on the definition of secure IP mobility and analysis of the existing 
solutions. A detailed description of the Internet structures and relevant protocols can be found 
in appendix A, which should be common to the readers. The ideal high uses requirements are 
defined in 2.1. They are broken down to technical specification in 2.7 considering the 
physical limitations. The definitions are presented in 2.2. The influence of access network is 
described in 2.3. The influence of NAPT and of multi-homed hosts on the mobility is 
discussed in 2.4 and 2.5. The principles of mobility protocols are presented in 2.8 and 2.9. 
The potential solutions are presented and analysed in 2.10. Research projects are discussed in 
2.11. 
2.1 High-level description of secure IP mobility 
In order to communicate, the application opens a network socket, which is common name 
for bidirectional communication flow. For typical applications, it can be TCP stream socket 
or UDP datagram socket. From network perspective, the socket is characterized by four major 
parameters (quadruple): source IP, destination IP address, source port, and destination port. 
Every change of these four parameters leads to the fact that the application cannot 
communicate. On the one hand, if the destination IP or port changes, the sent packets get lost, 
since the values are incorrect. On the other hand, if the application’s source IP or port 
changes, it cannot receive packets. By every change of the quadruple, the socket must be 
reinitialised with the correct values. For example: if SIP [2] client changes its IP or listener 
port (UDP), no one can call this client until the SIP registrar is informed of the new IP and 
port. The notification for the new IP and port is done by registration in SIP [2]. 
In the context of this work, IP Mobility means keeping the same source IP and ports 
whist the host changes the networks. In this way, the application stays reachable and can 
communicate uninterrupted. The application does not have to re-establish the connection. In 
other words, Mobile IP is the ability to keep the network and transport layer constant from an 
application perspective when the host changes its network and transport parameter. The high-
level user requirement is: independent of the physical access medium and network to keep 
uninterrupted application communication.  
To achieve uninterrupted communication, the mobile host has virtual and physical 
network/transport parameters. The virtual parameters stay unchanged and they are used by 
the application. The physical parameters may change according to the current physical 
network. 
Security of IP Mobility means protection of all exchanged data between the mobile host 
and its mobile Gateway. This includes the exchanged application data and the signalling by 
the mobile protocol. The potential attacker is between the hosts, thus somewhere in the 
Internet. Any information helping an attacker to find private information must be secured. 
The communication must be protected between the originator and destination host. Solution 
with protection in hop-by-hop manner, like in SIP [2], is considered insecure. The SIP 
proxies (the hop) between the SIP clients have access to communication the in clear (without 
encryption).  
The definition of secure IP Mobility leads directly to the primary target scenario – 
overlay private network. The term “Mobile Virtual Private Network” (Mobile VPN) points 
out that there is protected overlay network. It can be compared to remote VPN access used in 
the most corporations. This remote secure access must work in mobile environment, thus 
mobile VPN. Figure 2.1 presents the scenario. There are three mobile hosts (A, B and C) 
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connected to mobile gateway. The mobile hosts and mobile gateway participate in the same 
private network, called corporate LAN in Figure 2.1. All hosts are connected to Internet, thus 
they are multi-homed having Internet and Corporate network. The Gateway has constant 
network parameter and the Mobile Hosts change frequently the networks. There are two 
overlay networks: one public (Internet) and one private (Corporate LAN). As already 
mentioned in 1.1, the overlay network allows the use of any form of communication, like 
peer-to-peer, when abstracted to application layer. In fact most of the know peer-to-peer 
applications, like Skype and Torrent-Clients, have client-server relation at network layer. The 
users have the same rights administratively, which forms peer-to-peer relation at application 
layer. 
2.2 Definitions 
Point of Attachment to Internet (PoA): An application is reachable from the Internet at 
certain IP address and TCP/UDP port. These parameters are defined as the Point of 
Attachment to Internet. They are a basic requirement to open a socket for the communication 
with the application. PoA defines an abstraction layer summarising all necessary parameters 
for communication with one application, such as TCP, UDP, ESP etc. A packet contains two 
PoAs of the destination and the source application. 
 
Location is synonym for Point of Attachment to Internet (PoA) of the host. 
 
Movement is a change of the PoA. The application is reachable under new IP and port 
after the movement. The word movement is used in an Internet sense and it may but does not 
have to be related to physical movement. 
 
Update is a procedure for informing the participant of the new PoA. For example, a 
registration of Mobile Node to Home Agent in Mobile IP [4]. It consists typically of request 
and response messages, which must be sent proactively by the hosts, which PoA has changed. 
An abstraction of the procedure is explained in details in 7.3.  
 
Location Update means update of the PoA parameter and it is a synonym for update. 
 
Signalling refers to the messages exchanged by the solution for maintaining the 
connection, like negotiation, updates etc. They do not contain the application data.  
 
Application data is generated by the end applications, like web, mail etc.  
Corporate
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LAN A InternetInternet
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Mobile Gateway 
Corporate
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Secure Connection
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Corporate
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Corporate
LAN C
Corporate
LAN C
Mobile Host B
Mobile Host C
Figure 2.1: Mobile VPN 
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2.3 Influence of network change on the mobility 
The Internet address structure defines that static IP ranges are allocated to the access 
network, thus changing the access network reflects in a change of the IP address. The socket 
parameters change (PoA) and the applications must establish a new connection. This means 
by every change of the network is expected a change of the host’s IP, thus disconnection. For 
example: changing (moving) from Wlan Hotspot to 3G (UNTS) will change the host’s IP. If 
host is changing (moving) between access networks in one provider, the host can be assigned 
the same IP. For example, the 3G (UMTS) network of one operator is geographically huge. 
The operator can implement solution, like link layer mobility, delivering the same IP in large 
area. The possibility is limited within the administrative domain of a certain operator and it is 
physically limited. This is not considered further in this text. 
Disconnection and reconnection (up/down event) to same access network does not 
automatically mean keeping the pervious IP address. The Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
assign the IPs randomly from IP pools. For example, disconnection of DSL line and 
reconnection will typically change the IP address. 
By every re-connection to an access network, an IP address change has to be expected, 
see Figure 2.2. The host must notify the participants that its IP has changed. Only after 
successfully update, it can receive packets.  
 
Movement of the host is expected by every change of the access network or reconnection. 
The mobile application must monitor the interface status and by up/down event must check 
the IP addresses. The participants must be immediately notified if the IP, and thus the PoA, 
has changed.  
2.4 Influence of NAPT on the mobility 
The Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) has a tremendous influence on the 
Internet connectivity. A NAPT is de facto standard in the broadband access, like DSL. The 
NAPT properties are presented in A.2.1. Here are discussed only the restrictions related to 
mobility.  
In the transparent Internet without NAPT, movement means local change of the network 
parameters. It happens mostly because of a change of the access network, which can be 
related to physical movement. Figure 2.2 shows an abstract example, where the host is 
changing its local public IP from 1.1.1.1 to 2.2.2.2 and to 3.3.3.3 
 
The situation becomes far more complicated in NAPT environments. When the host is 
behind a NAPT device, it has private IP address routable only in the LAN behind the router 
and not in the Internet (see A.2.1). The Internet partners sent packets to the public IP of the 
NAPT router. The router translates them to private IP of the host in the LAN and forwords 
Figure 2.2: Mobile host movement in a Internet without NAPT 
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the packets. This means that the PoA from Internet perspective is the one of the NAPT router 
and not the local network parameters of the host behind the NAPT. The PoA is under control 
of the NAPT router (NAPT binding entry, A.2.1) and the host behind NAPT is even not 
aware of it. A change of the binding entry at the NAPT router reflects in new public IP/port 
parameters of the application. From an Internet perspective, the application is reachable at 
new port or IP address. The host moves but it is unaware of it since there is no local change 
of its network parameter. A change of the NAPT can happen due to idle timeout of table 
entry or due to a new public IP address of the router as described in A.2.1.2.1. For example, 
the public IP addresses of DSL customers are rotated typically every 24 hours by the Internet 
Service Provides (ISPs).  
The NAPT influence is demonstrated in Figure 2.3 in context of a DSL Router with 
NAPT and host wired via Ethernet cable to the router. The host has local IP 192.168.0.2 and 
the application uses port 2000 at the host. The application starts communication to certain 
Internet host. At step A, the NAPT router creates a binding translation of 192.168.02:2000 to 
82.2.2.2:1024. The application is reachable from Internet Server at 82.2.2.2:1024. Assume 
that the application does not exchange information for e.g. 30 min, which is more than the 
typical binding idle timeout of 5 min. Then the binding is deleted at the NAPT router. At Step 
B, the application sends again some information to the same server. A new NAPT binding 
entry is created. It could be 192.168.02:2000 to 82.2.2.2:1025. The NAPT Router typically 
uses the next free port in the table. The application is reachable from Internet Server at 
82.2.2.2:1025. The PoA has changed, thus the host has moved. At Step C, the application 
keeps communicating, but the Internet connection is reset by the ISP. The NAPT router is 
assigned a new public IP address and this causes deletion of all bindings inevitable. The 
NAPT router creates a new binding on demand using the new IP address, in the example this 
is binding of 192.168.02:2000 to 82.3.3.3:1026. Again, the PoA has changed without 
changing the local IP parameters. The host is not aware of the NAPT binding and any change 
of NAPT device. The host moves even though it does not change its local parameters.  
 
There are two possible reasons for host’s movement (PoA change): NAPT table change 
or reattachment to new access network. The two mechanisms overlay and lead to complex 
movements of the host. A practical scenario is shown in Figure 2.4. The host is initially 
attached to the Internet via NAPT router, step A. The NAPT binding is updated and the host 
obtains new PoA at Step B. Later on at step C, the host, changes the access network and 
attaches to a new access network with new NAPT device. The mobile host is assigned the 
same private address as in first step, but the NAPT binding is different (The private address 
can overlap between different independent LANs). At step D, the host attaches to the Internet 
without NAPT devices. There is a movement in all of these cases, but local parameters 
change only at steps D.  
Figure 2.3: PoA change in NAPT environment 
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Every NAPT device between the communication participants adds a degree of mobility. 
There is additional probability for movement by every additional NAPT device. Multiple 
sequential NAPT devices are possible although currently unpopular.  
The main problem is that the host is not notified for any binding change at NAPT router 
as described in A.2.1. The host moves on the Internet sometimes without its knowledge as in 
Figure 2.3. The only way to determine its PoA and consequently a PoA change is to check 
pro-actively in regular intervals involving update procedure. The host sends notify to partner 
host which replies with the PoA of initiator in the payload (see definition in 2.2). To 
recapitulate: 
 
The host is not always aware of its movements regarding PoA, since some changes of 
PoA are caused by intermediate NAPT routers. The NAPT router gives an additional degree 
of mobility in general. The NAPT is a significant part of modern Internet access (A.1) and 
consequently, it must be assumed that the current hosts do not know their PoAs.  
 
In static environments, the applications assume that the NAPT binding will not change 
during the session. This strategy will not work in mobile environments where the network 
changes are frequent. 
2.5 Multi-homed hosts and mobility 
Multi-homed host has more than one IP address simultaneously. It is an effect of having 
multiple interfaces connected to different or the same networks. An example is provided in 
Figure 2.5. The host hast two interfaces, A and B, with two addresses 82.2.2.2 and 
145.253.2.2. In the same principle, the host can have a single physical interface, but multiple 
logical interfaces. Furthermore, the remote corporate access through the Internet causes 
multi-homed hosts too. The host has one IP address from the corporate network and one 
public IP assigned by the ISP. 
Figure 2.4: PoA change example  
Figure 2.5: Multi-homed host 
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Most modern smart phones have multiple physical interfaces like GSM, 3G (UMTS), 
Bluetooth and WiFi. When two or more interfaces are IP connected, the host automatically 
becomes a multi-homed host. The host has an IP address assigned from WiFi, GSM or 
UMTS interface. 
To understand the difficulties of mobile host with multi-homed hosts, it must be 
considered the process of setting source IP address at a host. Here is described the decision 
procedure of the connectionless UDP protocol, since the mobile protocols always operate on 
UDP, see 3.13. The TCP mechanism is different and out of scope.  
The first possibility is that the application can define the source IP address. The 
application must be pre-configured. Predefining the source IP address causes the use of the 
same IP address regardless of the outgoing interface. At first sign, it is a good choice. 
Unfortunately, this is a problem, since the chosen source IP address might not be routable 
through all interfaces. The Internet Service Providers (ISPs) implement anti-spoofing 
protection [3]. The anti-spoofing limits the use of source IP to the one assigned to the 
interface. Different IPs are filtered by the ISPs. Otherwise spoofing attacks will be possible 
on the Internet. To recapitulate, using a constant IP regardless of the interface is not possible.  
The second possibility for choosing the source IP is using the outgoing interface. This is 
the most common way. The application does not set the source IP and leaves the decision on 
the routing engine. The routing engine operates at network layer, thus lower than the 
application. The routing table defines the next hop and the outgoing interface. The IP of the 
outgoing interface is set as source address of the packet. (The IP addresses are assigned to 
every interface.) 
The routing table can change during one communication session. Those changes could 
reflect in a change in the outgoing interface and consequently the source IP. The routing table 
changes are triggered by different events, such as the status of the interface, DHCP 
configuration etc. If the host is running a dynamic routing protocol, the routing can change 
due to the update of the table by the remote peer. In order to know the source IP address for 
sure, the application must monitor the routing table. This is practically impossible since there 
could be numerous changes. 
In static environments, the applications assume that the routing table will not change 
during the communication. The applications check the routing table at the start up and keep 
the IP constant. Some applications monitor the state of the interface, which is obviously 
insufficient in gaining a conclusion on the outgoing interface. This mechanism works in static 
environments only. 
 
The routing table of multi-homed hosts is decisive for the source IP. It can change 
independently from the interface’s link status. Changes on the routing table are frequent in 
mobile environments. The application layer is not notified of these changes. Monitoring of 
the routing table is for the application almost impossible. Consequently, the application is not 
aware of its PoA changes.  
2.6 Tracing of physical location in mobile environments  
The mobile and security protocols, like Mobile IP [4, 6] and IPSec [27], have a major 
issue allowing an intermediate attacker to trace the physical locations of the mobile host. The 
temporarily IP addresses used by the mobile host for communication can be matched to 
physical location. Practically, the host movements, like going to hotel, to work, driving on the 
highway etc. The user ID, like Peter Schmidt, cannot be directly uncovered. The attack gives 
the movements of certain host. The user ID can be uncovered by using simple heuristics. For 
example, who is entering the WiFi HotSpot and which session gets active at the same time? 
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This problem in mobility and security protocols allows making profiling of physical 
movements, which is a major privacy thread. 
The scenario is shown in Figure 2.6 regarding Mobile IP and IPSec. An attacker taps 
(intercepts) all packets going to Home Agent (HA) or to IPSec Gateway regardless of the IP 
of the mobile host. This means it must be in front of the IPSec Gateway (HA) in the best 
case. 
 
In IPSec, there is data confidentiality but not for the Session ID. The headers of ESP [14] 
and AH [12] contain the Security Parameter Index (SPI), see A.2.2. The SPI value is unique 
for the gateway and constant during the IPSec session. The SPI is used to identify the 
Security Association (SA) for inbound processing at the peer. The SPI value stays constant 
for a long time and its change can be tracked during the Rekeying in IKE as the NAPT 
devices does, see A.2.2.10.6 and A.2.1.11. The attacker can match the SPI to all the 
temporary IPs. The Home Address or User ID is unknown. The attacker has a SPI and all 
physical locations in the time, thus a profile. As mentioned earlier, the user ID to SPI can be 
matched using heuristic observation.  
In the Mobile IPv4 [4] protocol, the registration message is authenticated but is not 
confidential. The Home Address of the Mobile Node is sent in clear as part of the registration 
request. The attacker can easily match the Care-of-Address (temporary IP address) to the 
Home Address. The attacker can find out where the mobile node is located and how it is 
moving. 
The Mobile IPv6 [6] uses IPSec for protection of the Binding Update which makes the 
protocols vulnerable in the same way. 
The tracking of the mobile session is serious deficit of IPSec and Mobile IP, which are 
the major protocols for mobility and security. All current solutions, see 2.10, have this issue 
and it is considered by the author as very serious problem. 
2.7 Requirements for secure IP mobility 
The high-end requirements defined in 2.1 are described here in technical terms. The 
common criteria are divided into three groups: 
General requirements: 
• The mobility must not involve special features by the intermediate devices, 
such as router, switches etc. The requested functionality must be 
implemented at the mobile hosts and at the gateway only. The solution must 
be possible in the heterogeneous Internet, where the devices are under the 
control of different ISPs. 
• The solution must be compatible to the current Internet with NAPT router 
and multi-homed hosts (see 2.4 and 2.5). The solution should not require a 
translation of payload by the NAPT routers (see A.2.1).v 
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Figure 2.6: Tracking of mobile hosts location 
2.7 Requirements for secure IP mobility 16   
• The solution must be supportable in IPv4 and IPv6. 
• The solution should integrate in the current network structures, such as AAA 
(Authentication Authorisation and Accounting) servers, firewalls routers. 
Without this integration, a practical implementation becomes almost 
impossible. 
• The Internet hosts must not support any features in order to communicate to 
mobile host. The mobility features must be supported at mobile host and its 
mobile gateway (Mobile IP terminology Mobile Node and Home Agent). 
 
Requirements on mobility: 
• The solution must deliver IP mobility, thus keeping the same IP address 
while changing the access networks (see 2.8). IP mobility allows the 
transparent use of all IP based protocols, without any need for specific 
changes in previously developed applications. 
• Mobility must be independent from the link layer. Changing the different 
types of access networks, such as from UMTS on WiFi, must not interrupt 
the connection insofar as IP connectivity is available. 
• The mobile host is unaware of its PoA, thus its Internet IP and port. The only 
way of detaching the PoA is executing proactively an update procedure in 
some intervals. The procedure updates also the current PoA at the 
participants. 
• The bandwidth must be used efficiently. The signalling packets should be 
proportional to the network changes and host movements. When the host 
moves rarely the signalling must be low, and vice versa. 
 
Security requirements: 
• The mobile signalling and application data must be: authenticated, encrypted, 
replay and integrity protected. 
• The session must not be traceable to IP address. Header information, such as 
session ID’s, can be static during the session. This allows an attacker to map 
certain sessions to PoA. The IP addresses are physically allocated and the 
attacker can trace the physical movements of the mobile host in this way. 
This must be avoided in M-VPN. 
• The principle of Perfect Forword Secrecy must be implemented, see 
A.2.2.6.3. The compromising of a single private key must not lead to the 
compromising of other keys.  
• The solution must deliver security between the Mobile Host and the 
Gateway. The intermediated devices are not considered trustful. Solutions, 
like hop-by-hop protection implemented in SIPS [2], do not deliver the 
required security. In the hop-by-hop solutions, the connection is only 
protected between the clients and proxies. The data in the proxies is 
unprotected, thus in clear text. 
The requirements in terms of security and mobility are delivered from a practical 
experience. They do not try artificially to tie the circle of possible solutions, in order to 
develop research work. Currently, there is a big gap between the theoretically developed 
protocols and the real implementation requirements as shown in 2.10. The primary target is to 
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achieve acceptable mobile solutions, which can be implemented in the current Internet 
structures. 
2.8 Principles of mobility 
Network mobility means changing significant network parameters and at the same time 
keeping the communication sessions active. Significant network parameters are usually the 
device (service) identifiers, such as the MAC address, IP address, TCP or UDP port, URL 
etc. When some of the identifiers change, the data cannot be delivered to the destination. To 
overcome this situation, there are two alternatives:  
• First alternative is to inform the communication node of the new identifier. 
This requires certain features at the node, like redirection in HTTP protocol. 
• Second possibility is to map the current identifier to the original one at some 
intermediate node.  
The first alternative is not suitable, since the mobile nodes will not be able to 
communicate with the majority of the Internet hosts, which do not support the required 
features. The second possibility is implemented in the mobile protocols. The mobility 
protocols create dynamic mapping on some of the communication elements, like end hosts or 
intermediate devices. The change is transparent for applications and does not require any 
special features. Depending on the mapped identifier, the protocols can be classified in 
different groups. For example, Mobile IP deals with mobility on IP layer. 
2.8.1 Layer of delivery and operation for the mobility 
The mobility must be defined regarding the layers in first place. Layer of delivery denotes 
the transparent layer enabled by the protocol. The applications benefit from this transparency. 
For example: constant IP addresses means delivering the network layer, like in Mobile IP. 
The mobile protocol operates at certain layer, called Layer of operation. Most of the mobile 
protocols operate at application layer, like Mobile IP where the signalling is done using an 
application layer. It can be achieved using lower layers, like in 3G networks. 
In this thesis, the target is to achieve network layer of delivery, called IP mobility. There 
is simple principle: the lower the layer, the more protocols are served. For example: FTP 
Clients must not be rewritten if the network layer and above do not change.  
Which is the optimal layer of operation for mobility protocol is an important question for 
the design. It can be answered by discussing the typical layers for home broadband 
connection, see Figure 2.7. The principle is the same even there can be different layers, like 
in 3G networks. The operation layer should not be interrupted. Otherwise, the intermediate 
device must support the protocols. For example, the NAPT device interrupts the transport 
layer, since it manipulates the ports in TCP/UDP. When the protocol operates at transport 
layer, NAPT device must support its header. The device must handle the header in an 
equivalent way to TCP, UDP, ICMP etc. Without supporting the protocol, the packets will be 
dropped.  
Bringing new features to the intermediate devices requires investment and a lot of non-
technical organisation work, which can take several years to set up. This is not a realistic 
strategy in the heterogeneous Internet. For this reason, the mobility protocol must operate at 
application layer.  
The mobile protocol must operate at application layer and deliver a constant network 
layer. The controversy exists in that the higher layer must deliver lower layer features. 
Normally it is exactly the opposite: the features of the lower layer enable higher layer 
properties. This problem is solved by tunneling described in the following chapter.  
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2.9 Tunneling for enabling mobility 
The controversy of the last chapter that the higher layer must deliver lower layer features, 
can be solved by using tunneling. The basic idea is to encapsulate parts of the packet again in 
new packet. This can be achieved at every layer and two examples are shown in Figure 2.8. 
The original packet, in white in the figure, is transported in the application layer of GRE or 
ESP packet, see a) and b) in Figure 2.8. The receiver of the tunnelled packet must de-
capsulate and forward the original packet to the application. The connection is transparent for 
the application. The mobile solutions use always some type of tunnel. The tunnel itself has 
some disadvantages:  
• It brings an overhead of packets because of the encapsulation. Increasing the 
overhead decreases the useful data, which can be transported in one packet.  
• A second disadvantage is the sub optimal routing. The packets are routed to 
the tunnel destination and then to the inner packet destination. This is not the 
shortest (optimal) path.  
• The tunnel causes some mixture of the layers, so the IP or UDP header can 
be met twice in the same packet. The packet structure becomes complicated 
and some inter-layer relations cannot be always treated correctly. 
 
Tunneling is unavoidable in the mobile protocols, which operate at the application layer 
and deliver network layer functionalities. For Example, the Mobile IP [4] operates at 
application layer and uses tunneling for delivering constant IP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Layers typical broadband connection 
Figure 2.8: Tunneling 
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2.10 Existing approaches for secure IP mobility 
Many efforts are carried out focusing on mobility. The protocols claim to solve the 
mobility problem that is investigated in this section. They deliver partial security according to 
2.6 in combination with security protocols. The solution candidates are classified into groups, 
depending on their properties:  
• Combination of mobile protocols and security protocols at different layers  
• Security with mobility features in the same layer 
• Protocols at research stage with new ideas 
2.10.1 Mobility and security at different layers 
A common idea is to separate the mobility and security in two different layers. The 
advantage of this solution is to use already existing protocols without any new developments. 
The two-layer principle is the same for all mobile protocols- one layer for mobility and one 
for security. The most popular representative is Mobile IP [4, 6] with IPSec [13]. Other 
mobility protocols such as Network Mobility [10], Hierarchical Mobile IP [11] and Proxy 
Mobile IP [52] are briefly overviewed, since they do not change the working principle and 
the conclusions. Overlaying of mobility protocols with other security protocols such as SSL, 
SMIME does not change the working principle. These change the security layer and are 
application specific, thus more restrictive. They are not presented here, since IPSec delivers 
the most straightforward implementation. 
2.10.1.1 Mobile IPv4 overview 
Mobile IP (MIP) is a popular protocol for achieving IP mobility. The protocol is specified 
for IPv6 in [6] and for IPv4 in [4]. The focus in this section is on Mobile IPv4. The Mobile 
IPv6 is described in 2.10.1.4. 
The key elements and the terminology are provided here to align all readers. Details on 
the protocol can be found in [4, 6]. The hosts (nodes) in Mobile IP are classified as: 
• Mobile Node (MN) is a host or a router that changes its point of attachment 
from one network to another. It obtains a new IP address by every change. 
• Home Agent (HA) is a router on a Mobile Node's home network. It tunnels 
the datagrams for delivery to the Mobile Node when it is away from home. It 
maintains the information of the MN’s current location. 
• Foreign Agent (FA) - A router at a Mobile Node's visited network, which 
provides routing services to the Mobile Node in the visited network.  
• Correspondent Node (CN) - An Internet node without any mobile 
functionality, which communicates with the MN. 
 
The Mobile Node (MN) has two IP addresses: care-of address (CoA) and home address. 
The home address is constant and used to communicate with the other hosts (Correspondent 
Nodes). This address is part of the Home Agent network. The care-of addresses are the 
transport IP’s assigned by the visited network. This temporary address is used to build a 
tunnel from Home Agent to Mobile Node. The original packet is encapsulated in the IP 
packet with care-of address. The general structure is shown in Figure 2.9.  
The packets sent to the home address of the Mobile Node are intercepted by the Home 
Agent (HA), step 1 in Figure 2.9. The HA tunnels the packets (IP in IP [8]) to the current 
location of the Mobile Node, step 2 in Figure 2.9. The Mobile Node or optional the Foreign 
Agent decapsulates the packet. The Mobile Node (MN) can reply directly to the 
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Correspondent Node, step 3 in Figure 2.9. Optionally, the MN can use reverse tunnel to the 
Home Agent [7]. The HA decapsulates and forwards the packets to the CN. The Foreign 
Agent can also perform encapsulation of the tunnel instead of the MN. When the MN 
changes it PoA it notifies the HA of its new care-of-address. 
The Mobile IP (MIP) provides integrity protection of binding updates during the 
registration. The signalling in general is not confidential. The confidentiality is a retirement 
for mobile IP security as described in 2.6. Protection of application data is out of scope of 
Mobile IPv4, so this must be done by some other protocol, such as for example IPSec. The 
possibility for protection of signalling and application data with IPSec is presented in 
following chapters 2.10.1.2 and 2.10.1.3.  
 
The main limitation of Mobile IPv4 is the assumption that the Mobile Node is aware of 
its PoA and changes of it. The Mobile Node must send binding update by every PoA change. 
The contrarily was clearly shown in 2.4 for NAPT environments and in 2.5 for multi-homed 
hosts. Therefore, Mobile IPv4 cannot work in the current Internet structures with NAPT and 
on multi-homed hosts. 
2.10.1.2 Mobile IPv4 over IPSec 
The first possibility is to protect Mobile IP (MIP) with IPSec as under layer. The 
constellation is shown in Figure 2.10. IPSec session is established from the MN to the IPSec 
Gateway. The IPSec Gateway is in front of the Home Agent from MN perspective. The MN 
can register and send packets to Home Agent (HA) through the IPSec protection. The IPSec 
tunnel is point 2 in Figure 2.10, which protects the Mobile IP protocols at point 3. Reverse 
tunnel [7] must be used in this case, so that the packets are transmitted through the tunnel.  
The HA is logically behind the IPSec gateway denoted as the Intranet. An Intranet could 
even have private IP addresses, which are not routable from the Internet. The mobile 
signalling is encrypted, integrity protected, and authenticated which was a necessary point for 
secure IP mobility as defined in 2.2. The Mobile IPv4 does not implement confidentiality 
(encryption) of the signalling.  
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Figure 2.10: Mobile IP over IPSec 
IntranetIntranet
Home
Network
Home
Network
Foreign
Agent
Visited
network
Visited
network InternetInternet
HA
Mobile Node
Correspondent
Node
IPSec
Gateway
1
3
2IPSec
2.10 Existing approaches for secure IP mobility 21  
If the IPSec Gateway and the HA are implemented in different devices, then IPSec in 
Tunnel mode must be used. The Tunnel at MN must use the care-of address as a source IP, 
since this is the only routable address. If the IPSec Gateway and the HA are implemented in 
the same device (same IP) then transport mode can be used. In transport mode, there is not 
need for intranet IP addresses. 
There are two major problems using Mobile IP over IPSec regardless of tunnel or 
transport mode of IPSec operation: 
• IPSec uses the care-of address to establish the IPSec session. This address is 
temporary and changes every time the mobile host moves to a different 
foreign network. This means that when changing a visited network, a new 
IPSec session must be established. This is practically a controversy to 
mobility – the IPSec session is static. The reestablishment requires resources 
and time. If host is moving very frequently, it may even occur that there is 
not enough time to negotiate the IPSec session.  
• The Foreign Agent cannot be used in the registration, since the traffic 
between the MN and IPSec gateway is encrypted. The FA cannot inspect the 
headers as defined in [4]. The FA must not be involved. Use of hop-by-hop 
protection, thus one IPSec session from MN to FA and second from FA to 
HA, is considered as unsecure as defined in 2.7. 
 
To recapitulate, the Mobile IP over IPSec is not a reasonable alternative, since the IPSec 
session must be re-established with every movement of the mobile host. Furthermore, no 
Foreign Agent can be used. 
2.10.1.3 IPSec over Mobile IPv4 
The security protocol can be set on the top of IP mobility. The representative case is 
shown in Figure 2.11, where the IPSec gateway is behind the HA. The Mobile IP (MIP) 
session is established, see point 2. The IPSec is transported in the Mobile IP tunnel, see point 
3. The HA forwards the IPSec packets to the IPSec gateway. 
 
The Intranet, which is accessed via IPSec, is part of the home network. This is exactly the 
inverse case to the one described in 2.10.1.2. From a routing perspective, this case can be 
split into three sub cases, which are:  
1) The HA and the IPSec gateway can be installed at the same host. The HA and IPSec 
gateway will be the same node with the same IP address. The IPSec must not be 
encapsulated in Mobile IP tunnel and a lot of overheads will be saved. The IP-in-IP 
tunnel [8] described Mobile IP [4] can be replaced by IPSec tunnel. 
2) HA and the IPSec are different hosts. This is presented in the Figure 2.11 and taken 
as an example. The IPSec must be encapsulated in the Mobile IP-in-IP tunnel. This 
multiple encapsulation leads to a lot of overheads (Figure 2.12) and it is not very 
comfortable. The outer IP header (CoA in Figure 2.12) contains the care-of address 
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of MN and the HA’s address. The packet can be routed between the MN to HA, see 
Figure 2.12. The second IP header (Ha) contains the home address of the MN and the 
IPSec gateway address. In this way, the IPSec gateway communicates with a constant 
Mobile Node home address. When IPSec is used to access to corporate network, then 
the IPSec can be in tunnel mode. The inner IP header (Ca) contains the corporate IP 
addresses. There are three IP headers and two UDP/TCP headers in this 
encapsulation. This is obviously not ideal and significantly reduces the real data 
payload. In practical terms, there are two tunnels IP-in-IP and IPSec tunnel. The 
IPSec session must not be re-established when the MN attaches to a new access 
network. 
3) The IPSec gateway can be on the Internet. Consequently, the Intranet is not part of 
the home network. The HA decapsulates the tunnelled packet from the MN and 
forwards the IPSec packet to the IPSec gateway on the Internet. The whole IP packet 
must be encapsulated in the same way as shown in Figure 2.12. The return transport 
is exactly the opposite. 
 
IPSec secures the data exchange between the Mobile Node and the Home Agent . The 
IPSec session is carried out in tunnel IP-in-IP or MIP. The advantage of this type of 
implementation is that the IPSec must not be re-established when the user changes its IP.  
 
The main issue is that the Mobile IP itself is not protected by IPSec. The IPSec is over 
Mobile IP and cannot protect the lower layer. A man in the middle attacker can read passively 
the mobile signalling. The registrations are authenticated in Mobile IP and cannot be 
manipulated but in cleat text. A major requirement for secure IP mobility is not fulfilled and 
therefore, the solution is not acceptable.  
2.10.1.4 Mobile IPv6 and IPSec protection 
The Mobile IPv6 [6] is designed for working in IPv6 [5] environments, as the name says. 
The Mobile IPv6 profits from the gained experience of IPv4 networks. It takes also advantage 
of the new IPv6 features, such as the additional header extension for optimal routing, called 
routing header option. Details for Mobile IP can be found in [6]. The node types are shown in 
Figure 2.13. The major differences to Mobile IPv4 can be found in RFC 3775 [6] and can be 
summarised as: 
• There is no need for a Foreign Agent (FA). Mobile IPv6 operates without any 
special support at the visited network which a bing advantage for the 
deployment.  
• Mobile IP is part of the standard IPv6 stack and mobility functionality can be 
expected in every native IPv6 host. Most of the packets are sent direct from 
the Mobile Node to the Correspondent Node using direct mobile binding. 
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• Route optimisation is part of Mobile IPv6 and standard feature. The route 
optimisation in IPv4 is usually blocked by the anti-spoofing (ingress 
filtering) at the ISPs. The Mobile IPv6 allows coexistence of route 
optimisation and anti-spoofing filters. 
• To increase the security of the direct binding, the return routability procedure 
is defined. 
• Mobile IPv6 is independent of the link layer, because it uses the Neighbour 
Discovery [18] of IPv6 instead of ARP mechanism of Mobile IPv4  
• The IPv6 encapsulation (and the routing header) removes the need to manage 
tunnel state in Mobile IPv6. 
The mobile host receives its global care-of address through the IPv6 address 
configuration. The IP configuration can be stateless [19] or statefull [20]. Then, the Mobile 
Node builds an association with its Home Agent, called binding. The binding is a mapping of 
MN’s care-of address to the home address for a certain time (lifetime).  
 
The Home Agent adds an extension routing header type 2 to the IP packet [6], when 
sending a packet to the Mobile Node. The packet structure is shown in Figure 2.14 a), where 
MIP denotes the mobility header. The field msg. data in Figure 2.14 is the mobility message 
sent in MIP. The routing header type 2 (rout. ext in Figure 2.14 a) specifies the home address 
of the Mobile Node. The destination option (dest.opt.) of the IP header (home address opt) is 
used by the sending packet from the Mobile Node to the Home Agent. The option contains 
the home IP address of the Mobile Node. The dest.opt. is not used when the HA sends to the 
MN. The IP header has the source IP of the Home Agent and the destination of the Mobile 
Node care-of address (CoA). 
 
The Home Agent intercepts all packets sent from the Correspondent Node to the Mobile 
Node and tunnels them in IP-in-IP [21] to the care-of address, when the Mobile Node is away 
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Figure 2.14: Mobile IP header structure with and without IPSec protection 
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from its home network (step 2 in Figure 2.13). The mechanism is quite similar to the Mobile 
IPv4 tunneling . The packet structure is shown in Figure 2.14 b).  
The Mobile IPv6 is part of the standard protocols stack and mobility support can 
therefore be expected by all Correspondent Nodes. The main resultant advantage is the 
routing optimisation. The Mobile Node and the Correspondent Node can establish binding 
and exchange packets directly with each other, step 3 in Figure 2.13. The binding is 
established using a return routability procedure. In general, the procedure conducts a simple 
check against spoofing. The binding messages are transmitted in two redundant ways: 
directly from the Mobile Node to the Correspondent Node and the secondly and indirectly 
through the Home Agent. The binding is established only when both messages are received. 
The binding messages are tunnelled through the Home Agent as shown in Figure 2.14 b).  
There are possible two IPSec sessions in Mobile IPv6: (1) Application data protection 
between the Mobile Node and the Home Agent in the case of Tunneling, see section 15.7 of 
[6]. (2) Protection of the Mobile IP signalling from Mobile Node to the Home Agent 
described in [22]. 
The ESP in tunnel mode replaces the IP-in-IP tunnel by the protection of the data 
exchange (step 2 in Figure 2.13) between the Mobile Node and the Correspondent Node 
through the Home Agent. It is also used by the return routability procedure. The payload 
structure is presented in the Figure 2.14 d). The ESP header is over the IP header and protects 
the Mobile IP messages and the application data from/to the Correspondent Node.  
ESP protects the mobile signalling messages between the Mobile Node and its Home 
Agent in transport mode shown in Figure 2.14 c). The binding updates are in the payload of 
ESP protocols. There is no need for tunnel mode, since the receiver of the IPSec packet is 
also the receiver of the end Mobile IP packet.  
The exchanged data and the mobility signalling are protected according to the Mobile 
IPv6. The prime target for authentication, encryption, and integrity is met in this is way. 
Unfortunately, the current specification of ESP [14] cannot cover this type of implementation 
as described in [22]. The source and destination IP addresses in one ESP communication 
must be constant as described in A.2.2. Every change to the IP addresses or port during the 
session causes disconnection. The IPSec does not include any mechanism for address update 
and relys on the constant IP parameters. In practical terms, a new ESP session must be 
established as by Mobile IPv4 with every change of the care-of address.  
The authors of Mobile IPv6 suggest in [22] changes to the IKEv1 [15] and ESP [24] 
implementation to overcome this. The basic idea is that Mobile IP must control the IPSec SA 
and SDP parameters and change them depending on the Mobile Node movements. With 
every change of the care-of address, the Home Agent updates the new address in the current 
IPSec SA and SPD. The changes can be summarised as: 
• When the Mobile Node receives ESP packet, the route header type 2 must be 
considered as the destination of the packet. In this way, the received packet 
can be preceded by the selectors of the SPD. 
• The SPD policy must be deactivated when the Mobile Node returns to his 
home network, thus no IPSec. 
• When the Home Agent sends packets to the Mobile Node, the correct care-of 
address must always be set by IPSec. IPSec cannot handle changing care-of-
address. There are two possible solutions: 
o IPSec stack works with the home IPs, which is constant. The packets 
are intercepted after the IPSec encryption and the care-of-address is 
set. 
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o Direct API interaction with the SPD and SAD, thus IPSec becomes 
mobile.  
• When the Mobile Node sends IPSec protected binding messages to a 
Correspondent Node, the IPSec must use the right addresses. It is the same 
problem as the previous point. 
• When the Mobile Node receives a changed set of prefixes from the Home 
Agent, a new security policy must be configured. 
• The Home Agent must consider the routing option of the received packet as 
the source address of the packet in order to match the SPD. 
• The ESP header does not protect the outer IP header with the source and 
destination IP. Possible attacker can manipulate the outer header. The binding 
IP must be included in the ESP payload and thus protect it. This is done with 
the use of a destination option in the binding updates and mobile prefix 
solicitation.  
• The Home Agent must take significant care of matching the IPSec ID and the 
mobile IP bindings. Mobile node must be prevented by using its security 
association to send a Binding Update for another node. The Home Agent 
must carefully match the IDs in the two layers. 
• Circular dependencies must be avoided. For example: An IKE session is 
required for proceeding a binding update and in the same time to establish 
IKE session is required a binding update. 
• The Home Agent and the IPSec Gateway must be implemented on the same 
host, see 2.10.1.3 
 
The Mobile IP and IPSec are tied in one implementation - they cannot be implemented in 
two independent layers. The IPSec stack must be changed in order to work with Mobile IP, 
because Mobile IP should control the IP addresses in the SAD and SPD. Changing the IPSec 
implementation stack has influence on all other protocols using IPSec. Even there are not 
currently implementations of IPSec with Mobile IPv6 the following problems can be pointed 
out: 
• The changes of IKEv1 to support Mobile IP lead to interoperability 
problems. There will be two implementation types: with Mobile IP and 
standard IKE. This is considered as potential source of many failures. 
• The movements of the Mobile Node can be easily traced. The IPSec session 
uses a constant SPI, which can be matched to physical care-of-addresses. The 
target of the secure mobility is also to hide the movements of the host 
between the access networks. 
• Matching the IDs between the IPSec and Mobile IP is very important. The 
SPD entries must define which credential of IKE phase 1 can be used to 
protect certain Binding Updates. Otherwise, session hijacking attacks can be 
carried out by insider. The Mobile IP must authorise the IKE ID for certain 
mobile binding. The only possible way to implement this is the inspection of 
Mobile IP packets by the SPD selector. After the packet is decrypted, the 
SPD verifies that the packet matches the policy defined by the selectors (see 
A.2.2.4). At this stage, an inspection of the Mobile IP binding can be made. 
This requires joined database between IPSec and Mobile IP, which can be 
very difficult. 
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• Every time the Home Agent changes its prefix, a new security association 
must be negotiated. 
• When a host is used by multiple mobile users, they can use the same IKE 
phase 1, since IPSec protects the communication between the hosts. The 
authentication credential used in IKE phase1 will be the same for all user of 
this host. The same IKE credentials will be used to send bindings for 
different users. The Home Agent cannot determine a misuse within this group 
of users and this is a theoretical issue. To overcome this issue, for every user 
different ID in IKE phase 1 must be used. 
The IKEv2 [23] is the successor to IKEv1 and is much closer to mobile IP requirements 
than IKEv1. The IKEv2 and Mobile IP must be tied together even using new version. 
The Mobile IPv6 with IPSec is certainly much closer to the required secure mobility than 
the Mobile IPv4 solution. Unfortunately, IPv6 is not currently implemented on a large-scale 
basis by the ISP and the mobile operators (Status Q1 2009). The operators are currently 
evaluation the all-IP backbones. The practical experience on global IPv6 backbone is far less 
then IPv4. There is still no reliable road map by the ISPs for IPv6 implementation.  
2.10.1.5 Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 with IPSec protection 
The Mobile IPv6 have been designed for providing mobility at heterogeneous Internet, 
like using smart phones with constant IP addresses instead of phone numbers in CDMA2000 
[26]. Implementing Mobile IP in large backbones and especially in wireless networks arise 
the following issues [11]: 
• Every time the Mobile Node changes its care-of address, it must send binding 
updates to the Home Agent and optionally to all Correspondent Nodes, when 
not using tunneling. The binding update requires 6 packets [6] according the 
return routability procedure. This reflects in delay of about 2 times the round-
trip (if all nodes have the same time distance between them and the Home 
Agent registration is done in parallel to the Correspondent Node updates). 
This handoff delay decreases the performance of the Mobile Node connection 
and running application. Supplementary, it generates loads on the access 
network, which is the most expensive part of the network transport.  
• The Mobile IP structure is flat and strongly concentrated at the Home Agent. 
The Mobile Nodes always update their binding to the Home Agent, which is 
the central instance. To avoid load concentration at one node, there is a need 
for logical distribution between the nodes part of the same administrative 
domain. 
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Hierarchical Mobile IP was defined in order to solve these issues and improve the Mobile 
IP performance [11]. The Hierarchical Mobile IP is add-on to Mobile IP, which adds new 
features to the current Mobile IPv6 specification.  
A new node type is introduced, called Mobility Anchor Point (MAP). The new node 
functions as a local Home Agent. It keeps a track of the current location of the Mobile Node 
and tunnels the packets from the Correspondent Node to the Mobile Node. It can be 
compared to the Foreign Agent in Mobile IPv4. The main difference is that it is an optional 
element and must not be presented at every visited network. The Mobile Node is free to use it 
or not. The Figure 2.15 presents the structure. The Mobile Anchor Point (MAP) is a back-to-
back user agent. From a Mobile Node’s perspective, it serves as a Home Agent. The MAP is 
the Mobile Node from the perspective of the Home Agent and the Correspondent Nodes. It 
can be compared to Proxy, thus back-to-back agent.  
The Mobile Node (MN) registers at the MAP, shown at step 2, Figure 2.15. The MAP 
cannot authenticate the MN. On behalf of the Mobile Node, the MAP sends a binding update 
to the Home Agent (step 4, Figure 2.15). Then it tunnels all packets between the 
Correspondent Nodes and the Mobile Node (step 2, Figure 2.15). The Home Agent makes a 
tunnel to the MAP node and MAP to the Mobile Node. When the Mobile Node is moving in 
the administrative domain of the MAP, the binding is not forwarded to the Home Agent, 
since from HA perspective there is no movement at all. 
The MAP is an intermediate device breaking the flat Mobile IP structure into a 
hierarchical one. This significantly reduces the number of binding updates at the access 
network. Furthermore, it hides the exact location of the Mobile Node from the Correspondent 
Nodes. There is additional delay, because of the two steps forwarding “Correspondent Node -
> MAP -> Mobile Node”. 
To secure Hierarchical Mobile IP with IPSec is a difficult task. As already mentioned, the 
MAP is Home Agent from MN perspective. The MN establishes IPSec connection to the 
MAP node. The MAP node can itself establish IPSec to the Home Agent. The MN must trust 
the MAP node. MAP is part of the access network and probably of the control of not trusted 
authority, like HotSpot in a hotel. If the MAP is part not trusted, the mobile mode must not 
use the benefits of the MAP node. In this case, it will function like a standard Mobile IP v6. 
The MAP and MN must have trusted relation in order to protect the communication with 
IPSec. In this case, the properties described in 2.10.1.4 are valid. 
 
The MAP should be in the same trusted domain as the Home Agent. In this case, the 
security issues are the same as Mobile IPv6 with IPSec. If MAP is not part of the trusted 
domain, then there is no sense in building IPSec sessions to it. On the other hand, the whole 
point of MAP is not to be in the same trusted domain. Hierarchical Mobile IP makes no 
significant difference to the security mechanism to the one in Mobile IPv6.  
2.10.1.6 Proxy Mobile IP 
Proxy Mobile IP enables mobility to hosts without any mobile features, like Mobile IP. 
The mobility is delivered by the network and not by the host itself, thus the intelligence is at 
the network and not at the end device. The protocol is specified in [52] for IPv6 and in [53] 
for IPv4. The motivation for the protocol is mainly 3G networks (cellular networks) where 
few operators serve large physical areas. The protocol will allow the operators to assign 
constant IP to the cell phones, which can be used for VoIP in NGN. The advantage is that the 
operators can guarantee service delivery without changing the end devices.  
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The main properties are described in the following paragraph and then analysed regarding 
Mobile VPN usage. More details can be found in [52, 53]. The Proxy Mobile IP protocol 
bases on Mobile IP and defines two new key elements: 
• Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) is the Home Agent for the Mobile Node in a 
Proxy Mobile IP domain. It is the topological anchor point for the Mobile 
Node's home network prefix(es) and is the entity that manages the Mobile 
Node's binding state.  
• Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) is a function on an access router that 
manages the mobility-related signaling for a Mobile Node that is attached to 
its access link. It is responsible for tracking the Mobile Node's movements to 
and from the access link and for signaling the Mobile Node's local mobility 
anchor. 
The Mobile Node (MN) establishes a point-to-point connection the access router with 
mobility functionality (MAG), step 1 in Figure 2.16. The MAG authorizes the MN node if it 
can be served with mobility and which is its Home Agent (HA). At next step 2, the MAG 
connects the Local Mobility Anchor and performs Proxy Binding Update. The LMA has local 
HA functionality and manages the MN bindings. The LMA may connect the HA for 
obtaining the Home Address of the MN at step 3, if it not locally cached. On successful 
Proxy Binding Update, the MAG assigns to the MN its Home Address. The Mobile Node 
uses its home address for communication, thus the MN does not have any Care-of-Address. 
For communication to the MN, the Correspondent Node sends the packets to the HA. They 
are forwarded to LMA, MAG and the MN. If the Corresponded Node has Mobile 
functionality, it may communicate directly to LMA as described in Mobile IPv6. 
 
The main idea is that to assign the MN its Home Address and in this way, there is no need 
of any mobility functionality at end host (no Care-of-Address at host). This requires that the 
access router must support mobility functionality. This can be achieved when single operator 
controls the network, like a 3G operator can enroll mobile functionality to all access routers 
and control them. 
Proxy Mobile IP requires functionality of the access network, thus intelligent network. A 
main requirement on Mobile VPN, see 2.6, is that the mobility must not require special 
features of the intermediate network devices, like routers and switches. The Proxy Mobile IP 
has the scope of 3G backbone solution and not general Internet solution. There is not realistic 
to consider that the subscribers of WLAN Hotspot and DSL are going to enable the feature. 
The Proxy Mobile IP is not considered further for Mobile VPN, since it does not targets 
heterogeneous Internet.  
Figure 2.16: Proxy Mobile IP 
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2.10.1.7 Network Mobility (NEMO) with IPSec 
The network mobility protocol (NEMO) [10] treats networks and not single hosts, as the 
Mobile IP does. It can practically manifest itself in the example of a moving train. The hosts 
inside the train can be the laptops of the passengers. The hosts in the train are static to each 
other and part of one network. The network is moving through different access networks.  
The protocol is extension of Mobile IPv6 and its global structure is shown in Figure 2.17. 
The hosts in the mobile network do not need any mobile functionality and are not aware that 
they are part of the mobile network.  
The Mobile Router (MR) is a new node type, which registers at HA in a similar way as 
the Mobile Node does. The MR registers not a single address, but one or multiple network 
prefixes (Step 1, in Figure 2.17). A Correspondent Node can send packets to a host part of the 
network (Step 2, in Figure 2.17). The packets are intercepted by the Home Agent and 
forwarded in tunnel to the mobile network (Step 1, in Figure 2.17). There is no direct binding 
between the Correspondent Node and the mobile router, thus all packet are routed through the 
Home Agent. The protocol makes minimal extensions to the classical Mobile IPv6.  
 
In fact, the same result as by Network Mobility (NEMO) can be achieved with the 
classical Mobile IP. The mobile host must simply run routing (static or dynamic routing 
protocol) and the Home Agent must treat the tunnel as an interface. 
The tunnel between the Mobile Router and the Home Agent is build with Mobile IPv6. 
The security mechanism is the same as in Mobile IPv6 described in chapter 2.10.1.4. 
2.10.1.8 Conclusion of two layer solutions for secure IP mobility 
The IPSec under Mobile IPv4 [4] cannot be used to protect the signalling and the 
application date, since a new IPSec session must be negotiated with every change of the care-
of address. When using IPSec over Mobile IP the mobile signalling is unprotected and can be 
manipulated. 
Concerning Mobile IPv6 [6] can be concluded that the IPSec policy must be changed. 
This requires changes in the IPSec stack, which can cause interoperability problems. The 
main problem with Mobile IPv6 is that it requires IPv6. There is no currently reliable time 
schedule for IPv6 deployment with the major Internet service providers.  
A general problem for IPSec is that the connection can be traced. The SPI number in the 
ESP header is constant during the session, so it can be mapped to a care-of-address. The 
physical movements of an unknown user can be traced in this way. 
 
The two layers solution cannot meet the requirements of chapter 2.6. The problem is of a 
principle nature. The security protocol is defined for static IP addresses, thus it cannot be 
located on the layer under the mobility. If security is over the mobility layer, it cannot protect 
Home
network
Home
networkMobile 
Router
LANLAN Internet
Internet
Home Agent
Static hosts Correspondent
Node
2Visited
Network
Visited
Network
1
Figure 2.17: Network mobility 
2.10 Existing approaches for secure IP mobility 30   
the mobility signalling. This dilemma cannot be solved without bringing mobility at the 
security layer and vice versa. 
2.10.2 Secure protocol with mobile features 
A different approach is to integrate the mobility and security in one protocol, thus single 
layer solution. The development of IKEv2 [23, 27], ESP [24] and AH [25] opened new 
possibilities for secure IP mobility. The main reason for the new standardisation was the big 
gap between the real implementations and the standard of IKEv1 [15] and ESP [13] as 
described in A.2.2.10.  
2.10.2.1 Overview of IP Security v2 and Internet Key Exchange v2 
IKEv2 [23] and ESPv2 [24] do not specify new features in the first line. Most of the 
features were already existing RFCs or draft standards. The main differences relevant for 
mobile security are: new database type, simplified negotiation, more authentication 
algorithms, new processing rules, NAPT support, compression algorithm, and encryption 
methods. Without going into deeper details, they are shortly explained in the following 
paragraphs.  
A new database, called Peer Authorization Database (PAD) [27], was created. It enables 
the interaction between the SPD and the IKE. The database: 
• Identifies the peers that are authorised to use IPSec entity 
• Gives the possibility for specification of authentication protocol for each peer 
• Provides the authentication data, for example: passwords 
• Defines the IPSec SA, which can be created based on the IKE session 
• Optionally contains information about the location, such as the IP address or 
DNS entry 
The PAD is a reflection of the current complexity of the authentication policies. One 
IPSec gateway serves multiple administrative domains such as the user, guest, special 
departments etc. All of these groups have different authentication algorithms and access 
rights. Together with the SPD, the PAD database builds something like a higher layer firewall 
with different policies. 
The second new extension, which is relevant for the secure mobility, is the method of 
matching the inbound ESP packets. By processing inbound traffic, SA matching can be made 
with [27]: 
1. Combination of SPI values, destination address and source address 
2. Both SPI and destination address 
3. Match on SPI only 
The closer match has the highest priority. This brings advantages for the mobility, 
because the source/destination IP address is not decisive. 
The IKEv2 reduces the number messages and the protocol states. This improves the 
mobility characteristic of the protocols through increasing the probability for successful 
establishment. The communication consists of request and response messages for every 
exchange. The IKEv2 does not differentiate in phase 1 and phase 2. The IKEv1 was designed 
to work with different protocols, but this idea has failed. The IKEv2 does not try primarily to 
support protocols other than IPSec (ESP, AH). Consequently, there are no phase 1 or phase 2.  
The negotiation has different exchanges. The IKE_SA_INIT exchange negotiates 
cryptographic algorithms, exchanges nonces, and does Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DH). 
The following exchange, IKE_AUTH, authenticated the previous messages, exchange 
identities and certificates. The IKE_AUTH messages are encrypted and their integrity 
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protected with keys generated in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange. The identities are hidden from 
intermediate attackers. The IKE_AUTH creates also the first IPSec SAs (inbound and 
outbound). It corresponds to the phase 2 (Quick Mode) in the IKEv1. The 
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange generates supplementary IPSec SA (in IKEv2 phase 2). The 
exchange starts after finishing the IKE_SA_INIT and can be in parallel to IKE_AUTH. It 
generates new key material with Diffie-Hellman. It sets the protection algorithm and defines 
the connection selectors. The selectors correspond to the ID payloads in Quick Mode in 
IKEv1. 
IKEv2 supports multiple authentication possibilities. For example, the initiator can use 
password based EAP [31], like EAP-MSCHAPv2, and the responder can use the digital 
signature with certificate [32, 33]. This is a great advantage, since the initiators (client) do not 
usually have a certificate. 
The following Figure 2.18 shows packets exchange, where the initiator authenticates via 
EAP-MSCHAPv2 and the responder with digital signature. In the first packet, the initiator 
sends Security Association proposals (SAi1) for the protection of IKE negotiation, see Figure 
2.18, packet 1. The responder replies with the chosen algorithms (SAr1), its DH values, 
nonce and certificate request. The further communication is protected with the DH key 
negotiated in the first two messages. In the third message, the initiator sends its ID, certificate 
request, SAi2 parameter for the IPSec session and the traffic selectors. The traffic selectors 
are very important, when the IPSec is used in tunnel mode. They contain the information 
which traffic must be routed in the IPSec tunnel. Notice that the client does not answer to the 
certificate request (CERTREQ) message, which indicates desire to use EAP authentication 
(indirect announce for EAP). The responder sends its certificate, signed hash value, EAP 
value in message 4. The 5th and 6th message transport the EAP authentication. The 7th 
message is the signed hash of the payloads. The last message is the IPSec SA parameter and 
the traffic selectors from the server. In general, the EAP payloads are directly transported as 
described in [31]. More details and different negotiations can be found in [23].  
 
The abbreviations for the header are: 
 
AUTH Authentication 
CERT Certificate 
CERTREQ Certificate Request 
SK{} Encryption 
 and integrity protection 
EAP Extensible Authentication 
HDR IKE Header 
IDi Identification - Initiator 
Dr Identification - Responder 
KE Key Exchange 
Ni, Nr Nonce 
Initiator Responder
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni 
HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERTREQ,] 
[IDr,] SAi2, TSi, TSr}
HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] 
AUTH, EAP }
HDR, SK {EAP}
HDR, SK {EAP (success)}
HDR, SK {AUTH}
HDR, SK {AUTH,
SAr2, TSi, TSr }
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Figure 2.18: IKEv2 negotiation with EAP and digital signatures 
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SAi/r Security Association 
TSi Traffic Selector - Initiator 
TSr Traffic Selector – Responder 
 
The next new feature in IKE v2 concerns fragmented packets in the negotiation. The 
experience with IKEv1 shows that sometimes the UDP packets need to be fragmented. 
Typically, when certificates are used in the authentication. The certificates with 2048 bit key 
(currently standard) are commonly bigger then 1500 Byte and cannot usually be transported 
in a single UDP datagram. The problems arise since the NAPT devices can drop the 
fragments in order to have short transition delays (see A.2.1.9). Furthermore, firewalls treat 
out of sequence fragments as an attack and consequently drop the fragments too. The IKE 
negotiation cannot be finished when the packets are dropped. To solve this problem in 
IKEv2, the peers can send a URL link to their certificate instead of sending the certificate 
itself. The packets stay small and do not need to be fragmented. The negative effect of this 
solution is that accessing this link can cost time. When multiple retries are needed, this can 
cause a timeout by the sender and it will start a new negotiation. A circular dependency 
without solution will be the result. It is not clear how the application can solve this issue.  
The IKEv2 extends the use of tunnel mode with ability for configuration of the initiator 
and responder. The new feature is motivated by the high deployment of the non-standardised 
CONF_MOD in IKEv1 (see A.2.2.10.8). The new feature defines 
"CFG_REQUEST/CFG_REPLY" and "CFG_SET/CFG_ACK" exchanges. The first 
exchange allows an IKE endpoint to request information from the peer. The peer can assign 
parameters such as IP address, DNS, WINS etc. This is very useful when using IPSec for 
remote access, where the client (initiator) does not have a pre-configured IP address. The 
gateway maintains IP pools, DNS server parameter etc, which are assigned to the client. The 
"CFG_SET/CFG_ACK" allows an IKE endpoint to push parameters to its peers. The peer 
can accept this configuration and use it for the tunnel. This parameter can be a static IP 
address for example. The set configured must be carefully considered, since attacks can be 
run from inside. The insider attack can try to acquire a higher privilege level by pushing a 
malicious configuration. Both configuration exchanges are executed before the IPSec SA 
creation and are usually part of the IKE_AUTH exchange. 
2.10.2.2 IKEv2 Mobility and Multi-homing Protocol (MOBIKE) 
IKEv2 itself does not provide any mobility support. The MOBIKE [28, 29] protocol is 
bringing mobility to the IKEv2 [23] and ESPv2 [24]. The protocol defines extensions to the 
existing IKEv2 specification, which are briefly described in this section. 
The MOBIKE defines a new notification payload called UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES. 
The extension payload is sent by the initiator to change the IP address in the IPSec SA and 
IKE SA. The main principle in MOBIKE is that only the initiator of the connection can 
change IP parameter of the IPSec SA at the responder. After the responder receives this 
notification, it will change the address of the IPSec SAs. The notification is encrypted with 
the IKE SA session. The notification cannot be replayed by attacker and in this way, the 
IPSec session cannot be directly hijacked by attacker. The main problem is that the IP/port is 
part of the header, which is unprotected see 2.4 and 2.5. The IP/port parameters are extracted 
from the unprotected packet header. A man-in-middle attacker changes the IPSec SA 
parameter indirectly. An attacker must intercept and drop some of the IKE SA packets. This 
will motivate the initiator to send notification. The attacker can manipulate the header of the 
notification message. 
Another MOBIKE extension is the list of alternative peer’s IP addresses, called 
ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and/or ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS. If one of the 
addresses is not responding, then the initiator can try the next. The IP addresses are 
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exchanged in the authentication (IKE_AUTH) or with separate notification. This improves 
the possibility of reaching the peer. For example: if the peer is multi-homed it can certainly 
send all its addresses. If one of the IP becomes unreachable, the connection can be moved to 
the new one.  
IKEv2 has a peer’s status detection mechanism, formally known as Dead Peer Detection 
(DPD). This is an empty IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL message. It allows to detect if the 
currently parity is reachable. The Dead peer detection is notation of the IKEv1 [16], in IKEv2 
status detection is used instead. The status check is typically done when no data is received 
from the peer for a long period. The payloads NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP and 
NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP are used in the INFORMATIONAL message to 
detect if the NAPT mapping (binding) has changed. The responder of message must include 
the received packet in the reply, so the sender can compare with the sent one. When the 
mapping has been changed, the peer must immediately send an update of SA 
(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES). The update can also be send by suspicions that the mapping 
has changed. 
If the peers have multiple addresses, the status check procedure (DPD) can test the paths. 
Path denotes a combination of the initiator and responder address and port. There are multiple 
paths when a peer has more than one address. An active path is one in current use. A working 
path is the path, which can be used for communication. The initiator must be aware of all 
working paths (address combinations). This reduces the time for switching between the paths, 
when one of the addresses becomes unreachable. For this purpose, a new procedure “Path 
testing” is defined in MOBIKE. The initiator tests whether the responder is reachable through 
certain path. IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL request/response messages are used, thus the same 
by status detection. Implementations may execute path testing to find alternative or better 
paths, even there is currently an active path. The procedure for testing the path is called return 
routability check. The procedure is one of the new extensions and recommended behaviour. It 
should be executed before updating the IPsec SAs. It may also be executed during the session 
for any other purpose. The cookie values protect against replay attacks.  
These are the major new components of MOBIKE [28, 29] in IKEv2. 
2.10.2.3 MOBIKE for secure mobile connections 
MOBIKE is making a big step towards improving the security of mobile connection. The 
IETF working group has understood that the two layers model suggested in Mobile IP is not 
working. Although its advantages, there are numerous still open issues. The reason for them 
is the static origin on IKEv2. The mobility extensions are pushed down to the static IKEv2. 
The core IKEv2 protocol is kept and the extensions cannot overcome the restrictions.  
After analysing the specification of IKEv2 and MOBIKE, the author points the following 
short comings: 
• The physical locations of the Mobile Nodes are traceable as described in 2.6. 
The IPSec SPI parameters are constant during the session and are part of the 
ESP header. 
• The MOBIKE requires about 8 exchanges to establish IPSec SA, see Figure 
2.18. This is not optimal for mobility protocol and leads to problems with fast 
moving devices. The connection can be dropped before final establishment. 
• When using certificates for authentication, the connection negotiation can 
increase by many minutes. As discussed in 2.10.2.2, instead of certificate, the 
peer can exchange URLs for accessing the certificates. The URLs (web links) 
use typically HTTP, which has different network requirement (timeout) then 
mobile protocols. If there are packet losses, the initial download of a 
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certificate can take minutes. This is unacceptable for the mobile negotiation, 
where the host can move in this time. The IKE session is dropped before 
authenticating. There is need for caching to overcome this, which is not part 
of the implementations. 
• The protocol is not optimising the status check messages and nat-keep-alive. 
The both updates are executed at constant interval (see section 4 in [54] and 
section 2.23 in [23]) regardless of the network properties and the host 
activates. The result is wasted resources in not needed updated and long 
disconnection times. This was main target of Mobile VPN, see 1.3.2. 
• There are status checks for every: active IPSec SA, IKE Session and potential 
path, see [28]. All these checks generate a big amount of updates messages 
executed at constant intervals in parallel, see 1.3.2. The updates have an 
overlapping functionality.  
• The MOBIKE requires some changes in the IKEv2 protocol in the status 
synchronisation procedure (formally Dead-Peer-Detection). The change 
reduces the IKEv2 ability to react properly with NAPT mapping change [28, 
section 3.8]. When the NAPT mapping is reset, the receiver must not use any 
authenticated packet to adjust the SA source port and IP parameters. This 
change in the standard IKEv2 leads to packet loss, when the NAPT mapping 
is deleted during an active IPSec session. There will probably be two IKEv2 
versions: for MOBIKE and static (with and without this change). 
• The MOBIKE uses the major principle that only the initiator can change the 
IPSec SA IP parameter see 2.10.2.2. The result is that the IKE SA parameters 
can be changed by the both peers and the IPSec SA only by the initiator. This 
significantly complicates the state synchronisation and can lead to packet 
loss. Practically, the IP addresses and port in IKE and IPSec SA can be 
different. Usually the IKE SA uses the address of the last received packet for 
the response. If the NAPT device deletes the mapping, than the IPSec SA 
address becomes different to the IKE SA (assuming IKE packet were 
received from the new binding). All data packet are lost, since the IPSec SA 
parameters are not correct (showing to the old binding). Only after receiving 
information notice can the IPSec SA be updated.  
• The protocol has a problem when moving between networks with NAPT and 
without NAPT. Assuming that the communication starts in NAPT-free 
network, then no NAT-keep-alive is activated. If the host moves to NAPT 
network during the session then the NAPT mechanism must be activated. 
The IKEv2 detects the NAPT existence only at the beginning, so in this case 
the protocol will fail. 
• The rule, that only the initiator can change the IPSec SA parameter is 
unsuitable and it is bad defined. The IP/UDP parameters are manipulated by 
NAPT devices and (or) by intermediate attack. The IP/UDP values are not 
trusted by default and there is no difference between the “good” NAPT 
device and the “bad” attacker. A man-in-the-middle attacker can manipulate 
the packets and cause changes to the IPSec SA parameter as the NAPT does. 
The principle that only the initiator can change the IPSec SA parameter does 
not really increase the security. It leads to packet losses and complicates the 
protocols significantly.  
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• The MOBIKE is supporting the tunnel mode of IPSec only. The transport 
mode is not specified. The deployments can use only tunnel with ESP/AH. 
The ESP tunnel cannot satisfy all practical requirements, like AAA 
integration, forwarding performance, etc. There are stable implemented and 
already industry proven tunnels (like PPP), which are much more suitable for 
the current provider infrastructure. They work with AAA, are hardware 
accelerated etc. For example: PPPoE is implemented by the millions of aDSL 
subscribers. A new tunneling protocol requires huge investments for high 
scale implementations. 
2.11 Related research projects for secure mobile networks 
There are numerous institutes and groups working on mobility and security. The topic is 
not new and a lot of work has already been done by the researchers. In this thesis, we are 
using the experience and conclusions made in these projects. Most of them have different 
targets and implementation status. They are presented in the following sections. 
2.11.1 Secure Mobile Architecture (SMA) 
The Secure Mobile Architecture (SMA) [34] is a research project for creating a 
framework for secure mobility. This framework architecture enables individual design that 
solves specific deployment requirements. The SMA is developed by the Open Group [35], 
which is a vendor-neutral consortium. The main task of this group is to develop open 
standards between the enterprises for secure mobility and to increase the interoperability in 
this way. Involved in the development of SMA are: University of St. Thomas, USA [36], 
Boeing Technology (Boeing Company) [37], NetMotion Wireless [38] and others. There are 
currently test implementations at the Boeing network and no commercial deployments have 
been announced. 
 
The Secure Mobile Architecture [34] delivers secure IP mobility on a high scale basis 
using popular protocols (Popular denotes draft or industrial not RFC protocols). There are a 
number of extensions defined, but the core bases on existing services. The application data 
are protected by IPSec protocol. The signalling is protected depending on the server but 
mostly SSL/TLS. 
The architecture is shown in Figure 2.19. The hosts should use public/private key for 
authentication with x509 certificates (step 1 in Figure 2.19). The mobile host downloads the 
security policy and mobility information from Network Directory Services (NDS). The NDS 
holds the data in a virtual directory (step 2 in Figure 2.19), which contains information of the 
IP address and mobility policy information. The current location of the communication host 
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is obtained from the Location Enabled Network Service (LENS), step 3 in Figure 2.19. The 
LENS is a real-time location service giving the current location of the host. This type of 
service is typically designed for emergency calls with VoIP or location information in maps. 
After the policy and the current location are presented, the both hosts start negotiation 
directly. The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [39] is used for session key generation, 
authentication and algorithm negotiation. The data are protected by the ESP protocol with 
HIP tag extensions described in [40]. 
The SMA framework requires special features at all communication participants. It is an 
Intranet solution where the network is controlled by a single provider (or group). Deployment 
in heterogeneous structure such as the Internet is not realistic, since it is not possible to 
implement this protocol stack in all participants. A host cannot communicate when it do not 
support these features. Furthermore, the NDS and LENS server are not currently available on 
Internet. The concept of location delivery is currently not fully clear, and thus how it can be 
implemented. The NAPT problem is not considered either, thus where no the direct 
communication is possible. There is need for specific proxies in NAPT environments. 
The SMA is suitable for close Intranet environments (the Intranet must not be restricted 
to a small network). In this thesis, the emphasis is on open structure, which can be deployed 
in the heterogeneous Internet without changes on all carrier networks. The SAM require that 
all participating host must support mobility feature in order to communicated which is not 
acceptable for Mobile VPN as pointed in 2.7. 
2.11.2 Enabling efficient and operational mobility in large heterogeneous IP networks 
(ENABLE) 
The ENABLE [41] is an EU-funded research project, which concentrates on mobility in 
IPv6 networks. It targets an efficient mobility in large heterogeneous IPv6 networks. It will 
enhance the basic mobility provided by Mobile IPv6 with set of additional “premium” 
services, such as multi-homing, fast handovers and operator policies for service activation. 
The project develops long-term strategy for Mobile IP development. The project coordinates 
and gives input to the working groups in IETF, 3G, WWW etc. The project aims the 
developing real prototype, where firewalls, authentication, NAPT etc, system are working 
together.  
Telecom Italia coordinates the project. Major partners are: Consulintel Corp.(Spain), 
Georg-Augus-Universität (Göttingen, Germany), Siemens AG, University of Murcia (Spain), 
Waterford Institute of Technology (Ireland), Brunel University (England), Huawei 
corporation (China).  
The project has published numerous drafts in the area of application key management for 
Mobile IP [42], Network-based Localized Mobility Management [43], AAA with Mobile IP 
[44] and others. The major difference to this thesis is that this project works only on IPv6 
including Mobile IP [6] and HIP [39] as a basic protocol. In this thesis, the practical solution 
researched includes IPv4. The IPv6 research is a long-term solution, which is not possible on 
the current IPv4 Internet. 
2.11.3 Mobile IP group by ComNets 
This is a research group on Mobile IP at department of Communication Networks 
(ComNets) of the University of Bremen [45], Germany. Its primary task is to research and 
develop advanced wireless technologies for providing continuous network access 
connectivity. The research focuses on (text source [45]): 
• Integrated network platforms based on mobile Internet and multi-hop ad hoc 
protocols 
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• Performance evaluation and optimisation of Mobile Internet Protocols 
through theoretical analysis, simulation modelling and prototype 
development 
• Determine the impact of mobile Internet protocol overheads to a range of 
applications such as IP-Telecommunications, FTP and the World Wide Web 
• Improve the performance of the mobile Internet protocols by, 
 the elimination or reduction of protocol overheads such as 
Mobile Node hand-offs 
 the integration of heterogeneous wireless technologies and 
multi-hop ad hoc networks 
 providing enhanced terminal mobility via the concurrent 
utilisation of all available overlay networks (wirelined and 
wireless) in an intelligent manner that suits the users profile 
and the needs of the communications. 
 
Findings and results have been published and presented at the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF). Some of the published works are [46, 47, 48]. The research project stress ad-
hoc networks and not the security of mobility IP networks. 
2.11.4 Security Research Group at Microsoft Research Labs 
Microsoft Research [51] labs are playing an active part in the IETF Working groups. One 
of the scopes of the research lab is Mobile IP Security, where the group has major influence 
over the Mobile IP standard [6]. Some of the publications are [49, 50]. The research group is 
not focusing directly on mobile VPN and it is mentioned here because of its general 
importance on Mobile IP.  
2.12 Conclusion 
Finding a secure mobile solution based on current protocols is no trivial task. The Mobile 
IPv4 was developed in 1996 by IETF. The protocol was rewritten in 2002, the success of 
Mobile IPv4 seems only to be at research level and partially in CDMA 2000. Its successor, 
Mobile IPv6 improves the protocol properties significantly and it will be part of all IPv6 
implementation. The Mobile IPv6 will be part of the future IPv6 backbone, but there are less 
ISP deployments currently.  
The first solution candidate is using two-layer principle - one layer for mobility and one 
layer for security. In the 2.10.1 is clearly shown that this type of solution has design problem. 
The mobile signalling cannot be protected since the security layer cannot be under the 
mobility. The mobility layer provides the static layer for the security session. Furthermore, 
Mobile IPv4 is not compatible to NAPT. The two-layer solution cannot principally fulfil the 
protection of the mobile signalling. 
A different approach is the one layer solution. The best representative is the MOBIKE 
protocol based on IKEv2, see 2.10.2. The solution combines security and mobility in one to 
achieve mobile security. The protocol is a huge step to the necessary solution, but suffers 
from practical disadvantages. The deficits are a consequence of the static IKEv2 protocol see 
2.10.2.3. 
The use of IPSec as a protection makes the session traceable. A man-in-the middle 
attacker can trace physical movements. Even without knowing the exact used ID in the 
session, this is a security problem. 
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All existing candidates for secure mobility have a lack of efficient location update 
mechanism (called natt-keep-alive, dead-peer-detection, status check or path testing). The 
updates are suboptimal regarding disconnection and network load. An efficient mechanism 
executes updates depending on the movements of the Mobile Node and the network status see 
2.6. The target is, on the one hand, to reduce the update number to save network resources 
and on the other hand to minimize the disconnection time. This can be achieved by smart 
distribution of the updates as shown in this thesis see chapter 7. 
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3 Mobile Virtual Private Network 
Mobile Virtual Private Network (Mobile VPN or M-VPN) is a new protocol delivering 
secure IP mobility. It introduces new features and covers the opened issues described in 
chapter 2. The M-VPN consists of three sub protocols, which together deliver secure IP 
mobility: 
• Mobile Key Exchange (M-KE) is a protocol for the negotiation of session 
parameters in mobile environments. The peers are identified, authenticated 
and authorized during the negotiation. The protocol delivers crypto 
algorithms, session key, session ID etc, for the following protection protocol 
M-SE. The protocol operates over IP/UDP. Its structure is described in 3.5 
and it is fully specified in chapter 4.  
• Mobile Secure Encapsulation (M-SE) protects the communication in mobile 
environments. The protocol secures the application data and mobile 
signalling through encryption, authentication, integrity check and replay 
protection. The M-SE has an anti-tracing mechanism, thus the session cannot 
be matched to IP addresses. The protocol works on an application layer and 
delivers transparent transport layer. The applications can use the transport 
layer (TCP/UDP) directly or can implement an IP tunnel. The protocol itself 
does not have tunnel properties. It integrates existing tunnel protocols, like 
L2TP or GRE. The structure of M-SE is described in 3.6 to 3.11. Chapter 5 
gives the technical specification. 
• Mobile Location Update (M-LU) is a mathematical algorithms description 
rather than a technical specification. The protocol optimises the update 
intervals regarding minimal disconnection and resources. This is a very 
important requirement for the mobility. The structure of the M-LU is 
presented in chapter 7. The M-LU is derived in chapters 8 to 10. 
3.1 Principles of Mobile VPN  
The IP header currently has dual purpose for host identification and network routing. The 
PoA parameters cannot be used for the identification in the mobile environments (def: PoA - 
IP, TCP, UDP, ESP etc.). The network parameters can frequently change during one mobile 
session because of change of the access network.  
The dual purpose is split between PoA and M-SE. The PoA parameters are used only for 
transport to the destination. The packet is identified at the M-SE layer independent from the 
PoA parameters. The main principle is that if the packet is authenticated, then it must be 
assigned to the right session regardless of the network or transport parameter. The M-KE and 
M-SE do not rely on the identification of under layers, i.e. IP or UDP parameter. 
The PoA parameters can be replaced by intermediate NAPT devices or by an attacker. It 
is not possible to differentiate between “good” and “bad” header manipulations. For this 
reason, the PoA parameters are considered untrustworthy. If the IP and UDP are not trustful, 
then their influence on the security layer must be considered carefully. For example: ICMP 
notification for path MTU discovering (see A.2.2.7) [2] or host unreachable [3] must be 
carefully inspected and their influence on the security reduced. The restriction must be done 
using the local policy created and defined by the administrator (see 6.2). 
The NAPT devices are used in most of the Internet access networks as shown in A.2.1. A 
protocol friendly to NAPT must in general follow the client-server architectures at network 
3.2 Targets of Mobile VPN 42   
layer. Peer-to-peer at network layer is not possible behind dynamic NAPT router, because of 
the unidirectional establishment of the session. In protocols like SIP [4] the NAPT was not 
considered by the protocol design, which led to dramatic problem when implementing the 
security [6].  
It must be pointed out that peer-to-peer architecture depends on the abstraction level. It is 
possible to develop peer-to-peer topology at higher layer, where on network layer is user 
client-server architecture. In fact, most of the peer-to-peer networks (file sharing) have client-
server architecture at the network layer (Skype, DC++ etc.). M-VPN implements client-server 
model at a network layer. It can deliver peer-to-peer abstracted at the higher application layer. 
Peer-to-peer topologies are described in 3.3. 
The M-VPN must achieve maximum effect with minimum resources. The protocols must 
be simple to implement and based on existing crypto libraries. Complex protocols are 
difficult to understand and there is a higher risk of misunderstanding or wrong 
implementations. A modern protocol must integrate existing stable libraries, so that fast 
implementation is enabled. The use of common libraries increases the interoperability.  
The protocol is not starting on a green field. The companies and Service Providers have 
already network infrastructure and use already authentication and authorisation servers. It is 
not realistic to consider that a protocol can succeed, when it does not fit in the established 
networks types and AAA processes.  
3.2 Targets of Mobile VPN 
The protocol concentrates on delivering secure IP mobility to the current Internet using 
the gathered experience on the existing protocols. The technical targets are: 
• Protecting the mobile signalling and application data with encryption, 
authentication, integrity, and reply protections as defined in 2.6. 
• The location updates must be proportional to the mobile host movements in 
order to reduce the host and network resources. More movements are 
reflected in more updates and vice versa.  
• The protocol assumes that the mobile host is not aware of its PoA parameter. 
(see 2.4 and 2.5). The mobile host may use mobile gateway to be informed 
for it’s PoA. The procedure is denoted as location update in 2.2. 
• The M-VPN protocol must use IP and UDP for transport. The use of TCP is 
not possible, since it requires static IP addresses. Furthermore, the use of 
TCP for transport causes serious problem by packet losses as described in 
3.13. 
• The protocol must build a client-server model. A peer-to-peer connection 
could be built at higher abstraction layer. 
• The M-VPN protocols must itself implement datagram fragmentation in 
difference to IKE and ESP. The reason for fragmentation is that the network 
layer does not have the capacity to transport the data in one packet. In this 
case, the data is split and transmitted in multiple fragments. M-VPN is 
running over UDP and according the RFC 768 [9] fragmentation must be 
done at the IP packet. The IP fragments may be dropped by the NAPT 
devices if they are received out of sequence, as described in A.2.1.9 [11] 
(Firewalls have the same behaviour). The firewalls also treat out of sequence 
fragments as potential attack. In wireless networks (3G, WiFi), it is normal to 
receive out of sequence IP packets. To overcome this situation, fragmentation 
in the M-VPN protocols must be done and the UDP header left complete in 
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all packets. To increase the performance, the fragmentation must be carried 
out only in M-KE and as rarely as possible. 
• The protocols must be able to work in fast changing networks. Circular 
dependencies can occur in this type of networks, when the inner processing 
time of the packets is longer than the interval between the host movements. 
For example: when authentication request is processed by the server for 20 
sec and the Mobile Client is moving every 10 sec. During the processing of 
the message, the transport parameters alter. The response packet cannot be 
sent to the current PoA of the mobile host, since it has moved to a new one. 
To avoid circular dependences, polling and caching mechanisms must be 
implemented in the M-KE protocols. The caching delivers the ability for fast 
processing of repeated requests (see 3.5).  
• The protocol should integrate the existing cryptographic algorithms. Fast 
deployment due to existing libraries and high security due to already deeply 
studied properties, can be delivered in this way. 
• Already implemented authentication mechanisms must be supported. For 
example EAP [7] and RSA [8] signatures are widespread and there is no 
reason to replace them. 
• The protocols must support the existing authentication, authorisation and 
accounting structures, like Radius servers. 
• The M-VPN protocol should not have tunnel features. These should be 
delivered by well-established protocols, such as L2TP (PPP) [13]. The 
creation of a new tunnel protocol is not very suitable, because it requires new 
authentication and new hardware acceleration cards (see 3.3.1). Another 
major advantage is the ability to separate Tunnel Node and the Mobile Node 
at different hosts (see 3.3). The tunnel protocols will typically deliver IP 
connectivity, but it could also deliver constant link layer. 
• The packets to the MN are routed in a tunnel interface using standard routing. 
Interception, as in Mobile IPv4, can cause problems with the link layer 
security infrastructure. The actions of the Home Agent (HA) in Mobile IPv4 
can be treated as an attack, since the HA hijacks the ARP [7] mapping of IP 
to Ethernet MAC.  
• To facilitate the assigning of IP parameters, the tunnel must be implemented 
as virtual interface. (IP parameters can be assigned only to an interface) 
• The protocols should be carrier grade in the sense of delivering a pan 
regional backup possibility and the ability for load sharing.  
• The new applications are required only at the end hosts, thus Mobile and 
Server Node (see 3.3). The protocol must be transparent for the intermediate 
Internet devices, like routers, firewalls etc. 
• Route optimisation should be supported. It is not a primary target of the M-
VPN protocol, since it is not always possible in NAPT networks as described 
in 3.2.1.  
• Bundled session must be avoided, since they have problem with NAPT 
devices, see A.2.1.5. 
• The protocols must support IPv4 and IPv6. 
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These technical requirements are result of the experience on IPSec and Mobile IP and 
target easy and efficient integration.  
3.2.1 Route optimisation in Internet  
Route optimisation means direct communication between the hosts using the shortest path 
from a routing perspective. Proxies break the direct communication, because the packets are 
routed first to the proxy and then to the destination host. This leads to suboptimal routing, 
which increases the communication delay. An example is a host in Germany using a proxy in 
Japan to browse web pages in France. The packets are first routed from the German host to 
the proxy in Japan and then are routed back from Japan to the web server in France. The 
delay will be significantly bigger then a direct communication from the German client to the 
web-server in France.  
 
The route optimisation is a big advantage of the IP network. Unfortunately, this is not 
always possible in NAPT environment (see A.2.1). The dynamic NAPT allows the 
connection to be initiated from inside only. Direct connection in the routing sense is not 
always possible. There are five different constellations: 
• Only one of the hosts is behind a NAPT device, Figure 3.1 a). In this case, 
routing optimisation is possible, but the connection must be established from 
inside the NAPT, step 1. The connection from out side would fail, see step 2 
in the figure. 
• Both hosts are behind the same NAPT device shown in the Figure 3.1 b), for 
example the same WiFi network. Route optimisation can be used if the 
communication between the hosts is not restricted by a firewall.  
• Both hosts are behind different NAPT devices, shown in Figure 3.1 c). This 
is a very common scenario, when the host hosts access Internet on different 
physical location. For example: WiFi hotspots in Munich and Frankfurt. 
None of the host can establish direct connection to the other one, because 
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both of them are behind of NAPT router. Route optimisation is not possible 
and the hosts must communicate through a proxy.  
• Both hosts can be behind the same NAPT device, but the communication 
between the hosts is restricted by firewall (shown in Figure 3.1 d). Most of 
hotspot providers restrict the communication between the hosts in the LAN 
(“hub-and-spoke”). Even in the same network, the hosts cannot communicate 
directly with each other. This restriction at the local firewall is done for 
security reasons (protection against local LAN attacks). Although it is very 
controversial, the policy is in place. 
• There is no NAPT between the devices. This is the best case, where route 
optimisation is certainly possible. 
The route optimisation is not possible in many real cases. It is even difficult for the hosts 
to determine the exact NAPT constellation. The private IPs used behind the NAPT usually 
overlap and therefore, the knowledge of the IP address is insufficient to determine if the hosts 
are in the same network. Trying to exchange packets is the only way to find out if direct 
communication is possible. Sending packets and waiting to see if there is an answer, is not 
ideal for real time applications. There are protocols, like ICE [12], which try interactive to 
established direct connection when possible. The protocol is an extension of SIP [4] and 
controls the target IP addresses in SDP. The experience of ICE protocol shows that the 
benefits of trying on-the-fly to optimise the connection are far less than the implementation 
complexity. There are more states and error combinations. 
Interactive re-routing to a shorter path is a security issue too. A possible attacker can try 
to hijack a connection by pretending to be closer to the destination host. The security 
structure and states become more complicated and the risk of implementation defects 
increases.  
The network topology in mobile environments changes frequently because of host’s 
movements. The topology can change from transparent to behind different NAPT routers, 
thus from Figure 3.1 b) to c). Monitoring and switching during the communication require 
many resources on the mobile hosts. The communication session becomes very instable due 
to packet losses.  
Mobile VPN should deliver mechanism for routing optimisation, but its implementation 
is optional. The route optimisation makes more sense in closed networks, like provider’s 
backbones and Intranets. 
3.3 Architecture overview of Mobile VPN 
The M-VPN defines host types and network element. The terminology must not be 
confused with Mobile IP or IPSec although there are some relations. The roles of the nodes 
are different in Mobile VPN since the target and architecture is different. To prevent the 
reader from making some wrong association to the existing protocols, the nodes roles are 
defined:  
• Mobile Client (MC) is a host moving through different networks, changing 
its IP address. A typical example is a small hardware device, like a smart 
phone attaching to different IP networks whilst communicating. The M-VPN 
delivers a static IP layer to the applications running on the Mobile Client. 
The mobile host establishes a connection to the Mobile Server, thus the 
mobile host is the initiator of M-KE and M-SE connection.  
• The Mobile Server (MS) accepts connections from a Mobile Clients. The 
Mobile Server must not have static IP address and includes mobile 
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functionality too. In contrast to the Mobile Client, the Mobile Server cannot 
initiate connection. The Server can be only a responder. Furthermore, the 
server can provide information for other Mobile Servers in the same 
administrative domain. In this way, dynamic overlay networks can be 
created. It is subjectively assumed that the server is moving more slowly than 
the Mobile Node. It is assumed that the Mobile Client is aware of the Mobile 
Server’s IP even if it changes. 
• Mobile Node (MN) is a host being either Mobile Client or Mobile Server. 
The term is used to describe properties typically for both: Mobile Client and 
Server. The term is more general then Mobile Node in Mobile IP. 
• Tunnel Node (TN) provides tunnelling functionalities. It creates and 
terminates tunnels. It could be standard L2TP LNS/LAC or GRE. The Tunnel 
Node is an optional element, which is external to M-VPN protocol. The node 
does not need any specific M-VPN functionalities but it is relevant for the 
protocol. 
• Home IP parameter. The constant IP parameters assigned by the tunnel node 
(TN) are called Home IP parameters. These are used by the applications. 
They remain permanent during the PoA changes (moving to different access 
IP networks). 
• Home Network is called the network corresponding to the Home IP 
parameters. 
Other elements (nodes) relevant to the protocols and already existing parts of the network 
infrastructure are AAA servers (Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting). They are 
usually part of the Intranet infrastructure and mostly use protocols, like Radius [23],  
Kerberos [24] etc. 
The M-SE protocol delivers transparent transport layer and constant network layer. The 
constant network layer is not transparent because the IP addresses are exchanged by M-SE 
with IP Mappers, see 3.6.1. Over the transport layer, a tunnel can be built by the Tunnel Node 
(TN), which is independent of the M-VPN. This is called tunnel mode of operation. The TN 
must be present on both sides (start and termination point), thus Mobile Client und Mobile 
Server. The TN can be deployed physically on the Mobile Node (MN) or on a separate host. 
The TN is usually part of the Mobile Client (MC), such as L2TP LAC. In contrary, the TN 
will be typically implemented on a different host at the Mobile Server’s (MS) side. The MS is 
typically an aggregation point of multiple M-SE sessions and the separation increases the 
performance of node. To emphasis this possible implementation, the MC is drawn together 
with the tunnel end point in Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. The MS and its TN are 
drawn as two separate logical elements. 
The M-VPN can be also used in so-called native mode, see 3.6. There is not Tunnel Node 
in this deployment. The native mode is much more restrictive and can be used in fewer 
scenarios. The native mode is not the main target of the M-VPN and not described further in 
this section. 
There are principally two types of usage of M-VPN in tunnel mode: Intranet and Internet 
usage. In the first case, the MC accesses the Intranet, such as corporate LAN. This is shown 
in Figure 3.2. The home network is part of the Intranet. The M-SE session protects the 
exchanges for achieving mobility. A tunnel such as PPTP, L2TP [13] is built over the M-SE 
session. The TN is called LNS in the L2TP terminology [13]. The MC has two IP addresses, 
one corporate (typically private) and one public IP. The corporate IP is permanent and used 
for the communication. The public IP is dynamically changing according to the MC 
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movements. The communication hosts to the Mobile Client must also be part of the Intranet. 
The Mobile Client cannot communicate with its corporate IP to Internet. 
In the Internet usage, the home network consists of public routable addresses as shown in 
Figure 3.3. The MC has two public IP addresses. The first one is a constant IP of the tunnel 
interface. The second IP is dynamic and used for Internet access. The Mobile Client can 
communicate to all Internet hosts using its public Home IP and vice versa.  
 
3.3.1 Advantages of the physical separation between Mobile Node and Tunnel Node 
The advantages of using external Tunnel Node are: 
• There are already developed Tunnel Nodes, which can serve thousands of 
parallel sessions using hardware acceleration modules. They are a well-
studied and stable implementation. For example: all aDSL customers use 
Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and the ISPs server millions of customers. 
• The existing TNs are already integrated into AAA structures.  
• There are synergy effects of using the same infrastructure for M-VPN, 
PPPoE in aDSL, L2TP over IPSec etc. 
• The existing TNs integrate typically dynamic routing protocols, like ISIS and 
BGP, which is major requirement of the Network Service Providers. 
• A new Tunnel Node in M-VPN requires new hardware implementation, new 
settings at AAA etc. This will complicate significantly the deployment. 
3.3.2 Redundancy and load sharing in M-VPN 
The M-VPN enables working in topologies with parallel connections to the same 
resources. This improves the availability through redundancy. The Figure 3.4 presents 
redundant connection, where the same home network is reachable through two separate MSs. 
The M-VPN delivers load sharing when the redundant connections are actively used. The 
load sharing is a routing problem. In M-VPN, this is left to the standard routing mechanism. 
Generally, the routers perform load sharing, when there are multiple paths with the same 
Figure 3.2: M-VPN for Intranet access 
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metrics for the same destination. The two connections in Figure 3.4 can be used for load 
sharing and redundancy. The routing protocols can run statically or dynamically over the 
tunnel. 
 
3.3.3 Dynamic overlay network with M-VPN 
M-VPN breaks the static topologies where the peers must be predefined. The Mobile 
Nodes can discover resources and establish new connection. A dynamic overlay topology can 
be build using this property. Dynamic network topology is very important because in mobile 
environment the optimal provider to resources may dynamically change. This improves 
significantly the recovery time by network failures. Furthermore, it enables path diversity in 
VPN and load sharing.  
The key feature is a procedure, called Mobile Server discovery (see 3.8 and 4.10.1). The 
Mobile Server provides information to the Mobile Clients for other known Mobile Servers 
and optional their resources, like Web services, Videos etc. The procedure is part of M-KE 
protocol. The Mobile Client requests resources information and the server responds with a list 
of known Mobile Server. The server list contains objects representing resources, like IP 
addresses, home parameter, ID, media content etc. The criteria for establishing a connection 
to certain Mobile Servers depends on the Mobile Client policy and can be every parameter of 
the server list, such as the ID, round trip delay to the destination, etc.  
The Mobile Servers provide the list to the Mobile Clients. The Mobile Clients cannot 
announce a list to the Mobile Server in opposite way. The Mobile Client may only nonce 
single resource running at the same host. The same host can run Mobile Client and Server 
Client, thus the host can accept connection and initiate connection at the same time. In this 
case, the Mobile Node can announce to other servers that it is also running a Mobile Server. 
The announced resources are added in the server list of the other Mobile Server. The Mobile 
Node cannot announce resources, which are not directly provided by him. This protects from 
avalanche effect, when every Mobile Node announces all known elements. The system will 
be overloaded because the same resources will be re-announced permanently. This simple 
rule that only directly provided resources can be announced, assurances single object per 
resource in the list.  
Every Mobile Server has its own list of other resources. There is no general master list 
between all nodes in Mobile VPN, which requires version managements and time 
synchronisation etc. There is no desire to rebuild the existing dynamic routing protocols, 
where the target is to maintain a consistent routing table over multiple elements. The routing 
protocols may be used between the Mobile Nodes implemented in classical way. There are no 
particular restrictions because of M-VPN, thus there is IP connectivity between hosts.  
An overlay network built with Mobile VPN is presented in Figure 3.5: Dynamic overlay 
network. The Mobile Client A can reach the node G via two different paths: A-B-D-G or A-
Figure 3.4: Redundant connection with M-VPN 
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C-D-G. Which of them is better and preferred can be determined with the routing protocols 
running on the top Mobile VPN. The different routing protocols have different convergence 
time. The convergence time is the time for updating the routing entries, so that the routing 
table at every router is consistent. Protocol with fast convergence is ISIS [17, 18] and with 
slow can be considered RIP [19]. 
 
The Mobile VPN offers mechanisms for building dynamic mashed networks in a mobile 
and secure way. The transparent bidirectional connectivity in Internet can be restricted by 
NAPT as already mentioned in 3.2.1. The NAPT reduces the mesh possibilities of M-VPN 
too. 
3.4 Bundling of M-KE and M-SE 
One major requirement of M-VPN is to work in NAPT environment. Bundled sessions 
have a big problem in NAPT as described in A.2.1.5 because the payload must be properly 
interpreted by the NAPT router. The bundled sessions mean that the application uses multiple 
sessions at transport layer. A simple example is the FTP protocol (active mode). There are 
one control TCP session and multiple data TCP sessions. The control TCP session is 
established ingress (from Client to Server) direction and date egress (from Server to Client) 
direction. Both sessions have different source and destination ports. The NAPT must 
recognise the dependency between the sessions and correctly predefine bindings. The same 
problem exists in VoIP for example, where a signalling and data are different UDP sessions. 
The term session must be defined even for the connectionless UDP protocol in order to 
maintain the NAPT binding (see A.2.1).  
There are two approached to solve the NAPT issue. (1) The first one is to make the 
NAPT device aware of the dependencies between the sessions in the protocols. This is done 
by the manufactures for FTP, VoIP etc. (2) The second approach is to change the protocols in 
a way, that there is a single session at network layer or a session established at the same 
direction. There is no need of any change at the NAPT device. This is a clear target for the 
Mobile VPN. The same NAPT binding must be used for M-KE and M-SE between the hosts. 
To match the same NAPT binding, the protocols use the same source and destination IPs and 
ports.  
The Mobile Node (MN) will receive UDP messages on the same port from M-KE and M-
SE. Therefore, the MN must implement two-level asynchronous packets handling shown in 
Figure 3.6. The first process binds on the socket and distributes the packets between the M-
KE and M-SE processes at the second level. Fast dedifferentiation between the M-KE and M-
SE packet is achieved by comparing the first byte of the message. The first byte is the 
protocols version. M-KE has possible version 0 to 127 (8 major and 16 minor). The M-SE 
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uses versions 128 to 255 (8 major and 16 minor). Only by inspecting the first byte, the socket 
daemon (process) can find out the protocol. The daemon must also FIFO buffer the packets 
for sending and receiving. At the second level are the processes of M-KE and M-SE, which 
asynchronous read from the buffer and handle the packets. 
 
3.5 M-KE overview 
The Mobile Key Exchange (M-KE) has the following targets: 
• Operation in mobile environment with frequent changes of IP. 
• Identification and authentication of participants using a variety of algorithms, 
like digital signature with x509 certificates, shared secret, password etc. The 
protocol must integrate in the current AAA structures.  
• Negotiation of cryptographic parameters for M-SE session, like encryption, 
authentication, integrity protection etc. 
• Delivery of authenticated key material for M-SE session, thus session keys 
for encryption, authentication and integrity protection. 
• Announcement of the mobile parameter of the nodes, like minimal interval 
supported between the PoA changes. 
• Exchange of network and service information. They describe the network or 
services directly connected to the server and client. Networks connected by 
hops (not directly connected) are not considered. 
• The protocol allows information’s exchange about other known servers 
offering resources. The nodes can build overlay networks with dynamic 
topologies in this way. 
The M-KE runs over UDP and is fully defined in chapter 4. The Mobile Client initialises 
the negotiation using the pre-configured Mobile Security Policy (M-SP). The Mobile Server 
is always the responder and cannot initiate a session.  
The M-KE delivers the parameters for M-SE after a successful negotiation. The M-KE 
session is deleted after the negotiation, thus there is no permanent session, like in IKE (s. 
A.2.2). One M-KE session results in one M-SE session. If there is a need for more than one 
M-SE session, then the M-KE must be repeated. A single M-KE for building multiple M-SE 
sessions makes sense from theoretical perspective, but it has many practical disadvantages, 
like permanent session, need for keep-a-live mechanisms, out of the state by network failures. 
3.5.1 Mobility during the M-KE 
In order to define how fast can change the PoA, the term mobility in negotiation must be 
defined. A negotiation in total mobility cannot be designed principally. There is a circular 
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dependency if the time between movements is less than the packet transmission time. The 
IP/port of received packet is already out-of-date, since the sender already has a new one. The 
nodes can principally communicate only if the host has a constant PoA for at least the round 
trip delay plus the local processing time. The negotiation cannot be achieved if one of the 
hosts is moving faster than this interval. This is not a restriction specific to M-KE but one that 
hold for any other protocol as well. The IP and port can change during the negation but the 
change must be bigger than sum of round trip time with the processing at host. The 
requirement can be mathematically expressed as: 
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where serverclient
constPoAt
/ denotes the time for which the client or server must have constant PoA. 
The 
receivesendt / denotes the time for sending or receiving a packet. The time for sending and 
receiving could be assumed as equal (this is in most of the cases). Potentially, the asymmetric 
DSL bandwidth can lead to different delays but this is out of scope in this section. The 
serverclient
proct
/ is the time for packet processing, thus the time needed to generate an answer of the 
received packet. The processing time includes not only the physical processing time 
dependent on the gateway’s CPU but also the AAA authentication by remote server, thus 
looking in remote databases etc. It should not be underestimated, since by roaming for 
example, the authentication is made by remote system and it can take up to a minute. Further 
more, involving searches in databases leads to processing time of several seconds. 
3.5.2 Polling and caching in M-KE 
To increase the mobility, the interval with constant PoA must be reduced. The 
transmission time cannot be influenced because it is a physical property. The only way to 
reduce the interval with constant PoA is working on the processing time at the MC (Mobile 
Client) and MS (Mobile Server). The key idea is to split the negotiation in multiple parts, 
between which the PoA may change. The polling mechanism reduces the requirement on the 
processing time, thus improves the mobility. 
The M-KE exchange consists of multiple request and response messages. Mobile Client 
sends the request and the Mobile Server sends the response. A pair of request and response is 
denoted as mobile exchange pair. The M-KE consists of multiple mobile exchange pairs. 
The key requirement is that the Mobile Server must send the response message 
immediately to Mobile Client, thus with out any delay. There two types of possible 
responses: pending and response data. The pending is send when the server cannot process 
the request immediately. For example, if the Mobile Server needs to perform DB search 
taking around a second, then it responds with pending. The pending message contains the 
time in seconds, when the Mobile Client must repeat the request. If the Mobile Server can 
answer immediately, then it sends the data to the PoA of the request message. The PoA of the 
Mobile Client may change between the mobile exchange pairs. The Mobile Server uses 
always the PoA of the last request message of the Mobile Client.  
Every mobile exchange pair can be repeated several times until successful exchange. An 
example is shown in Figure 3.7. The client sends its authentication credentials, like username 
and challenge response. The server cannot verify the credential immediately and therefore 
answers with pending notification to the PoA of the request. The polling interval in the server 
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response is 50 seconds. The MC waits for 50 second and resends the authentication packet for 
the second time. The PoA in the retransmitted M-KE packet can be different that the first one, 
thus between the exchanges pairs the PoA can change. The server is still not ready with the 
authentication and authorisation and again answers with pending notification. The polling 
interval is 20 seconds. The client repeats the request in 20 sec from different PoA. The server 
has finished the authentication meanwhile and answers immediately with successful 
  
The server must implement caching to fulfil the polling mechanism. It must be able to 
keep client information in the memory, so it can be replied immediately. This is mostly 
relevant for the authentication and the authorisation, where the AAA server may be in 
multiple hops distance. The AAA answer can take many seconds. The current Radius servers 
do not use validity period, thus the answer is valid only at the time point of the response. In 
M-KE, validity of the AAA answer must be set. It is called caching period. The caching 
period must be at least the polling interval plus the serverclient
constPoAt
/
. Otherwise, the AAA response 
will expire between the pollings. The challenge and the response values must be cached when 
working with passwords. Caching password means that the same challenge must be involved, 
because the password can be verified only through the challenge value. 
3.6 M-SE overview 
The M-SE is an application protocol over UDP fully defined in chapter 5. The M-SE 
parameters can be classified in three groups: security parameters, mobility parameter and data 
parameters. The security parameters are keys, algorithms for the protection etc. The mobility 
parameters consider the mobility properties of the Mobile Nodes, like the minimum PoA 
change interval supported by the Mobile Server. They give common estimation of the node 
performance and the network quality. The data parameters are traffic selectors defining which 
packet must be protected by the M-SE session. The traffic selectors are pre-defined at the 
Mobile Nodes. They are announced during M-KE and the biggest common denominator is 
set. The selector defines the transport layer parameters such as protocol and ports. 
The M-SE achieves confidentiality through encryption, authentication and integrity 
through HMAC [32], reply protection. The protocols deploys anti tracing mechanism by 
using pseudo random values in the header (see 3.7). The M-SE delivers transparent transport 
layers to the server. Transparent means that it is not manipulated or intercepted between the 
end-hosts. The network layer (IP) is constant, but not transparent, thus IP’s are replaced 
between the ends.  
Figure 3.7: M-KE polling example 
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The protocol operates in tunnel and native mode (see 3.3). The tunnels, like L2TP and 
GRE can be built between a Tunnel Node (TN) and Mobile Node (MN). In native mode, the 
communication between single applications is achieved. The layers in tunnel and native 
modes are shown in Figure 3.8.  
The tunnel is built on top of the M-SE layer. The Tunnel Nodes (TNs) administrate Home 
IP parameters, which are unknown to the Mobile Nodes (MNs). The TNs can authenticate 
and authorize additionally to M-SE. This is common to the L2TP (PPP) implementations. 
The authentication and authorization duties can be distributed between the TN and MN 
according 6.1. The Figure 3.8 a) presents the integration with the two main tunnel types, i.e. 
L2TP and GRE. The use of tunnel requires more resources, but it is more flexible. It is 
recommended over the native mode. 
M-SE in native mode protects the communication between two predefined application 
hosts. The Mobile Node and the application host can be the same or different physical node. 
The applications can use TCP or UDP for establishing the connection. The layers are shown 
in Figure 3.8 b). This form of protection must not be confused with TLS/SSL, where the 
security protocol delivers application layer and operates at the transport layer. The 
applications must be written to support SSL/TLS. The M-SE native mode delivers transparent 
transport layers, so every application based on UDP or TCP can be used without any 
adoption. It can be compared to transport mode of IPSec. This mode can be used to secure a 
connection in an efficient way to dedicated server, like FTP, HTTP. The advantage of native 
mode is the simplicity of implementation. Because of its simplicity, the usage is very 
restrictive. It cannot be used with any protocols transporting IP addresses in their payloads. 
The M-SE does not take care of proper translation of the payloads. Bundled sessions are also 
not supported. M-VPN concentrates on tunnel mode and native mode is a minor feature.  
The M-SE contains a procedure for updating the PoA parameter described in 3.11. The 
procedure is implemented with notification messages (see 5.8.1). It is build of request and 
reply message. The messages are encapsulated in the M-SE protocols and therefore protected. 
The outbound processing of M-SE is different from the classical protocols, like IPSec. 
The main problem is how to match the packets to the M-SE session. The IP addresses of the 
Mobile Nodes cannot be used since they are dynamic. For this reason, a new concept of 
Mappers is introduced. A Mapper is a constant IP address assigned to an M-SE session and 
used for transport between the Tunnel Node and Mobile Node. The working principle is 
explained in the following 3.6.1. The inbound processing is similar to IPSec, where the 
packet is matched using unique session ID. 
3.6.1 Mappers 
The Mobile Node and Tunnel Node can be deployed at different physical hosts, as 
already described in 3.3.2. For the communication between physical hosts, IP addresses are 
Figure 3.8: M-SE mode of operation 
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required. The public IP addresses of the Mobile Nodes cannot be used since they are 
dynamic. The assigned Home IP addresses are encapsulated in the tunnel and are unknown 
before the tunnel establishment (causality principle). Local IP addresses, called Mappers, are 
used to solve this issue. The Mappers are IP addresses used between the Mobile Node and the 
Tunnel Node for transporting packets. The Mappers replace the dynamic transport IP 
addresses. They only have local meaning between the MN and TN and are fully transparent 
to the rest of the hosts. In native mode, they are IP addresses between the application server 
and the Mobile Node. The Figure 3.10 presents the layer structure in native mode. The Figure 
3.9 gives the layer in tunnel mode. 
The node assigns two IP addresses for every M-SE, called session and termination 
Mappers. The addresses are constant during the session. The termination Mapper IP is the 
address of the Tunnel Node in tunnel mode or of the application server in native mode. The 
session Mapper IP is the IP assigned to every M-SE session. The session Mapper must be 
locally unique in the network routing domain between the Mobile Node and 
tunnel/termination server. The session Mapper assignment can be carried out depending on 
the ID used in M-KE or on the pre-defined pools. The session Mappers can be used as user 
identifiers by the TN or application server. For example: the administrators receive different 
Mappers to the normal users. 
 
The network of the Mappers is closed and therefore, private IP’s can be used. The 
Mappers are not known or announced to the end hosts. They have local meaning for the 
configuration of the MN and TN. In general, the mapping is a way to overcome the issues 
due to the logical separation of tunnel and secure protocol. The separation of the tunnel and 
secure server has multiple advantages described in 3.3.1 and chapter 5. 
3.7 Anti-tracing mechanism in M-SE 
A major requirement for the secure IP mobility is protection against tracing of the Mobile 
Nodes (MNs) movements. Tracing of movements means physical location of the MN during 
the session as described in 2.6. This is achieved through mapping between header values and 
transport IP addresses. The IP can be translated to a physical location and in this way, the 
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movements of the host are physically traced. The link layer is out of scope in this work since 
it is used only with the network broadcast domain, see 2.6. 
Every predictable and unique header value can be used for the tracing. A typical example 
is using the session identifier to make the match. The value is unique and constant during the 
session. The sequence numbers can also be used, since they are predictable and semi unique. 
The probability for two sessions with the same sequence values is low and trace will probably 
succeed.  
The main task is to remove all predictable and unique fields from the header. First, the M-
SE header is split in to two areas: encrypted and unencrypted. The encrypted part contains all 
information not directly required for the matching of the M-SE packet to certain session, like 
sequence number. The sequence number is not decisive for matching of the M-SE packet to 
session and will be encrypted. The unencrypted header contains the values necessary for 
inbound processing of the M-SE and other not unique values. The session identifier is the 
only unique value required for the inbound processing. Without the identifier, the packet 
cannot be mapped to the right session. 
The idea is to make the session ID dynamic. The value must change during the session in 
unpredictable way. The changes must be made easily without negotiation or other CPU 
intensive operations. The introduced method is called jumping session ID. An eavesdropper 
can read the header values, but they are pseudo random. The header is not constant during 
session and cannot be matched the IP. 
There are two different session IDs for the inbound and for the outbound M-SE session. 
The inbound session ID is defined by local host. It must be unique for the host since it is used 
to map to incoming packets to the right M-SE session. The outbound session ID is defined by 
the remote peer and used by sending. These two session IDs are announced to each other 
during the M-KE.  
 
The target is to allow the local host to change the inbound session ID anytime during the 
M-SE connection. The outbound session ID can be changed in similar way by the remote 
peer. For this purpose, each M-SE packet contains two session IDs. The first one is part of the 
unencrypted header. It is the session ID used by the receiver for identification. The second 
session ID is embedded in the encrypted header, thus it is protected. The protected session ID 
is part of the encrypted header in M-SE between the MC and MS. The value is protected as 
the application data. The second session ID announces an alternative values which will be 
accepted by the sender (inbound). The receiver must use this session ID by sending packets 
and erase previous values. The announced session ID exchanges the current one. The 
Figure 3.11: Jumping session ID 
Mobile Client Mobile Server
Encrypted Session IDUnencrypted Session IDAAAA
DDDD AAAA
M-SE Packet 1
AAAADDDD
M-SE Packet 2
CCCC BBBB
M-SE Packet 4
BBBBDDDD
M-SE Packet 3
EEEECCCC
M-SE Packet 5
tim
e
tim
e
AAAA
3.7 Anti-tracing mechanism in M-SE 56   
outbound M-SE packets are used to announce new inbound session IDs in this way. The 
announced session ID can be changed with pseudo random algorithm at every packet. The 
algorithm is left free to the implementation. The intermediate attacker taps only the 
unencrypted header and therefore, cannot follow the change of the session ID. The Session 
ID seems random for the attacker and it cannot be matched to IP. 
The working principle, called jumping session ID, is shown in practical terms in Figure 
3.11. The Mobile Client (MC) first sends M-SE packet 1 with the unencrypted session ID 
AAAA and the encrypted ID of DDDD. This means the next packets sent by Mobile Server 
(MS) must use session ID DDDD in the unencrypted header part. The MS uses the new 
session ID DDDD in packet 2. The MS do not announce new session ID, thus is keeps 
AAAA. The MS announces new session ID BBBB in the next packet 3. The MC uses the 
received session ID BBBB and announces new session ID CCCC in packet 4. The MS uses 
CCCC for the outbound session ID in packet 5. 
Lost packets lead to missing announces of session ID. If the receiver has not obtained a 
message with a new session ID, then the host cannot use it. The session will be lost. The 
same effect can occur by out of sequence packets. The old packets containing announces can 
change back the session ID. Synchronization through acknowledgment is not very reasonable 
for security reasons. The announce and the acknowledgement message follow shortly in time. 
An attacker can easily follow this property and map these messages to one M-SE session. The 
proper session ID can be extracted from the unencrypted header. For this reason, the 
algorithm is enchased to tolerate losses and out-of sequence packets without synchronization.  
A window of tolerance is deployed to avoid drops because of asynchronous states. The 
window of tolerance is simple principle saying that the host must accept packets with old 
inbound session IDs. If the packet with the announced session ID gets lost, the remote peer 
will continue using old session ID. The received packets will be matched property, since the 
host accepts past session IDs as well. Out of sequence packets do not lead also to failure at 
the M-SE. Because of physical limitations, not all past session IDs can be stored. A window 
of the last 64 values is defined in M-SE. Every MN uses single outbound session ID but 
accepts 64 inbound session IDs per M-SE connection.  
Out of sequence or lost packets are not always due to network failures. They are normal 
behaviour in network implementing quality of Service (QoS). All backbone networks at the 
carrier are using QoS currently. The QoS defines priority by the packet processing. For 
example, VoIP packets have typically higher priority then TCP traffic. When the bandwidth 
is utilised, the router starts to drop the packets or to use low priority queues with a big 
latency.  
The MS and MC can use multiple destination and source ports in parallel to session 
jumping techniques. They can rotate some of them on random principle as described in 
chapter 4.  
It must be underlined that every session hiding technique has it limits. There must be a 
sufficient number of parallel M-SE sessions, so that identification becomes impossible. If 
there is a single session in a IP domain, then it can be easily identified.  
3.7.1 Alternative method for session hiding 
An alternative method is using generator of pseudo random numbers for automatically 
exchanging the session ID and sequence number. The initialisation vector for the random 
generators is delivered in secure way during the M-KE. The Mobile Client and Mobile Server 
deploy the same pseudo random algorithm with the same initialization vector. Both nodes 
generate the same numbers unknown to an intermediate attacker. The sequence number and 
the session ID can be exchanged by this single number. The new session ID represents the 
sequence number too, since every pseudo random number has defined sequence index by the 
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generation. For example, the 7th generated number is 123212. By getting the new Session ID 
(random number) the Mobile Nodes proves, which sequence index it has. Lost or out of 
sequence packets can be handled using a window of tolerance as in the previous section. 
The advantage of this method is the reducing the header size by representing the session 
ID and the sequence number by one single field. The random number generation requires 
CPU resources, which must be considered. The major disadvantage of this method is that the 
new session ID is not unique for the local host. The inbound session ID must be unique at the 
local host. If the Mobile Node has multiple parallel M-SE session, then the suggested 
inbound session ID can overlap in certain time from mathematical point of view. There is no 
way to assure that two random generator do not produce the same numbers for some time. 
The received packet cannot be matched to the right M-SE sessions. Even if the probability for 
overlapping can be reduced it is present. This major disadvantage convinced the author not to 
deploy this method, although it seems an elegant solution.  
3.8 Dynamic server discovery  
The feature allowing the dynamic overlay topology in 3.3.3 is the dynamic server 
discovery. It allows building dynamic structures, facilitates the load sharing and enables high 
availability through redundancy. The feature is part of the M-KE protocol (chapter 4) and it is 
realised using two notifications – announce and discover. 
The MC can announce that its host is also running a MS through an announce 
notification. The notification can be sent only form MC to MS. The notification contains the 
ID of the server, supported algorithms, lifetime, resources etc. The resources can be network 
parameters or applications, such as a certain media server. The MS adds this entry to its lists. 
The PoA parameters are part of the entry. The PoA is dynamic and must be updated 
synchronously with the M-SE session. When the M-SE session is terminated, the entry is 
marked as not currently active. The entries in the list have lifetimes and when these expire, 
the entry must be removed.  
3.8.1.1 Security consideration  
The server list is distributed from authenticated Mobile Server. The list contains Mobile 
server providing some resources. The elements in the list are not proved by the distributer and 
there is no guarantee for any parameter of the entry. When the client establishes a connection, 
it must authenticate the Mobile Server and do not consider that each element in the list is 
trusted. 
An insider, a member of the same administrative domain, can generate a malicious list. It 
can sabotage the overlay network in this way. To reduce this possibility, every item of the list 
can have a signed tag by trusted CA authority. The tag can by verified by the client prior to 
establishing a connection.  
3.9 Security Associations Management Database (SAM-DB) 
The Security Associations Management Database (SAM-DB) is a central interconnection 
point between the M-KE, M-SE and M-LU. The database includes information about current 
sessions in M-KE and M-SE. The main structure of SAM-DB is defined here to achieve a 
better interoperability between the implementations. 
A unique element in the SAM-DB is the Mobile Node’s unique ID. The ID can be in the 
form of Distinguished Name (DN) [21] or any other unique Uniform Resource Identifiers 
(URI) [20]. In the M-VPN, it is considered that the DN is a very suitable format for MN’s ID. 
It represents very good companies organisation and it is already integrated in the digital 
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certificates [22]. For example DN can be “CN=joe.smith, OU=department A, O=vodafone, 
C=DE”. The ID is used in the ID for identifying the AAA rules.  
The SAM-DB defines the AAA policy (Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting), 
which consists of rules with matching patterns (regular expression). The rules match the 
Mobile Node’s ID and define how the session can be authenticated. The following examples 
demonstrate the ideas: 
 
An example for the use of symbol “.” (any char):“CN=.*, OU=TNS, O=Vodafone, 
C=DE” matches every string having CN parameter and matching OU, O, C. For example 
“CN=abcse123, OU=TNS, O=Vodafone, C=DE” 
 
There is an assigned priority at every rule. The rules are evaluated from the highest to the 
lowest priority. The evaluation of the rules is stopped by the first match. A dedicated AAA 
group is assigned for every rule, which must be used for this session. A part of the AAA 
group is the cache time for the authentication and authorisation. The parameter is a 
requirement following from the polling negotiation described in 3.4. The value is manually 
configured in the entry and can be overwritten by authenticated reply.  
The corporate requirements are manifested in the rules. There are usually different group 
of users with different authorisation and authentication policies. The ID matching can be 
compared with firewall rules (ACLs) on ID basis. The AAA policy is general part of SAM-
DB.  
The Mobile Secure Policy (M-SP) is also part of the SAM-DB. The M-SP defines which 
traffic and how it must be protected. It has similar function as the Policy in IPSec [5]. There 
is M-SP object for every Mobile Node or group of nodes. The M-SP includes the traffic 
selector, IP addresses of the peer, optional Mappers, etc. They are used to maintain the M-KE 
and M-SE negotiation with this host. The relation between the SAM-DB, M-KE and M-SE is 
shown in Figure 3.12. Each M-SP entry must contain sufficient information to identify and 
establish M-SE. There are the traffic sectors, encryption, digest algorithms, Diffie-Hellmann 
groups etc. 
 
Every M-SP entry can be linked to multiple M-SE and to the single M-KE entry. The M-
SE entry represents a set of inbound/outbound M-SE sessions to one MN. The M-SE entry is 
the result of M-KE negotiation. The M-KE entry contains all parameters for one negotiation, 
like pooling intervals, cookies, DH values etc. The M-KE is removed after the negotiation is 
Figure 3.12: SAM-DB general structure 
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finished. Multiple M-SE entries to single MN is typically the result of interrupted operation 
described in 3.10.  
Every outbound packet is matched against the traffic selectors of the M-SP entry. M-SE 
entry(ies) are linked to the M-SP entry. If there are multiple M-SEs, then the session with the 
longest lifetime is used. If there is no M-SAP entry at the MC, then M-KE negotiation is 
started. The result of the M-KE negotiation is M-SE entry, which is linked to the M-SP. In 
the example in Figure 3.12: there is not M-SE session for M-SP 3 and one M-KE 4 is started. 
After finishing the M-KE the M-SE entry is set and the M-KE entry removed. For example: 
the M-SP 4 in Figure 3.12. 
By the inbound processing, the M-SE session ID and the M-KE cookies are extracted 
from the received packet. The values are unique for all local sessions and used the find the 
right M-KE/M-SE entry. Then the processing is carried out according the M-KE or M-SE 
parameters.  
3.10 Non interrupted operation in M-SE 
Every M-SE session has a lifetime, which is a consequence of the session key straight, 
authentication and authorisation policy. The M-SE session must be erased after expiration of 
the lifetime. For the establishment to the new M-SE, the MN must successfully finish M-KE 
negotiation. The M-SE is not created whilst the M-KE is not finished, thus no application 
data can be sent and received. 
To achieve uninterrupted communication during the M-KE negotiation, an overlapping of 
multiple M-SE sessions is allowed. The client starts new M-KE negotiations a sufficient time 
before the current M-SE expires. There are two concurrent M-SE sessions - one shortly 
before expiration and one just started. The sender must always use the one with the longest 
lifetime. The receiver accepts packets from all valid sessions, thus the new and legacy one. 
After expiration of the M-SE, the MNs are already using the new M-SE. An example of 
concurrent M-SE sessions is shown in Figure 3.12, M-SE 1 and M-SE 2. The parallel 
sessions use the same Mapper, so that the negotiation is transparent for the next (tunnel) 
server. 
3.11 Location update notification in M-SE 
Every Mobile Client is responsible for updating its PoA at the Mobile Server. The 
procedure for updating the PoA and getting a feedback, if the PoA has changed, is called 
location update. The procedure consists of request/response messages and is part of M-SE. 
The messages are coded in notifies described in 5.8.1. 
The receiver of the request, thus Mobile Server, extracts the PoA and stores the result in 
the SAM-DB entry. The feedback, if the PoA has changed between the current and the last 
packet, is part of the response message to Mobile Client. The M-SE packets contain a flag 
(bit) indicating if the PoA has changed. The flag is inverted every time a PoA change has 
occurred (see 5.8.1).  
The M-LU protocols in chapter 7 defines the frequency of the location updates, thus 
when to perform a location update.  
3.12 Dead peer detection and NAPT keep-alive  
In M-VPN, there is no need for dead peer detection or nat-keep-alives, as required in IKE 
for example (see A.2.2.10.2). The dynamic intervals of the location update adjust to the 
disconnections, regardless of the cause - by an intermediate NAPT device or by dead peer. 
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Independent of the disconnection reason, the location update are adjusted according M-LU 
described in chapter 7. 
The Mobile Nodes moves from networks with and without NAPT. The M-VPN operates 
in the same way with or without NAPT in the network and therefore, there is no need to 
detect the NAPT existence. This is a big problem for IPSec (IKEv1 and IKEv2) described in 
chapter 2. 
The M-LU covers dead-peer-detection and nat-keep-alive in efficient advantageous way. 
These two features are implemented separately in most of the classic protocols, like IKE. 
They generate significantly more load as in M-VPN (see chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10). 
3.13 TCP in TCP Tunnel 
The tunnel protocols implement UDP for the outer header. The use of the TCP protocol in 
the outer header is not suitable and leads to undesired connection blocking. The layer 
structure of TCP in TCP is shown in Figure 3.13. A common mistake is the use of TLS/SSL 
as IP tunneling protocols. If the user sends TCP data, then there are two TCP headers 
encapsulated in each other, see Figure 3.13.  
The TCP stack has the property of recovering lost data and congestions control. In 
general, the packet loss is assumed to be caused by overloaded links. When there are loses, 
the TCP windows size is reduced, which decrees the transmission rate [27]. Overloads of the 
link are avoided in this way. The best example is starting concurrent TCP sessions to the 
same destination from the same host. Even started at the different time points, the session will 
have the same speed after some adoption time. The TCP’s mechanism for speed reducing on 
losses leads to fair balance of the connections. Depending on the speed, the lost packets are 
retransmitted.  
In the TCP in TCP, there are two stacks responsible for the re-
transmitting of the same physical packet and adjusting the same physical 
speed. The lost packet will be retransmitted twice by the different stacks. 
If the stacks have different window sizes, this will lead to different speeds 
of retransmission. For example: the outer TCP header resends in 10 sec 
and the inner TCP in 2 sec. This leads to overloading of the internal buffer 
and blocking of the connection. There is a clear circular dependency. TCP 
in TCP is a very bad implementation style, because the connection can 
easily overload with some losses. For this reason, TLS/SSL is not proper 
protocol for encapsulation of IP packets including own TCP header.  
3.14 Summary and contributions 
The Mobile VPN protocol has many new features improving the mobility and security. 
The protocol targets primary remote VPN access in mobile environment, but it can be used in 
other overlay networks. The highlight properties can be summaries as: 
• Redundancy and load sharing capabilities with using Tunnel Node, see 3.3.2 
• Dynamic overlay network topologies thought resource distribution, see 3.8. 
• Anti-tracing mechanism of Mobile Node’s location, see 3.7 
• Key exchange during the Mobile Node changes it’s PoA (Polling), see 3.5.2 
• M-VPN integrates in the existing AAA structures, see 3.9. 
• Dead peer detection and Nat-Keep-alive thought PoA update procedure, see 
3.12  
Figure 3.13: TCP in TCP 
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• The separation of Mobile Node and Tunnel Node enables excellent 
integration in the existing infrastructure, see 3.3.1 
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4 Mobile Key Exchange 
The Mobile Key Exchange (M-KE) protocol negotiates cryptographic parameters, keys 
and authenticates the participants as described in chapter 3. The protocol runs over UDP 
using port 733 at the Mobile Server (MS). The port number must not be used by any other 
application. The motivation for port 733 is because there is no registered application for this 
port in IANA [15] currently. Different port could also be used. The M-KE negotiation is 
initiated by the Mobile Client according to the Mobile Secure Policy (M-SP) explained in 3.9. 
The values of the M-SP required to start M-KE negotiation are: 
• Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the Mobile Server. The Mobile 
Client resolves the FQDN to A record in DNS. If there are multiple IPs, the 
client must try sequentially to establish connection to all of them until 
obtaining a response of the Mobile Server. There is negotiation timeout 
defining the time before switching to the next IP. The direct use of IP 
addresses instead of FQDN is possible, but undesired since it leads to 
inflexibility. 
• The ID of the local host and remote peer must be defined. The ID must be 
Distinguished Name [16] or URI [17]. The local ID must be exact defined. 
The remote ID may be defined using pattern, thus regular expressions.  
• A list of supported cryptographic algorithms must be set. For example: CBC 
AES 128 Bit with SHA integrity protection with 3600 sec live time.  
• The authentication rules based on ID must be set as defined in 3.9. Ability to 
authenticate the remote peer must be present. 
The output of the M-KE negotiation is the parameters for the M-SE session 
establishment. They are stored in the M-SAB database in M-SE entry. The mandatory values 
are: 
• Algorithms for encryption and integrity protection of the M-SE session must 
be set. 
• Four keys for encryption and authentication of M-SE sessions (inbound and 
outbound) 
• Peers IDs 
• Inbound and outbound Session IDs must be set according 3.7. 
• M-SE session life time  
• The shortest interval between the movements supported by the MNs 
• Resources at the MS 
• Optionally, a list of other MSs according 3.8 
• Transport parameters, like PoA of the peer, defined in 3.9. 
4.1 Authentication methods 
M-KE is very flexible regarding the authentication. The MC and MS agree on any 
combination of the following authentication methods: 
• Signature authentication with RSA [5] and DSS [6] using x509 certificates 
• Password authentication similar to CHAP [7] authentication in PPP 
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• Shared secret authentication 
• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [8]. The EAP is encapsulation for 
authentication protocols and optional master session key derivation. Using 
EAP in M-KE is very suitable when the Mobile Node must be integrated in 
infrastructure supporting specific EAP authentication. For Example: SIM 
authentication can be performed using EAP-SIM [9] and in this way some 
interworking between M-KE and the existing GSM systems. The EAP must 
be considered only when the M-KE integrated methods cannot be used, thus 
signature, shared secret and password (The IKEv2 [13] also provides build-in 
methods and EAP). To avoid circular dependencies, since the EAP is only 
encapsulation, the following combination can be used in M-KE (see 
discussion in 6.1): 
o When the MC and MS use EAP for mutual authentication, than only 
EAP methods with Master Session Key (MSK) derivation can be 
used. These are: EAP-TLS [19], EAP-PSK [20], EAP-FAST [21], 
EAP-SIM [9] and EAP-AKA [18]. 
o When only one of the Mobile Nodes (MC or MS) is using EAP and 
the other the integrated M-KE authentications, there are no 
restrictions for the EAP method. The integrity of the negotiation is 
verified by the Mobile Node authenticated by EAP, since it receives 
authenticated HMAC. The case is similar to TLS [1] with server side 
certificates. 
o When both Mobile Nodes are using the M-KE integrated 
authentication methods, there are no restrictions. 
4.2 M-KE messages  
The M-KE consists of four message types: ClientHello, ClientResponse, ServerHello and 
ServerResponse. They are indicated in the TypeOfMessage byte of the M-KE header. The 
packets have the same structure, but they contain different payloads depending on their 
purpose. The M-KE is designed to achieve negotiation with a minimum number of packets. 
M-KE exchange without any retransmission and pending is shown in Figure 4.1.  
The first two packets (ClientHello and ServerHello) set up an encrypted channel for 
further communication. The following encrypted messages (ClientResponse und 
ServerResponse) authenticate the peers, makes message integrity check and set up session 
parameters. Brief description of the packet is following: 
  
• ClientHello suggests algorithms for authentication, integrity protection and 
encryption. The authentication algorithms may different be for the client und 
server. The message contains the clients DH values.  
Figure 4.1: Mobile Key Exchange 
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• ServerHello is the response of the Mobile Server to the Mobile Client. The 
message accepts certain encryption, hash and authentication algorithms. The 
Mobile Server also sends its DH values. It may request certificate from a 
certain CA, sent EAP values etc. Parts of the ServerHello are encrypted with 
the result of the DH key exchange. 
• ClientResponse gives M-SE parameters, like session ID, live time etc. This is 
the packet containing Client ID. It may contain also further authentication 
payloads. The message payloads are encrypted. The message contains also 
authenticated integrity check of all exchanged packets (HMAC).  
• ServerResponce is contains the Mobile Server parameters for the M-SE 
connection, Server ID, and authenticated integrity check of the negotiation 
(HMAC).  
If the Mobile Server cannot reply within the maximum answer time defined by the 
Mobile Client, it replies with status pending. The client resends the message in the interval 
given in the pending status response, as described in 3.5. Single M-KE negotiations can 
consist of multiple retransmissions as the example in Figure 4.2 shows. 
The participants can send notification payloads at every stage of the negotiation see 
4.13.17. The HMAC payload must be included in the M-KE when notifying. The notification 
must be part of the encrypted payloads if encryption channel is set. Otherwise, it may be 
included in the unencrypted payloads. This is typically the case when the authentication fails, 
or there is no proper protection algorithm. To facilitate the message description in the 
following sections, the possible notification payload is not discussed. 
The M-KE negotiation must be finished within a certain maximum negotiation time. 
Otherwise, the M-KE session is removed. 
 
Figure 4.2: Example of M-KE negotiation with polling 
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4.3 Packet structure 
The protocol structures are described with the notation of SSL and TLS defined in [1]. 
The general packet structure is: 
 
struct {  
 MkeHeader   header; 
 Payload   mobileKePayloads[0..2^16-1];     /* unencrypted payloads */ 
 Payload   encryptedPayloads[0..2^16-1];    /* encrypted payloads */ 
} MobileKE 
 
struct {  
 ProtocolVerion   mobileKeVersion; 
 TypeOfMessage  type; 
 Length   len; 
 opaque   cookieServer[4;, 
 opaque   cookieClient[4]; 
} MkeHeader 
 
struc { 
 uint8   version;  /* major | minor */ 
} ProtocolVersion 
 
enum { 
 clientHallo(1), ClientResponse(3), ServerResponse(4), serverHello(5),   (255) 
} TypeOfMessage 
 
struc { 
uint8  fragment; 
uint16  packetLength; 
} Length 
 
struc { 
 uint8  type; 
uint8  subType; 
 opaque  data[0..2^16-1]; 
} Payload 
 
Every M-KE packer has this structure. Structures and values may be empty in some 
packets when there is not data for them. For example: in the ClientHello, there are no 
encryptedPayloads since there is not key material.  
The M-KE header begins with the protocol version (ProtocolVersion) of one byte. The 
first 4 Most Significant Bits (MSB) indicate the major version. The major version is one in 
this specification. The 4 Last Significant Bits (LSB) indicate the minor version and are set to 
zero in this specification. In order to communicate, two hosts must use the same major 
version. The highest major version for the M-KE protocol is 7. The values from 8 to 16 are 
reserved for the M-SE protocol as described in 3.4. 
The next byte value TypeOfMessage gives the general description of this message. There 
are four types of messages described 4.2. The following Length structure (see 4.7) contains 
the length of the M-KE message and optional fragment details. The first two bytes 
(packetLength) give the total packet length including all fragments. The maximum size is 216-
1 bytes. The fragment byte gives the fragment sequence number. 
The next two values, cookieServer and cookieClient, contain 4 byte cookies. The client 
sets the cookieClient and the server sets the cookieServer. The values identify the messages. 
They are used to pick up the right M-KE negotiation. The cookies are the same for one 
negotiation and must be unique for the host. The unique values assure replay protection. 
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Furthermore, pseudo random cookies limit simple Denial of Service attacks. Pseudo random 
and unique values are recommended. 
A payload is a data structure containing related information, like encryption algorithms. 
The payloads carry all data needed for the negotiation. The sequence of the payloads in the 
messages is free for the implementation. The payload has a general structure consisting of 
Type, SubType and Data field. The Type byte specifies the information carried in the payload, 
like certificate. The Subtype gives further information, such as the encoding type of the data. 
It can also include value itself, like the Diffie-Hellman group number. The Data vector 
contains the data, like the certificate. The data field is optional, since only the existence of the 
payload is decisive in some cases.  
The payloads are grouped in two vectors unencrypted and encrypted. Security relevant 
payloads are embedded in encrypted vectors, such as the ID of the user. The premise for 
using the encrypted vector is the existence of the shared master session key (secret). The 
unencrypted vector carries payloads for key derivation, like Diffie-Hellman public values and 
protection algorithms. The payloads are exactly defined in chapter 4.8. 
4.3.1 ClientHello  
The first M-KE packet sent by the Mobile Client is the ClientHello packet. It has the 
following structure: 
 
struct {  
 MkeHeader   header; 
 struc { 
  DhValuePayload  clientDhValues[3..2^16-1]; 
  ProtectionAlgPayload clientSuggestedProtectionAlg[3..2^16-1];  
  ProtectionAlgPayload serverRequiredProtectionAlg[3..2^16-1];    
  MaxAnswerTimePayload requiredMaxAnswerTime; 
 } UnencryptedPayloads; 
 
 struc { 
   /* no encrypted payloads */ 
 } EncryptedPayloads; 
 
} ClientHello; 
 
struct {  
 ProtocolVerion   mobileKeVersion; 
 TypeOfMessage  clientHallo; 
 Length   len; 
 opaque   cookieServer[4]=0x00000000; 
 opaque   cookieClient[4]; 
 
} MkeHeader; 
 
The header contains TypeOfMessage set to clientHallo. The Mobile Client generates the 
cookieClient value of 4 bytes. The cookieServe is null. The Lengths is set according to 4.3. 
The UnencryptedPayloads contains multiple payloads defined in 4.8. The clientDhValues 
contains the list of DhValuePayload payloads see 4.13.1. The client sends one payload for 
each DH group supported, including public values. To reduce the number of exchanged 
messages, DH groups are predefined with large primes and elliptic curve equations. The node 
must only send the group number and its public value. For example: If the client proposes 
four groups, then the four payloads with four public values are sent. This generates more 
resources, since only one group with its public values is chosen. The benefit is in reducing the 
number of negotiation packets, which is considered critical in a mobile environment. The 
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server chooses one group by responding with a single DhValuePayload containing its public 
value. The master session key (secret) generation of DH values is defined in 4.6. 
The next vector clientSuggestedProtectionAlg, see 4.13.2, contains the protection 
algorithms offered by the client, i.e. encryption, integrity check and authentication. For 
example, the client offers authentication with a password and can send packets encrypted in 
CBC_AES 128 bit, integrity protection with HMAC with SHA1. The client and server agree 
on supported algorithms using these Payloads. There is not session key at this point and the 
payloads are sent in clear. The Client ID and Server ID are not sent in the first two packets 
since they must be protected. The singe structure ProtectionAlgPayload contains one 
combination for authentication, encryption and integrity protection. More combinations are 
set in multiple payloads.  
The vector serverRequiredProtectionAlg, see 4.13.2, contains the required protection 
algorithms from the server. This is a list of expected algorithms, for example the client 
expects RSA signature authentication for the server authentication and CBC_AES 128bit, 
HMAC with SHA1. The separation between offered and accepted algorithms gives maximum 
flexibility, like server authenticates with certificate and client with password. The server 
chooses one combination and replies with single payload in clientSuggestedProtectionAlg 
and serverRequiredProtectionAlg. 
The requiredMaxAnswerTime, see 4.13.3, gives the maximum packet processing time at 
the server, tolerated by the mobile client (see Figure 4.1). The client can omit this payload if 
it has not estimation of this value. Knowing an estimated value of the constant PoA of the 
client reduces the polling interval. For example: if the PoA change is expected to be once a 
day then the server can certainly take 30 sec to generate the reply.  
The EncryptedPayloads structure is empty since there is not key material. The structure is 
listed only for completeness.  
4.3.2 ServerHello 
After the server receives the ClientHello packet, it creates a new M-KE negotiation entry. 
It generates its cookieServer value and uses it in all packets for this negotiation. The answer 
structure is the following: 
 
struct {  
 MkeHeader   header; 
 
 select (ReplyStatus) { 
 
  case pending:  /* no immediate reply possible */ 
 struc { 
  PendingPayload pending; 
 } UnencryptedPayloads; 
 
 struc { 
   /* no encrypted payloads */ 
 } EncryptedPayloads; 
 
  case replyReady:  /* reply ready */ 
 
  struc { 
 DhValuePayload  serverDhValue; 
 ProtectionAlgPayload clientProtectionAlg;   
  ProtectionAlgPayload serverProtectionAlg;   
  } UnencryptedPayloads; 
 
 struc { 
  MinPoaChangeIntPayload minPoaChangeInterval; 
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  MaxUpdateIntPayload maxUpateInterval; 
  
  select (ClientAuthenticationType){ 
   case rsasig:  
  CertificateRequestPaylaad clientCertificteRequest[3..2^16-1]; 
   case dsssig:  
  CertificateRequestPayload clientCertificteRequest[3..2^16-1]; 
   case password  : 
  ChallengePayload  clientChallengeValue; 
   case eap 
  EapPayload  clientEap; 
   case sharedsecret: 
  /* no payload */ 
 } 
 
 PaddingPayload  padding; 
 
 } EncryptedPayloads; 
} ServerHello; 
 
struct {  
 ProtocolVerion   mobileKeVersion; 
 TypeOfMessage  serverHallo; 
 Length   len; 
 opaque   cookieServer[4]; 
 opaque   cookieClient[4]; 
} MkeHeader 
 
enum {pending, replyReady} ReplyStatus; 
 
enum {rsasig, dsssig, password, sharedSecret, eap ,null .. 255} ClientAuthenticationType; 
If the server cannot reply to the client within the maximalAnswerTime, it sends a pending 
payload in ServerHello. In the data field of the pending payload is given the interval for the 
next polling, see 4.13.4. The value subtype can be seconds or milliseconds. 
If the server can reply (replyReady), it selects the desired DH group and sends the 
serverDhValue Payload. The clientProtectionAlg value contains the selected authentication, 
encryption and integrity protection for the client. The client has sent a list of possibilities and 
the server selects only one. The server sends serverProtectionAlg in the same principle. These 
payloads are unencrypted in the ServerHello message. The DH values are exchanged with 
these payloads and the protection algorithms set, so there is sufficient information for 
generation of the Master Session Key (MSK), see 4.6. It must be stresses that the Master 
Session Key is also considered not trusted until the DH values are not authenticated. The DH 
values are authenticated with exchange of the HMAC values in ClientResponse and 
ServerResponse. 
The next payloads are encrypted, as described in 4.9. The minPoaChangeInterval value 
gives the minimum interval for PoA change supported by the server. The value depends on 
the server performance. If the client expects to move more frequently than the server 
supports, then it can terminate the connection. The maxUpateInterval gives the idle timeout 
interval before the M-SE connection is deleted. If the client does not send any authenticated 
M-SE packet within this interval then the session is erased. The idle timeout must be 
announced to the parity, i.e. the client. This is very important since one of the main tasks in 
the M-VPN is to achieve optimum updates as described in 7.  
If the client authenticates with a signature, then the server attaches clientCertificteRequest 
vector. It contains multiple CertificateRequestPayloads, one for every accepted certificate 
authority see 4.13.8. If the client wishes to authenticate with a password then the challenge is 
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sent in the clientChallengeValue, see chapter 4.13.10. If the EAP is to be used, then the 
server uses clientEAP, see chapter 4.12. 
The padding values in the last payload add empty values to the EncryptedPayloads, so 
they can be encrypted with block cipher, see chapter 4.9. 
4.4 ClientResponse  
After receiving the ServerHello, the client sends all further payloads encrypted. The 
structure of the ClientResponse is the following: 
 
struct {  
 MkeHeader   header; 
 
 struc { 
 /* no payloads */ 
 } UnencryptedPayloads; 
 
 struc { 
 IdPayload  clientId; 
MinPoaChangeIntPayload minPoaChangeInterval; 
 MaxUpdateIntPayload maxUpateInterval; 
 SessionIdPayload  clientSessionId; 
 SessionLifeTimePayload clientSessionLifeTime[0..2^16-]; 
TrafficSelectorPayload clientTrafficSelector; 
 
 select (ServerAuthenticationType){ 
   case rsasig:  
  CertificateRequestPaylaad serverCertificteRequest[3..2^16-1]; 
   case dsssig:  
  CertificateRequestPayload serverCertificteRequest[3..2^16-1]; 
   case password: 
  ChallengePayload  serverChallengeValue; 
   case eap: 
  EapPayload  serverEap; 
   case sharedsecret: 
  /* no payload */ 
  } 
 
  select (ClientAuthenticationType){ 
   case rsasig:  
  CertificatePaylaad  clientCertificte; 
   case dsssig:  
  CertificatePayload  clientCertificte; 
   case password  : 
  ChallengePayload  clientChallengeResponse; 
   case eap 
  EapPayload  clientEap; 
   case sharedsecret: 
  /* no payload */ 
  } 
 
 /* optional notification */ 
 NotificationPayload  notification; 
 
 HmacPayload   clientHmacValue; 
 PaddingPayload   padding; 
 
 } EncryptedPayloads; 
} ClientResponse; 
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struct {  
 ProtocolVerion   mobileKeVersion; 
 TypeOfMessage  clientResponse; 
 Length   len; 
 opaque   cookieServer[4]; 
 opaque   cookieClient[4]; 
} MkeHeader 
 
enum {rsasig, dsssig, password, sharedSecret, eap, nul ..255l} ServerAuthenticationType; 
 
The clientId contains the ID of the client, which is a unique string. If the server has other 
M-KE negotiations with the same ID then the M-SE are removed after successful 
authentication. The maxPoaChangeInt is the idle timeout after which the session is deleted. 
The minPoaChangeInterval contains the minimal interval between the PoA changes 
supported by the client. 
The clientSessionId contains the session ID in SessionIdPayload, see 4.13.14. It is used in 
the M-SE for session identification. The optional clientSessionLifeTime payloads give the 
lifetime of the M-SE session. The lifetime can be in seconds and/or in bytes, see 4.13.7. 
The clientTrafficSelector contains the transport layer parameter for the protected traffic. 
They are used together with the Mapper for classifying the data for encryption. 
Depending on the selected server authentication, the client sends serverCertificteRequest, 
serverChallengeValue or serverEAP. The clientCertificte, see 4.13.9, is sent when the client 
authenticates with a signature. The certificate must be issued from one of the authorities listed 
in the clientCertificateRequest part of HelloServer message. The client sends the 
clientChallengeResponse when using password for authentication, see 4.13.10. The result can 
be forwarded to the AAA server (Radius) for standard CHAP authentication. For EAP 
authentication the clientEAP values is used.  
NotificationPayload (see 4.13.17) can be optionally embedded if the client makes server 
discovery or announces server service. The notification procedure is described in 4.10. 
The purpose of clientHmacValues payload is integrity protection of the exchanged 
payloads. It contains the hash of the significant sent and received massages. The hash is 
protected by server signature or authentication key, see 4.13.16. Significant messages are all 
M-KE without the retransmissions and pending notifications. Only after successfully 
verification of the HMAC, the client can be considered authenticated and the M-SE session is 
created. If the verification fails, then the M-KE negotiation is considered as bogus. Optional 
notification can be sent to the client. How the clientHmachValues is built is described in 
HmacPayload in 4.13.16. 
4.5 ServerResponse 
The ServerResponse is the last message with the following structure: 
 
struct {  
 MkeHeader   header; 
 
 struc { 
 /* no payloads */ 
 } UnencryptedPayloads; 
 
 struc { 
 IdPayload  serverId; 
 SessionIdPayload  serverSessionId; 
 SessionLifetimePayload serverSessionLifeTime[1..2^16-1]; 
 TrafficSelectorPayload serverTrafficSelector; 
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 select (ServerAuthenticationType){ 
   case rsasig:  
  CertificatePaylaad  serverCertificte; 
   case dsssig:  
  CertificatePayload  serverCertifictet; 
   case password  : 
  ChallengePayload  serverChallengeResponse; 
   case eap 
  EapPayload  serverEap; 
   case sharedsecret: 
  /* no payload */ 
  } 
 /* optional notification */ 
 NotificationPayload  nofity 
 HmacPayload  serverHmachValue; 
 PaddingPayload  padding; 
 
 } EncryptedPayloads; 
} ServerResponse; 
 
struct {  
 ProtocolVerion   mobileKeVersion; 
 TypeOfMessage  serverResponse; 
 Length   len; 
 opaque   cookieServer[4]; 
 opaque   cookieClient[4]; 
 
} MkeHeader 
 
The server sends its ID in the serverId value. The serverSessionId is the M-SE session ID 
used by the server for sending. The M-SE session is created after successful authentication 
and verification of serverHmachValue. Otherwise, the negotiation is discarded and 
notification may be sent. The server sets the session lifetime in the serverSessionLifeTime. 
The lifetime must be set and at least one SessionLifeTime payload must be sent. The lifetime 
cannot be larger than the one suggested by the client. The client adjusts its value to the server 
ones. 
The transport parameters are sent in the serverTrafficSelector value. The client must 
adjust its traffic selector to the server one if the values are different. 
The authentication value serverCertificate contains the certificate of the server, if 
signature authentication is required by the server. If password authentication was used by the 
user then the serverChallengeValue is sent. The serverEap gives the EAP values. 
The serverHmachValue contains the integrity check of all significant messages, which are 
sent and received by the server, see 4.13.16. The client must verify the value carefully since it 
gives the proof of private key or shared secret ownership by the server. 
4.6 Key derivation 
There are 6 keys derived from Diffie-Hellman values exchanged in the M-KE: 
• SKe_c is the client encryption key of the M-KE encrypted payload. 
• SKe_s is the server encryption key of the M-KE encrypted payload. 
• Sa_c is the client authentication key for integrity protection of the M-SE 
packets. 
• Sa_s is the server authentication key for integrity protection of the M-SE 
packets. 
4.7 Fragmentation of Mobile KE datagram 73  
• Se_c is the client encryption key of the M-SE packets. 
• Se_s is the server encryption key of the M-SE packets. 
All keys must be of a fixed size required by the protection algorithm. If the protection 
algorithm requires specific key, such as DES and 3DES with parity bits, then this derivation 
from the random values must be defined in the encryption algorithm. For integrity algorithms 
based on hash, the key size is always equal to the HASH length.  
 
The key derivation is the same as IKEv2 [13] and described as: 
 
SKEYSEED = prf(cookieClient | cookieServer , gDH) 
 
{ SKe_c | SKe_s | Sa_c | Sa_s | Se_c | Se_s } = prf+ (SKEYSEED, cookieClient | cookieServer | 
clientSessionId | serverSessionId ), 
 
where prf() is pseudo random function described in 4.6.1 (The brackets “()” denote 
function). The pfs+() denoted pseudo random stream with sufficient length see chapter 4.6.2. 
The gDH denotes the shared secret of the DH negotiation. The gDH = (gs mod p) c mod p = (gc 
mod p) s mod p, where: gc mod p is the public values generated by the client, gs mod p is 
generated by the server, p and g are group predefined values see [13]. The s and c are called 
private values. If necessary, padding with zeros is added to gDH to reach sufficient length. The 
cookieClient and cookieServer are the cookies from the M-KE header. The 
clientSessionId1(2) and serverSessionId1(2) are the session ID’s negotiated in the M-KE.  
4.6.1 Pseudo Random Function 
The pseudo random function prf() is described in [12] and out of scope of this document. 
The function uses the same integrity hash algorithm negotiated in the M-KE for M-SE 
protection, thus SHA1 or MD5. 
4.6.2 Pseudo Random Stream 
The pseudo random stream function returns variable length pseudo random data. The 
keys have different sizes and the result of pfs+() has the total size of all keys. M-KE uses the 
same pfs+() as IKEv2 [13] defined as follows: 
 
prf+ (K,S) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ... 
 
   where: 
   T1 = prf (K, S | 0x01) 
   T2 = prf (K, T1 | S | 0x02) 
   T3 = prf (K, T2 | S | 0x03) 
   T4 = prf (K, T3 | S | 0x04) 
 
The equation can be continued, when necessary to compute all required keys. The keys 
are taken from the output without considering the boundaries of the T() functions.  
4.7 Fragmentation of Mobile KE datagram 
A packet must be fragmented if it is larger than the maximum MTU of the path [2]. The 
UDP packet must be fragmented at IP layer as defined in [2]. This leads to problems with 
NAPT router described in A.2.1.9 and 3.2. To handle this issue, the fragmentation is made at 
M-KE layer.  
If a M-KE packet must be fragmented, the data block of encrypted and unencrypted 
Payload vectors are split into fragments. The M-KE packets contain an UDP and M-KE 
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header and part of the payloads. The packet can be handled by the intermediate NAPT router, 
since the UDP header is present. The fragment byte in every M-KE message is set to the 
sequence number of the fragment. The sequence starts from 1 and increases monotone with 1 
for every fragment within one M-KE negotiation, i.e. ClientHello, ServerHello etc. The 
numbering does not start from the very beginning on every fragmentation, since it must be 
unique. Upon reaching the 255, the counting starts from the beginning. The packetLength 
contains the size of the total datagram equal to the sum of all fragments. If the byte fragment 
is zero, then there is no fragmentation.  
The receiver identifies the packet using the cookieServer/cookieClient, packetLength and 
the fragment values. All fragments have the same cookies, thus it is the equivalent of the ID 
value by IP fragmentation. The fragments belonging to one datagram are gathered until the 
packetLength is reached. The sequence number indicates how these must be joined. This is a 
simple and efficient method for fragmentation. 
The MTU size of the interface and the PMTU mechanism gives the maximum size of M-
KE packets. The nodes are moving frequently in a mobile environment. The PoA must be 
constant for at about three roundtrips in order to be able to perform PMTU and sent packet. 
The PMTU requires one round trip with a static PoA. The message exchange requires 
constant PoA for one roundtrip plus the processing time see 3.5.1. The processing time is 
defined as maximum one roundtrip, thus the message exchange requires two roundtrips. 
Constant PoA for ca. three round trips is not always possible. It was assumed in 3.5.2 that the 
PoA is constant for at least two roundtrips. When PMTU is impossible, the nodes can set the 
maximal MTU to 1450. The value is considered as a sufficiently small. Setting the MTU to a 
constant value of 1450 contains the risk of loosing packets in the links with lower MTU. A 
constant MTU must be used if no other alternatives are possible.  
4.8 Payloads  
The different payloads have the same general structure as shown in the 4.3. The values 
depending on the context are defined in the appendix 4.13. 
4.9 Encrypted payloads 
The algorithm negotiated in the unencrypted payload is used for protection of 
EncryptedPayload. The same algorithm is used for the encryption of the M-SE and M-KE. 
The block encryption algorithms require the input with length of modulo, like 64 bit. Padding 
with zeroes is added in PaddingPayload until the required length is reached.  
Keys for inbound and outbound traffic are different. The client key, SKe_c ,and the 
server key, SKe_s, derivation is described in 4.6. The encryption algorithms are defined in 
4.13.  
4.10 Notification 
The notification is used for informing or requesting information. The notification consists 
of requests and responses. There is a response to every request. The NotificationPayload 
should always be carried in M-KE message together with a HMAC payload in 
EnryptedPayload. If there is no authenticated DH key, then the notification is sent in the 
unencrypted part as a single payload of M-KE. If carried in the unencrypted part, the 
notification may be discarded by the receiver. The notification payload can be added to every 
packet or sent as a single payload of the notification message. 
 
The structure of notification message in the NoficationPayload, see 4.13.17 is: 
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enum { serverDiscovery(1),,, ...255} notificationType; /* see 4.13.19 */ 
struc { 
 opaque  notificationCookie[4] 
 uint8  notificationType; 
 select (notificationType) { 
  serverDiscovery: 
  Server  serverDiscovery[0..255]; 
  serverAnnonce: 
  Server serverInfo; 
  redirection: 
  Server serverParams[1..255]; 
  else: /* any other type */ 
  opague text[1..255]; 
 } 
} NotificationMessage; 
 
The notificationCookie is a unique cookie of 4 byte for the identification of a response 
message. The initiator generates and sets the value. The responder uses the same values in the 
reply. The notificationType gives the subject and it is defined in 4.13.19.  
The following value depends on the notificationType. A list of servers is used by 
serverDiscovery type. The structure Server is defined in 4.11. A single server (serverInfo) is 
included by announcing with serverAnnonce. If the type is a redirection then a list of servers 
is used serverParams. A string can be included providing the verbal notification text. The 
string is variable in length with a maximum 255 characters. The text has information and 
debugging purposes only. The action is taken depending on the notification type. 
4.10.1 ServerDiscovery notification 
A server discovery is a notification payload included in ClientResponse and 
ServerResponse packet. The client requires a list of known servers. The server responds with 
a list of servers. The structure is described in 4.11. For example: if two VoIP participants are 
behind the same NAPT router and have client and server functionality, they can communicate 
directly without using a public Internet server. 
The request message contains null Server structures. The server answers with a list of 
servers built in the same way as described in chapter 4.11. The server also sets itself in first 
position on the list. The resource string plays a significant role. The string describes the 
resource provided by the server. This can be a URI [17] or any other Text. For example: 
news:comp.infosystems.www.servers.unix, file://Wikipedia_Articles\URI.xml, “News etc. 
The client evaluates the entries and can a establish connection with some of them. The exact 
format of the resources strings depends on the deployment. It is left to following documents 
to describe exact scenarios. The priority byte is ignored. 
It negotiates a native mode and sends the encrypted ServerDiscovery payload in the 
ClientResponse message. The message consists of the HMAC and ServerDiscovery payload. 
The server replies with the server list in its ServerResponse. After this, the M-KE session is 
terminated.  
4.11 Connection redirection 
The connection redirection notification gives alternative servers for this session. The new 
servers must have the same administrative rights and offer the same resources as the current 
one. It can be the same physical machine reachable under a new address. This type of 
notification can be only sent encrypted between mutual authenticated peers. 
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The client must try to establish M-KE and consequent M-SE session to new server(s). 
The entries in the list have priority and the client must start with the highest one. If two or 
more servers have the same priority, then parallel M-SE connection can be established. 
Otherwise only one session is expected.  
A possible reason for the redirection can be load sharing. For example, if the server has 
reached its maximum capacity then new connection can be redirected. The new server is an 
alternative for reaching the same resources. Load distribution on session basis can be 
achieved easily in this way. Optionally, the client may reconfigure to use the new server 
instead the old one for all future connections. The replacement of the current server in the 
configuration depends on the local security policy. 
The Server structure is the following: 
 
enum { IPv6(1), IPv4(2), fqdn...255} Host; 
 
struc { 
 opaques  name[1..32]; 
 uint8  priority; 
 uint16  timeToLive,  
 uint8  ipVersion; 
select (Host) { 
  IPv4: 
  uint8 ipv4[4]; 
  IPv6: 
  uint8 ipv6[16]; 
 fqdn: 
  opaque  fqdn[1..255]; 
 } 
 uint16  port; 
 opaque  resources[0..255]; 
} Server; 
 
The first string is the name of the server. Its size is limited to 32 bytes. The next one byte 
gives the priority. The lower the byte values, the higher the priority. The timeToLive contains 
the validity of this entry in seconds. After the time expires, the entry must be discarded. Zero 
value is set to ignore this field. The Host value gives the type connection. It can be 
FQDN(Fully Qualified Domain Name), for example “server1.foo.de”. The FQDN must be 
resolved in the DNS with its A-Record. The information can also be an IPv4 or IPv6 address. 
The port value contains the destination port for the connection establishment. The last string 
resources describe the type of resources contained within the server (see example in 4.10.1) 
If one server is reachable at multiple addresses, then the server is listed multiple times in 
the list with different priorities. If the client already has a list of servers then only the entries 
with the highest timeToLive are kept. The number of entries kept by the client is left to the 
implementation. It depends on the memory of the node. It should be noted that some of the 
entries might not be reachable because of the NAPT see 3.2.1. 
4.12 EAP Authentication properties 
The M-KE negotiation has four messages, ClientHello, ClientResponse, ServerHello, 
ServerResponse. The EAP payload can be added to ServerHello, ClientResponse and 
ServerResponse. The EAP is not limited to 3 messages. If more EAP messages are required 
then the ServerResponse and ClientResponse are repeated until EAP is finished. These 
additional messages contain only EapPayload and HmacPayload in the encrypted part.  
4.13 Appendix M-KE 77  
4.13 Appendix M-KE 
4.13.1 DhValuePayload 
The payload carries the Diffie-Hellman (DH) public parameters. 
 
struc { 
 uint8  consDhValuePayload;  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  contDhGroup; 
 opaque  dhPublicValue[0..2^16-1]; 
} DhValuePayload 
 
The constDhValuePayload is byte value indicating the type of the payload see 4.13.19. 
The contDhGroup is a byte from the predefined DH group from 1 to 5 (contDhGroup1 to 
contDhGroup5). The groups are defined in Oakley protocol [10] and additional in [11]. The 
dhPublicValue is the public value with a variable length, in accordance with this group. 
4.13.2 ProtectionAlgPayload 
enum { client (1), server(2) } Node; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constProtectionAlgPayload;  /* defined in 4.13.19*/ 
 uint8  node    /* client or server */ 
 opaque  constProtectionAlgorithms<0..2^16-1>; 
} ProtectionAlgPayload 
 
The protection algorithm payload contains one combination of authentication, encryption 
and integrity protection algorithms. It has type constProtectionAlgPayload, see 4.13.19. One 
combination is stored in vector of two bytes constProtectionAlgorithms. The constant values 
defined in 4.13. The subtype node can be client or server, depending who should use this 
method. The payload can be included multiple times in one message. 
4.13.3 MaxAnswerTimePayload 
enum { sec (1), millisec(2) } Unit; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constMaxAnswerTimePayload;  /* defined in 4.13.19*/ 
 uint8  Unit 
 opaque  interval<0..2^16-1>; 
} MaxAnswerTimePayload 
 
The payload gives the maximal time for processing expected by the Mobile Server. This 
payload is sent by the Mobile Client. This parameter is important for defining the mobility of 
the client. The constMaxAnswerTimePayload is defined the 4.13. The subtype Unit gives the 
unit, seconds or milliseconds of the interval.  
4.13.4 PendingPayload 
If the server cannot answer within the interval given in MaxAnswerTimePayload, then it 
sends a pending payload.  
 
enum { sec (1), millisec(2) } Unit; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constPendingPayload; /* defined in 4.13.19*/ 
 uint8  Unit 
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 opaque  interval<0..2^16-1>; 
} PendingPayload 
 
The interval vector gives the interval for polling. The client repeats the request after 
expiration of this interval.  
4.13.5 MinPoaChangeIntPayload 
The MinPoaChangeIntPayload gives the minimal time interval between the PoA changes 
supported by the Mobile Node. In this way, the client and server avoid connection drops due 
to low performance of the nodes. The structure is very similar to the 
MaxAnswerTimePayload. 
 
enum { sec (1), millisec(2) } Unit; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constMinPoaChangeIntPayload; /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  Unit 
 opaque  interval<0..2^16-1>; 
} MinPoaChangeIntPayload 
4.13.6 MaxUpdateIntPayload 
The payload provides information about the idle timeout used for the M-SE connection. 
The node must send M-SE location update or authenticate packets maximal at this interval. 
Otherwise, the session will be deleted. Announcing this value helps to adjust the best update 
frequency for the connection update. 
 
enum { sec (1), millisec(2) } Unit; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constMaxUpdateIntPayload;  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  Unit 
 opaque  interval<0..2^16-1>; 
} MaxUpdateIntPayload 
4.13.7 SessionLifetimePayload 
The payload gives information on the M-SE session lifetime. The LifetimeUnit can be 
seconds, MBytes or KBytes. Multiple payloads can be combined. 
 
enum { sec (1), KBytes(2), MBytes(3)  } LifetimeUnit; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constSessionLifetimePayload /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  LifetimeUnit 
 opaque  values<0..2^16-1>; 
} SessionLifetimePayload; 
4.13.8 CertificateRequestPayload 
The node requires a certificate issued by authority pointed in this payload. The payload 
contains the Distinguished Name of the Certification Authority, thus the certificate subject 
name. The encoding can only be DER in this payload type. If there are no preferences for 
Certification Authority, then the node can send an empty data value for certificateDN.  
The Mobile Client and Mobile Server send separate CertificateRequestPayloads to each 
other and therefore, they may authenticate with certificates issued by different authorities. 
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enum { PKCS #7 (1), DER (2), ShaAndURL(3)} Encoding; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constCertificateRequestPayload /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  Encoding 
 opaque  certificateDN[0..2^16-1]; 
} CertificateRequestPayload; 
 
4.13.9 CertificatePayload 
This payload carries the node’s certificate. The encoding in the subtype can be DER, 
PKCS #7 (certificate chain) or URL. In the URL encoding, the node sends 20 octets SHA1 of 
the certificate followed by a URL link where the whole certificate can be loaded.  
 
enum { PKCS #7 (1), DER (2), ShaAndURL(3)} Encoding; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constCertificatePayload  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
uint8  Encoding 
 opaque  certificate[0..2^16-1]; 
} CertificatePayload; 
4.13.10 ChallengePayload 
The payload is used for password authentication very similar to PPP CHAP[7]. External 
AAA servers can be used in same way as by CHAP without any change of Radius protocol. 
The subtype is provided depending if the data is a challenge or response and calculated with 
MD5(default) or with SHA1.  
 
enum { Challenge7 (1), ResponseMD5 (2), ResponseSHA(3)} DataType; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constChallengePayload  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  DataType; 
 opaque  value[0..2^16-1]; 
} ChallengePayload; 
 
4.13.11 EapPayload 
struc { 
 uint8  constEapPayload;  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  0; 
 opaque  eapValues[0..2^16-1]; 
} EapPayload; 
 
M-KE specifies a container for EAP values as specified in [8]. Every type of EAP can be 
used, see 4.12. 
4.13.12 PaddingPayload 
struc { 
 uint8  consPaddingPayload;  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  0; 
 opaque  padding[0..2^16-1]; 
} PaddingPayload; 
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The payload adds padding to the EncrypredPayloads, so it can be encrypted with block 
encryption algorithms, see 4.9. 
4.13.13 IdPayload 
enum { DN (1), UTF8(2), URI(3), FQDN(4) } IdType; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constIdPayload  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  IdType; 
 opaque  value[0..2^16-1]; 
} IdPayload; 
 
The ID type can be Distinguished Name (DN) in DER format, String in UTF8 string 
format, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or Universal Resource Identifier (URI).  
4.13.14 SessionIdPayload 
This payload contains one session ID. The sub type is not used. The ID value is 4 bytes. 
  
struc { 
 uint8  constSessionId  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
uint8  0; 
 opaque  sessionID<0..2^32-1>; 
} SessionIdPayload; 
 
4.13.15 TrafficSelectorPayload 
The traffic selector contains the transport parameter. The subtype NetworkType gives the 
type of the protocol. The NetworkValues contains the port ranges. If there is a single port then 
the start and stop values are equal. There are no port values for ICMP. 
 
enum { TCP (1), UDP(2), ICMP(3), SCTP(3), all(4) } NetworkProtocol; 
 
struc{ 
 select (NetworkProtocol) { 
  case ICMP: 
  /* no additional parameter */ 
  case TCP || UDP || SCTP 
  uint16 startSourcePort; 
  uint16 stopSourcePort; 
  uint16 startDestPort; 
  uint16 stopDestPort; 
 } 
} NetworkValues 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constTrafficSelectorPayload  /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  NetworkProtocol; 
 opaque  NetworkValues; 
} TrafficSelectorPayload; 
4.13.16 HmacPayload 
The HmacPayload contains protected hash values (HMAC) of all M-KE messages sent 
by the client and the server excluding the pending and retransmissions. The HMAC function 
is well known and it is used in IPSec and TLS/SSL and described in [12]. The HMAC value 
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is built with the hash type of MD5 or SHA1, specified in the HashType variable. The general 
structure: 
 
enum { MD5 (1), SHA1(2), } HashType 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constHmacPayload /* defined in 4.13.19 */ 
 uint8  HashType; 
 opaque  hmac[0..2^32-1]; 
} HmacPayload; 
 
The input text for the HMAC is a general concatenation of all significant packets: 
 
Tex t= Node | ClientHello | ClientResponse1 | ClientResponse2 ....| ServerHello | ServerResponse1 |  
 | ServerResponse2 .... 
 
The Node string is equal to “1111” for the Mobile Client (MC) and “5555” for the Mobile 
Server (MS). The constants are set randomly, thus the only requirements are to be different at 
the MC and MS. The result is different HMAC values even when hashing the same messages 
at MC and MS. Mirroring attacks are avoided in this way. The retransmitted and pending 
messages are ignored and not considered. Retransmissions are result of packet losses or 
pending status. For the calculation of HMAC, all bytes of the fixed length HMAC payload 
are set to zero.  
The EAP authentication can require more than 4 messages. In this case, all 
ClientResponse and ServerResponce messages are used in the HMAC building 
The building of the HMAC depends on the authentication algorithm. The general 
principle is - if the sender has a private key then it signs the HMAC with it. The HMAC has 
null key in this case. If there is a shared secret or a Master Session Key (MSK) by the EAP, 
so it is used in the HMAC. The HMAC can be build with zero key, if no key is available. 
This is strongly undesired, because of man-in-the-middle attacks. The bytes of the key are 
repeated until the required size is reached if the HMAC key is less than the length of the hash 
function (SHA1 20 bytes MD5 16Byte). For example: if the key is 17 bytes and a 20 byte key 
is required then the first 3 bytes are added again at the end of the key, thus the result is one 20 
byte key. The HMAC for the different authentication scenario are summarized to: 
 
Case I 
The Mobile Client authenticates with a password or EAP without MSK. The Mobile 
Server authenticates with digital signature (RSA or DSS). The HMAC by server and client is 
built with zero key (equal to zero, thus no key). The client sends the HMAC result as it is. 
The server signs its HMAC with its private key.  
The HMAC sent by the server cannot be manipulated, since it is signed with private key. 
A man-in-the-middle attack will be noticed by the HMAC verification at the client. It 
contains all client and server messages. The server cannot detect manipulation, since the 
client’s HMAC is not protected. The trust lies on the client. 
Using the password as a key by calculation of the HMAC is unsuitable. The verifier of 
the HMAC must know the password. Commonly, the password is unknown to the M-KE 
server. The password is verified by external AAA server. The M-KE server forwards the 
CHAP values for verification to the AAA server (radius). The AAA responds with accepted 
or rejected to the K-KE node. The AAA cannot currently verify the HMAC, since it is not 
standard Radius operation. The M-KE server cannot verify the HMAC without the password 
in clear.  
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Case II 
The Mobile Nodes use shared secret or EAP with a derivation of the Master Session Key 
(MSK, see EAP). The client and the server use the MSK or the shared secret for a key in the 
HMAC function. The secrets are unknown to a potential man-in-the-middle attacker, thus no 
manipulation is possible. It must be stressed that the MSK value must be delivered with an 
authentication in EAP handshake.  
 
Case III 
The server authenticates himself with a password or EAP and the client with a digital 
signature (RSA or DSS). It is the inverse case of the first one. The HMAC is built from the 
input text with no key. The server sends the resulting HMAC as it is. The client signs the 
result with its private key.  
 
Case IV 
The client and server use passwords or EAP without a Master Session Key. This 
combination is highly undesirable, since there is no protection against a man-in-the-middle. If 
used, the HMAC is built without a key from the input text. 
 
Case V 
Both client and server use a signature. Then the HMAC is built without a key and signed 
with the private key of the sender. 
4.13.17 NotificationPayload 
enum { request (1), responce(2) } NoticationDirection; 
 
struc { 
 uint8  constNotificationPayload  /* defined in 4.13 */ 
 uint8  NotificationDirection; 
 opaque  NotificationMessage[0..2^16-1]; 
} NotificationPayload; 
 
The payload carries the notification NoticationMessage the structure of which is 
described in 4.10. The type of the message can be a request or response. The initiator sends a 
notification request and the responder replies.  
4.13.18 Protection algorithms 
The protection algorithms are coded in two bytes shown in Figure 4.3. The first four Most 
Significant Bits (MSB) define the authentication. The following 4 bits define the encryption 
method. The next two bits define the hash function 
used in the HMAC. The last significant bit defines 
the mode of operation native or tunnel mode (M in 
figure). 
 
 
The following values are used: 
 
Authentication 
Value Algorithm Standard 
1 Digital signature RSA PKCS1[5] 
2 Digital signature DSS DSS[6] 
3 Password M-KE 
Figure 4.3: Protection algorithms 
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4 Shared secret M-KE 
5 EAP EAP[8] 
6 Null  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.13.19 Payload constants 
The type byte of the payload has the values: 
 
constDhValuePayload  1 
constProtectionAlgPayload  2 
constmaxAnswerTimePayload 3 
constPendingPayload  4 
constMinPoaChangeIntPayload 5 
constMaxUpdateIntPayload  6 
constCertificateRequestPayload 7 
constCertificatePayload  8 
constChallengePayload  9 
constEapPayload  10 
constPaddingPayload  11 
constIdPayload  12 
constSessionIdPayload  13 
constTrafficSelectorPayload  14 
constHmacPayload  15 
constNotificationPayload  16 
 
Encryption 
Value Algorithm RFC 
1 DES CBC RFC 2405 
2 3DES CBC RFC 2451 
3 AES 128 CBC  RFC 3602 
4 AES 192 CBC RFC 3602 
5 AES 256 CBC RFC 3602 
6 Null  
Hash 
Value Algorithm RFC 
1 HMAC SHA RFC 2104 
2 HMAC MD5 RFC 2104 
Mode (M) 
Value Algorithm Standard 
1 Tunnel M-SE 
2 Native M-SE 
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The subtype bytes have values, which are defined in the payload definition, depending on 
the payload type, see chapter 4.8. 
 
The notificationType in 4.10 has the possible values defined in the following table. The 
taken action depends on the local security policy. In the table are given some possible 
actions.  
 
 
 
 
Notification 
Type  Meaning Originator Description 
1 Server Discovery client The client requires a list of servers. The server 
should reply with its list. 
2 Redirection to alternative 
server 
server The client must connect server from the list. 
3 M-SE session is about to expire client/server The node is about the delete the current session. The node should start new M-KE. 
4 Invalid M-SE client/server The M-SE session is invalid. 
5 Node is going down client/server The node cannot serve this session anymore. The 
receiver must delete its sessions. 
6 Node internal error client/server The node cannot serve this request due an internal error. 
7 No proposal chosen server No proper proposal can be found. 
8 Invalid signature client/server The node signature is invalid. 
9 Revoked certificate client/server The send certificate is revoked. 
10 Authentication failed client/server The credentials are invalid, i.e. password or 
shared secret. 
11 DH parameter not supported client/server The DH group is not supported. 
12 Decryption failed client/server The host cannot decrypt the payloads. 
13 Server running on this client client The node also runs a server. The new server can be added in the list. 
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5 Mobile Session Encapsulation 
The Mobile Session Encapsulation (M-SE) is a protocol for data protection between the 
Mobile Client and Mobile Server. The M-SE packets are encrypted, contain authenticated 
integrity check, replay protected and have session hiding mechanism. The M-SE requires pre-
configured keys, algorithms etc, which are delivered by the M-KE described in chapters 3 
and 4. The M-KE negotiation must be successfully finished before every M-SE session. The 
M-SE runs over UDP and uses the same ports as M-KE (see 3.4). 
The M-SE introduces a new approach for session hiding described in 3.7. There are novel 
methods for location update, see 5.8.1 and Mappers described in 5.1.1. The M-SE 
implements database SAM-DB for connection management described in 3.9. The well-
established crypto methods, like 3DES, AES etc, are used in the protocol. The M-SE does not 
intent to use new crypto algorithms then to use the well-studied and implemented algorithms.  
The M-SE delivers transparent network layer (UDP/TCP) to the end nodes. Transparent 
means that it is transmitted without any manipulation. The transport layer (IP) is constant 
during one session, but it is not transparent. The IP is constant equal to the predefined 
Mappers as described in 3.6.1. The public IP values change by the host movements and 
therefore, they are masked with Mappers. 
The M-SE session is not tied to constant PoA parameter. The received packets are 
matched to the certain session using dynamic SessionID filed in the M-SE header, thus the 
received packet is processed independent from the PoA. When sending packet, the last known 
PoA (last received authenticated packet) is used by the Mobile Node. The current PoA 
parameters are stored in the SAM-DB and updated with every authenticated packet received 
(see 3.9). If there is no permanent traffic, the node should send updates to announce its 
current location. The update procedure uses notification packets (see 5.8.1). The time 
intervals for update execution is subject of the Mobile Location Update (M-LU) protocol, 
described in 7.  
5.1 Tunnel mode 
The M-SE operates in two modes: tunnel and native described in 3.6. The M-SE does not 
provide a tunnel, but it integrates existing external tunnels such as L2TP. The tunnel mode is 
typically used for building IP layer connections known as VPN. Link Layer connection are 
also possible but not discussed here. The layer structure in tunnel mode with L2TP or GRE is 
shown in Figure 5.1. How the tunnel works is not a subject of M-VPN.  
The possibility for the physical separation of the Tunnel Node and Mobile Node provides 
a big advantage for the M-VPN. The Tunnel Nodes are usually already part of the provider 
infrastructure using AAA servers etc. The synergy effect is that the existing infrastructure can 
be used in M-VPN. 
5.1.1 Mappers in tunnel mode 
The Mappers mask (exchange) the public IP addresses of the Mobile Nodes, which 
change during the session see 3.6.1. The Mappers are constant during the M-SE session and 
are locally defined. The M-SE delivers constant and not transparent IP layer (transport). This 
is sufficient for building a tunnel over M-SE. 
The Mappers are used for transport between the Tunnel Node and Mobile Node, thus they 
only have local significance. They are not announced between the Mobile Nodes in M-VPN. 
The Mappers on the server and client side can overlap, since there is no relation between 
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them. The addresses must be unique in the local environment. Private addresses can be used 
also. 
There are two Mappers for every M-SE session: termination and session Mapper, 
described in chapter 3.6.1. The assignment of the Mapper depends on the node’s ID and can 
be static IP or from IP pool. It is important to stress that the user ID must be unique. 
Otherwise the Mapper can overlap, which leads to routing problems. 
The L2TP connection is initiated from the client (L2TP LAC) mostly. The Mobile Server 
may assign session Mappers from the IP pool. The advantage in this case is that the client ID 
must not be known in advance. The server chooses unique session Mapper from the IP pool. 
L2TP is considered more suitable for M-VPNs, since the client initiates the connection to the 
server. This fits well in the unidirectional nature of NAPT. The static Mappers are used by 
GRE tunnel, since the Tunnel Node points are fixed for these two clients. 
  
The termination Mapper defines the IP of the Tunnel Node. Setting the IP depending on 
the user gives the flexibility of using multiple Tunnel Nodes for one Mobile Server. Load 
balancing and administrative separation can be achieved in this way. For example: the nodes 
can be separated in different administrative groups and use different Tunnel Nodes. Figure 
5.2 shows the distribution of to 3 Tunnel Nodes for administrators, users and guests. 
 
5.1.2 Authentication in the Tunnel Node 
Authentication and authorisation can be carried out at different layers in tunnel mode, 
since PPP, L2TP and M-KE support authentication. If the Tunnel Node is already deployed, 
the existing authentication processes could be used. Before implementing the authentication 
must be considered that, the different layer authentication can have an impact on security as 
described in 6.1 
Figure 5.1: Layer structure of M-SE in tunnel mode 
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5.2 Native mode 
The native mode is simplified deployment without tunnel. It can be partially compared to 
IPSec in transport mode where TCP/UDP communication can be protected. The difference is 
that the IPSec host is at the same time the end host of the connection, for example HTTP 
session. In M-SE, the end host can be different from the Mobile Server, which gives 
additional flexibility of M-SE comparatively to IPSec. The layer structure is shown in Figure 
5.3. 
The Mappers are used between the application and the Mobile Server. The applications 
are aware of the Mappers, which are part of the Intranet. This must be considered carefully 
for all bundled sessions and protocols carrying network parameters in their payloads. The 
Mobile Node does not perform any translation of the payload and therefore, bundled sessions 
may not work properly. 
5.3 Packet structure  
The packet structure according the notation in [1] is following:  
 
struct {  
 ClearMseHeader   clearHeader; 
 EncryptedData  data; 
} MobileSe 
 
struct {  
 ProtocolVersion   mobileSeVersion; 
 Length   len; 
 opaque   sessionId1[4]; 
 opaque   hmac[12]; 
} ClearMseHeader 
 
struct {  
 EncryptedMseHeader encrHeader; 
 opaque   dataApplication [0..2^16-1]; 
 opaque   paddig [0..2^16-1]; 
} EncryptedData; 
 
struc { 
 opaque   sessionId2[4]; 
 uint16   sequeceNumber; 
 uint8   notification; 
 opaque   notificationDescription[0.255]; 
 byte   nextProtocol; 
} EncryptedMseHeader 
 
struc { 
 uint8   version;  /* major | minor */ 
} ProtocolVersion 
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Figure 5.3: M-SE in transport mode 
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struc { 
 uint8  fragment; 
 uint16  packetLength; 
} Length 
 
The packet contains encrypted and unencrypted part. Both of them have a header: 
ClearMseHeader and EncryptedMseHeader. The unencrypted header is used for matching 
the M-SE session and integrity check. The encrypted header carries sequence number of the 
packet, advertised sessionID etc. 
The ClearMseHeader header starts with the byte ProtocolVersion. The first 4 most 
significant bits (MSB) are the major version. The major version can be from 8 to 15. The 
version values do not overlap with the M-KE as described in 3.4. The 4 Last Significant Bits 
(LSB) contain the minor version, which can take values from 0 to 15.  
The Length structure contains the length of the datagram and optional information about 
the fragmentation. The values are set in the same way as described in the M-KE specification, 
see chapter 4. The fragmentation is done over the encrypted data. The fragments have 
unencrypted M-SE header and encrypted chunk. Generally, fragmentation of the datagram at 
M-SE layer must be avoided through reducing the MTU size of the virtual interface. 
The SessionId1 contains of 4 octets giving the M-SE identification. The value is 
negotiated in the M-KE phase and can be changed during the M-SE session see 3.7. The 
HMAC value is used for integrity protection and authentication of the packet. The vector 
contains the first 12 bytes of the HMAC result based on MD5 or SHA1 as defined in [2]. The 
HMAC algorithm is part of the M-KE negotiation. The HMAC key is the Sa_c for MC and 
Sa_s for MS, see 4.6. The HMAC value is built from the whole M-SE datagram without the 
UDP and IP header. The HMAC field is set to zero in the calculation. The data is encrypted 
with the Se_c for MC and Se_s for MS. The encryption algorithm is negotiated in the M-KE.  
The encrypted header (EncryptedMseHeader) is the first structure in the encrypted part. 
The first 4 octets are the announced session ID (SessionId2) see 3.7. The sequenceNumber 
gives the sequence number of the packet described in 5.5.  
The notification byte gives the possibility to send embedded information to peer. The 
notification does not require a supplementary packet in this way. The notification byte has the 
structure shown in Figure 5.4. The MSB (Most Significant Bit) bit 
is the P flag. The flag gives the feedback from the sender’s 
perspective, if the sender’s PoA has changed. The flag is inverted 
when the PoA differs between two following received M-SE 
packets, see 5.8.1. The information is used in the location update 
procedure (5.8.1). The Notifcation Code is the 7 LSB (Lat 
Significant Bits) in Figure 5.4. The zero means no notification. Every value greater than 0 is a 
notification. The codes are listed in 5.8. The notificationDescription gives a verbal 
description of the notification. The text is optional and can be used to add some additional 
details for debugging. The nextProtocols indicates the protocols carried in the M-SE. The 
protocol numbers are defined in [3]. The actual data is following in the dataApplication 
vector. The last vector padding adds a variable number of zeros to the data, so it becomes 
modulo of block size see 5.7. 
The M-SE adds a variable overhead depending on the added padding and notification 
text. The minimum length starts with 30 bytes (240 bit). The size can be optimised in the 
future versions of this protocol. In this research document, it is not part of the focus. The 
usable data of interface with 1500 bit MTU size and IPv4 is 1500 – 96 (IP) – 64 (UDP) – 
240(M-SE) = 1100 bits.  
Figure 5.4: Notification byte 
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5.4 Packet processing 
5.4.1 Inbound 
When a packet is received by the M-SE process, the following steps are proceeded: 
• The header structure and the version are verified.  
• Using the 64 bit SessionId1 value, the M-SE session is matched in the SAM-
DB. The M-SE session in SAM-DB defines the parameters for decryption, 
authentication etc. If the M-SE session cannot be found, the packet is 
dropped and an optional M-KE notification may be sent see 5.8. 
• If datagram was fragmented then the procedure is repeated until the hole 
datagram is assembled. 
• The HMAC value is checked. The packet is ignored if the proof fails. 
• The encrypted part is decrypted. If the decryption fails then the packet is 
dropped. 
• The sequence number is verified according to 5.5. If check fails then the 
packet is dropped. The current sequence number is updated if the check is 
passed. 
• The second SessionId is updated in the SAM-DB. The new SessionId is used 
for sending packets to the node, thus outbound.  
• The optional notification is considered. The notification values and possible 
actions are listed in 5.8. 
• The source IP and UDP is updated in the SAM-DB (current PoA values). 
This value is used for the P flag settings (see 5.4.2).  
• The encapsulated packet is extracted and compared to the traffic selectors. If 
the packet does not match, it is dropped and M-SE notification is send.  
• Mapper is added to the data and the packet is forwarded by the routing 
process. 
5.4.2 Outbound 
When a packet is received for outbound processing at the Mobile Node: 
• Using the Mapper one dedicated M-SE session is selected. The M-KE is 
initiated if there is no active M-SE session and the node is a client. The 
packet is dropped otherwise.  
• The traffic selectors are used to verify if the packet should be sent through 
this connection. If the verification fails, the packet is dropped. 
• The encrypted header is built in the following way:  
o The node sets the encrypted SessionId. It can be one already used or 
a new one. The new one can be generated by pseudo random 
algorithm, see 3.7. If a new SessionId is set then it is added in the 
database.  
o The sequence number is increased by one and set in the header.  
o The current destination IP and UDP are compared to the last used 
(last packet). If the values differ, the P flag is inverted see 5.8.1. 
o The notification value is set if required. 
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o The destination PoA is stored and used for building the P flag). 
o The next protocol value is set. 
• The data and padding is added to the structure, so the EncryptedData 
structure is built. The data is above the network layer (not including the 
network layer). 
• Then the clear header is build: 
o The protocols version is set 
o Length is constructed and if necessary, the datagram is fragmented. 
o The HMAC value is calculated over the whole M-SE packet, with 
HMAC values set to zero. 
• The packet is forwarded. The IP and UDP header of the current PoA is the 
target of the packet. 
5.5 Anti replay protection 
For the replay protection, the same method is used as in ESP [4]. Every node has a 
defined window size. This is the maximum disorder when receiving the packet, thus the 
maximum delay in packets. Out of sequence packets are result of path diversity in IP 
networks. Using M-SE in conjunction with Quality of Server (QoS) can lead also to a higher 
delay of sequence packets and therefore the windows size must be always carefully 
considered. For example: protecting VoIP traffic in the high priority queue and the best effort 
in FTP. The window size is expressed in packets and the typical recommended value is 64, 
but higher values can also be used. The value 64 is recommended since disorder of 64 is very 
unexpected practically. The same value is used also in the ESP [4] implementations. 
 
The highest received sequence number (authenticated packet) is in the right corner of the 
window shown in Figure 5.5. The left corner is shifted by the windows size. Every sequence 
number received within the window is marked. If one of the packets has been received 
already then the packet is dropped since it is considered as a replay attack. If the received 
number is out of the left side of the window, the packet is also dropped. More information of 
the method can be found in [4]. 
5.6 Unprotected notifications 
Unauthenticated messages must be considered very carefully when they should have an 
influence on the M-SE and general on security protocols. This can be, for example: ICMP 
destination unreachable or fragmentation needed. More detail can be found in 6.2. 
5.7 Traffic Flow Confidentiality Padding 
Even knowing the size of the packet is a security issue. There are typical packet sizes for 
telnet, rtp etc. The size of the packet carried in M-SE can be masked using the greater 
1 2 k k+1 k+2 k+nk+n-1 k+n+1
Window
Highest seq.numb. recieved
Figure 5.5: Window in anti reply protection 
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padding size. The padding is added to the length of block cipher, so the data can be processed 
by a block cipher. The sender can add a larger number of padding than the minimum needed. 
The size of the M-SE becomes significantly different to the original packet in this way. The 
sender can dynamically vary the size of the padding, so that no obvious correlation between 
the sizes can be found.  
The larger packets increase the required bandwidth. Larger packets do decrease the 
performance of the Internet router since their performance is limited majorly to packets per 
second. 
5.8 Notification 
The notification is an integral part of every message, so no additional messages are 
required to send maintenance information. There are Notification Code bits giving the 
notification information, the values are from 0 to 127. The optional description gives detailed 
information, which can be used for debugging. The text part is not handled by the M-SE. The 
notification may require some response from the recipient. If there is no answer then the 
connection can be reset. The following table defines the notification values and expected 
actions: 
 
5.8.1 Location update 
Location update is a procedure for: (1) detecting if the PoA parameters have changed and 
(2) updating of the current PoA. When the PoA changes the nodes are not notified and all 
packets sent get lost see chapter 2. To overcome this problem, the nodes must send packets in 
certain intervals to update its PoA in this way. The location update in M-SE is done in two 
ways: Firstly, the PoA is updated in the SAM-DB with every received authenticated packet. 
Secondly, if there is no data to be sent the node can proactively send an update. The update is 
an empty M-SE packet containing notification number 101. The receiver must immediately 
reply with the notification bits set to 102.  
All M-SE packets contain P flag. The flag is inverted every time when two following 
received packets of the same session have different PoA. The Mobile Client gets a feedback 
when its PoA has changed through received packets form the Mobile Server. Generally, this 
gives a feedback to the receiver, how its PoA changes from the perspective of the sender. An 
Notification 
Code Meaning Reply  Description 
1 M-SE session is about to expire Yes, #3 The node is about the delete the current session. The 
receiver should start M-KE to re-establish a new session. 
2 Invalid M-SE No The received M-SE packet is invalid. 
3 Node is going down Yes, #3 The node cannot serve this session any more. The receiver 
must erase its sessions. 
4 Node internal error No The node cannot server this request due an internal error. 
5 Revoked certificate No The sent certificate is revoked. 
6 Authentication failed No The credentials are invalid. 
7 Decryption failed No The node cannot decrypt the payloads. 
8 Has a server running on this 
client No 
The node also runs a server. If the receiver has client 
functionality, it can connect and take the server parameter. 
Then the new server can be added to the list. 
9 The traffic selectors are not 
matching No 
The client/server must close the session and start new M-
KE and M-SE 
101 Location update request Yes, #102 Requires an immediate reply with empty M-SE packet (no data) 
102 Location update reply No Reply of #101 
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example is shown in Figure 5.6. The PoA has changed at the 2nd, 6th and 8th received packet 
and the P flag is inverted. The send packets contain the P flag and give the information of the 
receiver.  
The time points, when the P flag is inverted, are use to adjust the update interval of the 
receiver node. The time points are the input of the Mobile Location Update protocol (M-LU) 
see chapter 7. The inversion of the P flag is used instead of a single set to minimise the 
influence of the packet losses. If the information is carried in the single packet and it gets 
lost, then the estimation of the update time point will fail significantly. The inversion is more 
robust against the losses of single packets.  
 
Every packet received is an execution of the location update, which can be initiated 
proactively through notification. The result of the location update is true or false. It is false, 
when the PoA has changed, thus the P flag has inverted. The result is true, if it has not as 
shown in Figure 5.6. The Boolean result is the input of the M-LU protocol describes in 7. 
5.9 L2TP over M-SE 
The Point to Point Protocol (PPP) [6] defines an encapsulation for transporting multi 
protocol packets across link layer. It is used at last mile in aDSL, UMTS (3G), ISDN, Dialup 
access networks. It provides client authentication with a variety of mechanisms such as PAP, 
CHAP and EAP etc. Furthermore, it is used to assign or to announce the different network 
parameters, like IP addresses, DNS servers etc.  
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Figure 5.7: L2TP over M-SE 
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The Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is a standard for transporting the PPP over 
packet switched networks (IP) and defined in [5]. The L2TP tunnel can carry over IP multiple 
PPP sessions and provides authentication mechanisms. The advantage of L2TP is the 
possibility of separating the physical link end-point from the PPP termination end-point. The 
traffic concentrators and aggregators can be used in the backbone structures. The PPP session 
can be forwarded into multiple instances. L2TP is deployed by the majority of the Internet 
Service Provider (ISPs).  
The L2TP initiator is called LAC (L2TP Access Concentrator) and the terminator LNS 
(L2TP Network Server). The L2TP header is carried in UDP, which is transported by M-SE. 
Figure 5.7 shows the layer structure. The client node sends packets encapsulated in the PPP 
part of L2TP tunnel. The L2TP data is itself a tunnel in M-SE. 
5.10 GRE over M-SE 
General Packet Encapsulation (GRE) protocols defined in [7] is a tunneling  protocol. It 
describes the encapsulation of a variety of protocols in each other simply using the GRE 
header. It is used for IP in IP encapsulation in most cases. The GRE over M-SE layer for IP 
encapsulation are shown in Figure 5.8. 
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6 Security properties of M-VPN 
The main topic of this chapter is the security properties of M-VPN. The suggested 
protocol must be carefully studied and analysed to minimise the risk of vulnerabilities and 
secure flows. The security of the cryptographic algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman, AES, 
RSA etc are out of subject in the analysis. These algorithms are widely used in many 
protocols, like IPSec and SSL and it is assumed they are sufficiently secure from a 
mathematical viewpoint. Verbal analysis of M-VPN against certain attacks is made in this 
text. Furthermore, the state diagram is presented and deployment recommendations are 
carried out. 
6.1 Authentication at different layers 
The M-KE definition in 4.1 sets which authentication methods may be used by the 
Mobile Client and Server. This chapter, gives the motivation, why the usage is restricted 
exactly to these combinations.  
The M-VPN is not starting from scratch, i.e. building new infrastructure. There is already 
an existing infrastructure and well-established protocols. Most deployments will use M-VPN 
in conjunction with already existing elements with PPP, Radius AAA etc. The good 
integration between all these protocols is the main requirements for building secure network. 
Generally, a big part of vulnerabilities is because of poor integration between the different 
applications. The application may work secure separately form each other, but the joint 
integration may suffer form vulnerabilities. The main problems are wrong assumption 
between the applications. For example using IPSec to protect SIP (VoIP). The IPSec session 
authenticates the hosts and not the SIP application. The SIP URI is not authorized and 
authenticate by the IPSec session, thus the SIP application may use bogus URI. The 
Integration of different security application must be analysed very carefully and it is target in 
this chapter.  
A typical layer structure of M-VPN with PPP is shown in Figure 6.1. There are generally 
three layers having authentication abilities, thus M-KE, L2TP and PPP, see Figure 6.2. The 
administrator has the possibility to set authentication at each of these three layers. It is a task 
of the security policy by the administrator to consider influences before switching features on 
or off. The problem is not limited to M-VPN, nut holds for all applications with overlapping 
functionality. 
Authentication, authorisation and key generation in different layers can bring many 
problems for the real deployment. The first reason is matching of the ID between the layers. 
Figure 6.1: Layers L2TP and M-VPN 
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For example: the x509 certificate used M-KE is issued to the user Alice, but the user 
authenticates himself as Bob in the following the PPP negotiation. Clearly, there is a 
mismatching of the ID and this can be an abuse from insider. It can be compared to a case 
when one person’s driving license and the ID card are valid, but issued on different names. 
Mismatching of the ID’s does not mean automatically an attack. This can be a legal case of 
inheriting administrative rights. In the last example, the certificate can authenticate the host 
and the PPP authenticates the user. This is obviously legal case.  
First, there must be a clear policy of mapping of ID between the different layers. The 
layers are dependent from each other concerning the security. The interaction between the 
layers is not very easy, since the authentication methods can even have different syntaxes of 
the ID. For example: the PPP username is built typically as “username@domain”, 
unfortunately the x501 structure has a different way of building the ID, for example 
“CN=user, OU=Arcor”. It even does not allow “@” in the Distinguished Name according the 
x501 specification. The matching is a major problem and must be carefully considered in the 
local security policy. It cannot be defined globally in a standard, since there are different 
cases with different layer combinations.  
The second potential problem arises when the authentication and the key generation are 
done at different layers. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange does not deliver 
authentication and therefore, it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. The exchanged 
DH values must be authenticated for this reason. This is typically done by exchanging 
authenticated hash values. A problem is, for example, when the authentication is made in PPP 
layer and the DH exchange is made in M-KE. The DH is not authenticated, so the M-KE is 
not secure against man-in-the-middle. Therefore, the PPP connection over M-SE is 
unprotected against man-in-the-middle. The reason is that the PPP session is started only after 
successful M-KE negotiation and establishment of M-SE. It is not possible to use PPP 
authentication for protection of M-KE, since M-KE is finished before PPP begins (causality 
principle). There must be always authentication at M-KE level. If authentication is required in 
a PPP session, then there must be two authentications at M-KE and at PPP. 
One possible solution in the example could be client authentication at PPP layer and 
server authentication at M-KE. The user PPP authentication can be made with a password. 
The M-KE server authenticates by certificate. The DH is authenticated by the server 
credentials (see 6.4.4). A manipulation can be noticed by the client because the server sends 
to the client a signed HMAC from all exchanges packets (containing also the DH public 
values). The server cannot notice any manipulation, since the client cannot build 
authenticated HMAC. The man-in-the-middle attack can be prevented only by the client. 
Naturally, the client has an interest of preventing manipulation. The exchange work in the 
same way as e-banking, thus server side certificate in TLS and client password in HTTP 
layer. 
Figure 6.2: Authentication possibilities L2TP over M-SE 
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The complexity of the authentications combination on the different layers is underlined in 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.1. The different possible authentications are shown. There is a clear 
overlapping of authentication possibilities. For example: a password can be used in PPP, 
L2TP, M-KE, M-KE-EAP and PPP-EAP. There must be a clear policy what must be allowed 
and how the layers must interact. The L2TP, PPP and M-KE can be terminated in a 
physically different host, which makes the interaction between the layers almost impossible. 
The authorisation is also an important point to be considered. It can be done depending on 
IP addresses, attributes in the username etc. In the most common, it will be at Tunnel Node 
or/and M-KE. The Tunnel Node can use the Mappers assigned by M-KE depending on the 
user ID.  
M-VPN has an enormous flexibility for deployments of authentication. The 
authentication, authorisation and key exchanges must harmoniously co-exist and not lead to 
vulnerabilities. The local matching policy must precisely define the interactions and the 
matching rules. The local policy is depends on the deployment.  
 
The M-KE defines that the integrated method for authentication must be preferred, thus 
signature, password, shared secret and password. If integrated methods do not provide the 
needed authentication, then EAP authentication may be used in the combination defined in 
4.1. 
6.2 Network security policy  
The network security policy plays a very important role, but it is unfortunately often 
under-estimated. The security policy treats many aspects, like the interaction between the 
layers by the authentication and authorization (see 6.1). The network security policy is part of 
the security policy and it maintains the interaction between the network protocols. Two very 
important aspects of the network policy are described here. 
The network security policy may be part of external node - Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) [11, 10]. On the one hand, the separation of IDS and M-KE/M-SE server has the 
advantage that already existing IDS solutions [12] may be deployed fast. On the other hand, 
implementing security policy may require M-SE/M-KE layer information, which is encrypted 
and unavailable for the intermediate devices, like IDS. In this case, there must be an interface 
between the M-KE/M-SE server and IDS node.  
6.2.1 Influence of unauthenticated messages on M-VPN 
Special attention must be paid to the interaction between unauthenticated messages and 
security protocols (see 3.1). From a security perspective, the unauthenticated message must 
not influence the M-VPN. On one side, the unauthenticated message should be ignored. A 
typical example is the ICMP messages “host unreachable” or “fragmentation needed” [13], 
which influence the connections between two hosts. The notifications are untrustworthy, thus 
they can be bogus. An intermediate attacker can decrease the MTU size of the M-SE session 
by sending “fragmentation needed” notification. This leads to underperformance of the 
connection. The “host unreachable” sent by an attacker causes erasing of M-SE session 
according to the ICMP protocol [13]. 
On the other side, the unauthenticated messages cannot be ignored because of these 
security concerns. They are core mechanism in the global IP network. A connection drop may 
occur, if they are ignored. For example: if the MTU must be decreased in order to 
communicate, then ignoring the ICMP notification causes fatal disconnection. It must be 
emphasised that it is not realistic to require authentication and authorisation from all 
intermediate routers on the Internet. 
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The simple question “react or not react on received ICMP notification?” cannot be 
answered clearly and definitively. It depends on many factors and only indirect indices can 
give the answer with some probability. It is a task of the network security policy to define 
heuristic rules [14] for dealing with these types of messages. This is a problem limited not 
only to the M-VPN and it is problem for all security protocols, like as IPSec. The heuristic 
rules can be for example: revise check if the sender is replying to pings, trace route to the 
sender, allow a range of minimal MTU values, restrict the number of ICMP messages per 
second, etc. 
6.2.2 Denial of Service attacks  
The M-VPN secures the transported data, but does not provide any delivery guarantee. It 
is possible that the packets are dropped, wrongly delivered or retransmitted by the 
intermediate router. The packet routing and in general the transportation is not a protected 
service and an attacker can easily manipulate the IP and UDP header without even knowing 
the content. 
Denial of Service attacks can be performed without any security knowledge, simply by 
replaying M-SE packets. The M-VPN gateway must decrypt the packet in order to verify the 
sequence number. This requires computational power of the gateway and an attacker can 
easily overload the gateway.  
The risk of (D)DoS can be minimized by implementing intrusion detection and 
prevention policies with heuristic rules. They can be very simple, for example: if a host has 
sent more than 10 packets incorrectly, then it is blocked for 5 minutes. If the M-SE packet 
received was repeated more then 10 times, this M-SE session is blocked for 5 min. This is a 
heuristic solution using efficient simple rules for preventing most practical attacks. Every rule 
can affect trustful (innocent) M-SE sessions and this can become an undesired issue. The 
heuristic rules are trade-off filters for the bad and good connections using abnormal 
behaviour detection. This of course, doest not prevent (D)DoD attacks, but my limit the effect 
of the attack. 
6.3 State attacks 
State attacks try to mislead the protocol in circular behaviour or to cancel certain session. 
The main instruments are out of sequence packets, replay or dropping packets.  
6.3.1 Lost last acknowledgement 
The security protocols are connection-oriented, because they negotiate security 
parameters. A general problem of all connection-oriented protocols is the so-called “lost last 
acknowledgement”. Both nodes can get in not corresponding states, so that the sent packets 
get lost. For example: Alice and Bob have one active session. After some time Alice sends 
finish/close message and deletes the session. If this finish message gets lost, Bob will not 
close its session and will keep using it. The sent packets by Bob get lost, since Alice has no 
session any more.  
The not secure protocols can mange a workaround to this issue. The TCP [15] stack, for 
example, uses a simple rule: if a packet is received for not existing session, then a packet with 
control bit RST is send back. The receiver of the RST deletes its session. The connection is 
closed and both nodes arrive at the same state.  
This problem is more complex in the security protocols, because they should ignore 
unauthenticated packets. The connection does not exist any more in the memory of the 
receiver and there is no key, ID etc. It cannot be answered in an authenticated way, 
consequently the peer will not trust this unauthenticated answer. Otherwise, an attacker can 
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reset every security connection. This problem cannot be solved principally by a design in any 
security protocols. It can be reduced only in the implementation using local policy with 
heuristic rules. 
Partial solution in some security implementations, such as Cisco IPSec [9], is using 
“down-negotiation” state. After sending close notify, the session goes in state “down-
negotiation”. The security parameters are kept for replying in an authenticated way if the last 
packet gets lost. The problem is only partially solved, because the time for keeping the state 
“down-negotiation” is limited. There is still the possibility to receive a packet after the 
“down-negotiation” is deleted. Furthermore, if the remote peer is not sending packets then its 
session will stay active. The session closure may be the trigger for backup actions or/and 
routing updates.  
This is a security thread of all protocols and must be considered by the implementations. 
The M-KE implementation should implement the Cisco IKE strategy, since it limits to some 
degree the problem. 
6.3.2 Rollback behaviour 
Rollback behaviour occurs, when the send/receive timeout is shorter than the round trip 
delay. The host receives delayed packets with previous state and goes back to the last state 
(the state rolls back). If the transmission time is constant, this will cause delay in the 
negotiation by some packets, but the negotiation will be successfully finished. 
The rollback becomes an issue when the transmission time is not constant during the 
negotiation. Some of the packets have bigger delay compared to other ones during the 
negotiation. The mobile environment uses mostly wireless connections, which are very 
unstable when the host moves. At some physical position during the movement, there is a 
strong signal and in some not. In areas with low signal, there will be more errors in the 
transmission. Therefore, some retransmission at wireless layer may be needed and the total 
delay will increase. When the host moves, there will be variable delay depending on the 
physical position of the node to the antenna. The variable delay in the negotiation can cancel 
the negotiation because of the retransmissions. Every protocol has a limit for retransmitting 
during the negotiation. When this number is reached, the negotiation is discarded. A simple 
example is show in Figure 6.3. Every state is retransmitted increasingly, which causes 
connection drop at the end. 
 
The same behaviour can occur not only due to natural properties of the media, but also 
due to attack. An active attacker can disturb the commutation and cause circular behaviour of 
the both nodes. The problem cannot be solved principally, but can be reduced by using some 
rules. Dropped and out of sequence packets are expected in mobile environments. In order to 
reduce this circular behaviour, the following rules are set in M-VPN:  
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time time
State 2State 1*
State 3
State 4
State 4
State 3 State 2
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State 3* State 4
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* - retransmittion due to timeout
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Figure 6.3: Rollback and retransmissions 
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• No retransmissions of already finished states  
• No rollback of any state is allowed 
• Out of sequence packet are ignored  
The comfort of the session decreases since some state differences will be noticed only 
after reaching a timeout. The states will be rest after the expiration of the timeout interval in 
M-KE. The values must be kept low for this reason. It is a trade-off between security and 
comfort. 
6.4 Attacks on M-KE and M-SE 
Attacks based on poor protocol design are very critical. They can be fixed only through 
new protocol version. The new version mostly will be not compatible with the old vulnerable 
one. Migration to a new protocol requires complex organisation. For instance, 
implementation issues can be solved on-the-fly by upgrading some modules. In this section, 
the M-KE and M-SE are analysed against some common design attacks. 
6.4.1 Parallel session attacks 
Two sessions are executed in parallel from a bogus insider in this attack. The target is to 
gain a different privilege level than the one assigned to the user. The attacker exchanges the 
IDs between the parallel sessions and can mislead the remote peer. The attack was first 
described by Abadi and Needham [1, 2]. It is briefly described here.  
There is an insider (attacker) Malice, which shares legal secret KMT with the 
authentication server (T). Alice (good user) shares the secret KAT with the authentication 
server. The Alice will be attacked by Malice, thus Malice will be authenticate as Alice by 
Bob. Bob is the attacked node, which terminates the connections and uses the authentication 
server T. The basic exchange is shown in Figure 6.4. The messages are simplified for easy 
understanding. They can vary depending on the real protocol. 
Malice starts two parallel negotiations with Bob. He is presenting himself as Malice in 
the first one and in the second as “Alice”1. He has a legal password for the first negotiation as 
Malice. The attacker sends the ID of Malice and Alice in the first messages of the sessions 1 
and 1’. Bob (attacked node) generated two nonce values one for Alice and one for Malice and 
returns them to the sender, message 2 and 2’.  
                                                     
1
 “Alice” - quotations denote the bad Malice acting as Alice 
Malice Bob   : Id=Malice1. 
„Alice“ Bob   : Id=Alice1‘. 
Bob Malice : NonceM2. 
Bob „Alice“ : NonceA2‘. 
Malice Bob   : {NonceA}KMT3. 
„Alice“ Bob   : {NonceA}KMT3‘. 
Bob T   : {Malice, {NonceA}KMT}KBT4. 
Bob T   : {Alice, {NonceA}KMT}KBT4‘. 
T Bob   : {NonceA}KTB5. 
T Bob   : bad secret5‘. 
Bob Malice : Accept as Alice6. 
T Bob   : reject6‘. 
{.}KTB    - encrypted text 
with key KTB
1,2..6   – Session with real Mailce
1‘,2‘..6‘ – Session with not true Alice
Figure 6.4: Parallel session attack 
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The nonce values are tied to a specific session and are identification of it, like cookies. 
Malice discards the nonce dedicated to him (NonceM) and returns the Alice’s NonceA in 
message 3. The 3’ message is build as expected with the nonce of Alice. The nonces are 
encrypted with key KMT, which Malice shares with the authentication server T. In message 4 
and 4’, Bob forwards the received message together with the ID to the T server for 
authentication. The messages are encrypted with the shared key KBT between Bob and T, thus. 
The server T decrypts correctly the NonceA in step 5 using KMT. The server returns the correct 
nonce. The T cannot properly decrypt the NonceA, since it not encrypted with the expected 
key KAT. The first session is accepted in the following message 6, because the nonce is 
correct. The session of 6’ is rejected. Bob accepts the first session and mapping it to Alice, 
which is actually the bogus Malice. 
The core idea of this attack is using a nonce (cookie) for one session and performing 
authentication with any legal key for other session. The vulnerability is because the nonce 
(cookie) values are not bound to a certain ID in the authentication. The nonce is used for 
session and user identification. More information can be found in [2]. 
There are multiple protections in M-KE against this attack. There is an entry in the SAM-
DB for every M-KE negotiation. The entry contains user ID, cookies, shared secret etc. The 
nonce is never the sole session identifier by the authentication. When signature is used for 
authentication, the ID is part of the certificate. The ID and the certificate are tied. When using 
external AAA in M-KE, then the ID and the password are authenticated for one dedicated 
session. The binding to one exact session ID is made by using request/response 
identifications in the radius requests. A parallel session attack is not possible in M-KE. 
Additional protection is that all sent and received messages including user ID, session ID, 
nonces etc are protected with HMAC against any sort of manipulation (see 4.13.16).  
 
6.4.2 Reflection attacks 
In reflection attacks [2], the message part is sent back to the originator. The target is to 
bluff the originator that this is the correct reply to its request and to accept it. In practical 
terms, the answer to the secret question is built on the question itself. Please notice that not 
the whole message is returned, but a part of it. The ID’s, headers and other values may be 
manipulated.  
 
The basic principle of the attack is shown in Figure 6.5. The 3rd and the 5th message are a 
reflection of the 2nd and the 4th message. The attacker Malice sends the nonce identifying 
Alice, at step 3. The attacker captures and reflects the authentication request sent by Bob to 
the authentication server at step 5. When the encryption is symmetric between T and B, then 
Bob accepts the session.  
Figure 6.5: Reflection attack 
„Alice“ Bob    : Alice1. 
Bob „Alice“: NonceB2. 
Malice Bob    : NonceB3. 
Bob T        : {Alice, Bob, NonceB }KTB4. 
„T“ Bob    : {Alice, Bob, NonceB }KTB5. 
{.}KTB    - encrypted text 
with key KTB
B „Alice“: accepts6. 
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The client and server HMAC are built in different ways, containing different values for 
client and server in M-KE. The HMAC verification will fail in a reflection attack, since the 
server will receive HMAC from server type and it is expecting client’s type, see 4.13.16. The 
reflection attack is not possible when using signatures, since the encryption and decryption 
key are different. A reflection of the server’s signature to himself makes no sense and it will 
fail. Authentication with passwords use challenge response mechanism, where the 
authentication server matches the challenge to the password. Generally, reflection attacks are 
performed on symmetric encryption algorithms. They are impossible in M-KE, because of the 
different HMAC values. 
6.4.3 Interleaving attacks 
Interleaving attacks [2] consist of two or more negotiation runs. The principle is to collect 
sufficient number of values, like nonces/cookies, ID etc. This could enable to fake the ID. 
The interleaving attack is an overlapping use of a parallel session attack with reply attacks. 
Since M-KE and M-SE are resistant against parallel session attacks, the protocol should be 
resistant against interleaving attacks. 
6.4.4 Man-in-the-middle 
An intermediate attacker intercepts and manipulates the communication between the 
participants in a man-in-the-middle attack. This is a popular active attack, where the target is 
to bluff (mislead) and in this way to set or get the session key. After successful execution, the 
attacker can read and manipulate the exchanged data. More information can be obtained from 
[7]. 
To prevent a man-in-the-middle attack the key exchange must be authenticated. As 
already mentioned the Diffie-Hellman exchange does not provide any authentication and is 
naturally vulnerable to this attack. In M-KE, all exchanged messages are authenticated using 
the HMAC function. The client and server build HMAC values from all sent and received 
messages. The key of the HMAC depends on the authentication method see 4.1. If the hosts 
use EAP, then the EAP must deliver the master session secret used for the HMAC. If client 
and server have shared a secret then it is used for HMAC key. By authentication with 
signatures, the HMAC is build without a key. The HMAC itself is signed with the private key 
of the sender. When using the password at least one of the participants must use a signature. 
EAP authentication without delivering of authenticated master secret must be avoided. All 
M-SE messages are also protected by HMAC values with secret keys.  
6.4.5 Replay attacks 
One of the simplest attacks is the reply attack [7], thus an already sent packet is 
intercepted, copied and resent. The attack also aims to mislead the node to gain access for 
example. The attacker cannot decode the message, but it must know its purpose. 
The protection of replay attacks in the key exchange (M-KE) is achieved through session 
unique cookies/nonces. These are protected by an authenticated integrity check. One of the 
nonce values is set by the client and the other by the server. If an attacker is replaying an old 
M-KE message, then the unique nonce/cookie will not match to the current session. The use 
of Hmac payload, see 4.13.16, protects the integrity of the messages and the cookies can not 
be exchanged without an notice. The receiver will drop the packet. Every negotiation in M-
KE has a unique cookie and therefore no replays from previous negotiations are possible. If 
the attacker is using a packet from the current M-KE session these packet are ignored. These 
packets are treated as retransmission. There is not state roll back in M-KE as described in 6.3. 
The replay protection in the M-SE is done by semi-unique sequence number. Each packet 
has an authenticated sequence number which must be received only once in a certain period. 
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The word semi is used because every digital counter is finite. The values will repeat in some 
long intervals. The packet is unique in period of 216 packets in M-SE (this is the counter size). 
Theoretically, the packet can be replied in 216 periods. Practically, the live time of the M-SE 
session is less then 216-1 packets, so the session is no longer active. The maximum lifetime of 
a session is 216-1 KB and each packet is ca. 1.5 KB. The attack cannot be preformed in 
practical environment. 
The replay attack can also be made with part of the message and not the whole packet. 
Authenticated integrity check is used in M-VPN. The M-KE and M-SE protection against 
reply attacks is quite similar to the well-studied IKE and ESP protocols. 
6.4.6 Attacks due to type flow 
The attacker uses vulnerabilities in the type flow of the protocol. The target is 
misinterpreting of the sent values and in this way to gain access. The idea is not to try to get 
the password but to replace it with some unsecure values. The best example is using certain 
encrypted nonce instead of encrypted session password, the values of which are known. 
Requirement for this type of attack is the same size and encryption of the key and the nonce. 
The attack was found on Neuman and Stubblebine protocol [4], see [2, 7] for more details. 
Exchanging parts of encrypted messaged in order to lead to misinterpreting is not 
possible in M-KE. All exchanged values are stored in payloads with different type identifiers. 
There is type and subtype field for every value giving the manner of interpreting the value. 
Furthermore, the datagram is protected by HMAC, so no parts can be exchanged. The 
payloads are interpreted because of their type and not because of their position. 
6.4.7 Name omission 
Every critical message of the protocol must be tied to unique session information. The 
unique session information is usually built of ID’s, nonces and cookies. If this is not done 
then a name omission attack can take place. The attack was demonstrated on Needham-
Schroeder protocol [5] and described in [6]. The attacker uses old sent values for 
demonstrating ownership of a private secret. For example: Alice and Malice establish a legal 
and correct session. Alice encrypts the session key with her private key and sends it to 
Malice. Malice can use this encrypted part to send it to Bob and in this way to show 
ownership of the private key of Alice. Bob cannot determine that this value is part of an old 
session not originally targeted to him. Malice knows the session key in the encrypted text, so 
it can start communication [2]. 
M-KE uses always Diffie-Hellman and in this way, the key material is unique for every 
session. Further, the HMAC protection of all messages protects against this problem. 
6.4.8 Attacks using absence of integrity protection 
The designers tended in the early versions of the security protocols to save on overhead 
by omitting the integrity check. Only authentication and encryption were used for protection 
of the traffic. This was a critical mistake opening possibilities for cut-and-paste or session-
hijacking attacks. The attacker can exchange part of the encrypted message and the packet is 
forwarded to some bogus insider after decryption, see [7]. This attack was possible in ESP in 
encryption mode [7]. In M-KE and M-SE, every message with all values is protected by an 
authenticated integrity check HMAC. 
6.4.9 Absence of semantic security protection 
The aim of this attack is to extract some critical part of information, which is sufficient to 
get secret information. This is a general vulnerability meaning that the attacker does not need 
the whole messages decrypted and concentrates on certain parts. To prevent these sorts of 
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attacks in M-KE, Diffie-Hellman exchange is carried out and all payloads are encrypted. The 
protection costs more resources, since some of information may not be confidential. In the M-
VPN design, the preference is not to save on computational power at the cost of security. The 
attacker can get “all or nothing”, thus all parts are encrypted with the key and algorithm. 
6.4.10 Other attacks 
Every day some new vulnerability is found and therefore, it is difficult to finalize it. The 
M-VPN is very close to TLS and IKE/ESP from a security perspective. These are well-
analysed protocols with many deployments. Keeping the security design close to these 
protocols assures robustness. 
6.5 Perfect Forward Secrecy 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is unfortunately a much-underestimated problem. Many 
modern security protocols are used without activation of this feature, like for example TLS, 
SSL, IPSec. (Currently most of the e-banking with SSL/TLS do not involve PFS). When PFS 
is not used, a simple offline attacks may be possible. For example: in SSL/TLS with server 
authentication RSA without PFS, the session key is generated by the client and encrypted 
with server’s public key. An attacker can record SSL/TLS sessions from certain server, which 
are point of interest. The private key of the server can be calculated offline even using simple 
brute force attacks. After some years, the private key will be known to the attacker. Then all 
recorded sessions can be decrypted. If the protected information in these old sessions is still 
relevant, then it can become a big problem. For this reason, in M-VPN a new key is generated 
via Diffie-Hellman for every session. All credentials, like ID’s, are also protected accordion 
PFS in M-KE. 
6.6 Oracle services 
Oracle services means that the gateway inadvertently provides cryptographic operations. 
Every security server or gateway in some way provides oracle services to a potential attacker. 
An attacker can send some messages and the gateway will try to decrypt them. It will fail in 
most cases, but the gateway may return values in some cases, which can help the attacker. It 
can be compared to typing some numbers in decryption machine and analysing what happens. 
A popular attack is the name omitting described in 6.4.7. Most of these attacks are on 
symmetric ciphers, where the same key is used for encryption and decryption. To limit this 
type of attack in M-KE, symmetric encryption is avoided, i.e. no clear text secrets are sent 
with symmetric encryption. General, the IDS limits the oracle services when dropping 
multiple tries form single host.  
6.7 State diagram 
The mobile environments characterize with packet losses, delays, out of sequence packets 
etc. These events lead to abnormal changes in the states. Having fewer states reflects in less 
complex structures, which are more suitable for the mobile environment. Therefore, the M-
KE and the M-SE protocols are designed to have fewer states. 
6.7.1 Server state diagram  
The server’s state diagram is shown in Figure 6.6 using UML 2.0 presentation [8]. Every 
received packet by the server is mapped to: an existing M-KE, a new M-KE or an existing M-
SE session. The mapping is made using header M-KE/M-SE values, like session ID, cookie 
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etc. The server can have multiple parallel negotiations and sessions. Every M-KE negotiation 
and M-SE session has its own set of values presented with grey background in Figure 6.6.  
• A new M-KE negotiation is created when the server receives ClientHello 
(CH) with new cookie values. The first state of the M-KE negotiation is 
“Verify CH”, where CH is abbreviation for ClientHello. The packet structure 
is verified in this state, thus presence and format of all values. If the check 
fails, the negotiation is erased and notification may be sent. If the check is 
successfully passed, then the negotiation goes to “SH Update SAM-DB” (SH 
is an abbreviation for ServerHello). The values in the SAM-DB are updated 
and the ServerHello message is sent to the client (generation of DH values, 
algorithms etc.). The ServerHello can be pending notification or can include 
all data. The pending notification is sent if the server cannot generate the full 
message immediately (see 3.5). After successful update of the SAM-DB, the 
server returns to wait for new packets. There is no need to keep the last state 
at the server side, since the client message ClientHello or ClientResponse 
contains sufficient information to handle the packet. The server must only 
limit the negotiation in time.  
• When the server receives packet to existing M-KE negotiation, it goes to 
verify the content in “Verify CR” or “Verify CH” (CR is abbreviation for 
ClientResponse). The server updates the SAM-DB and creates a 
ServerResponse or ServerHello. The message can contain pending 
notification or response with all information. If there is sufficient 
information, the M-SE entry can be created. After the M-SE is created, the 
M-KE negotiation is erased.  
• If the received packet is M-SE, then the packet is decrypted according to the 
M-SE session values in the SAM-DB.  
Figure 6.6: Server state diagram M-KE 
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• The non M-SE and non M-KE packets are matched against the M-SP, if they 
must be protected with certain M-SE session  
In order to handle multiple negotiations the server must fork to different processes by 
receiving messages. This is expresses by the first block “Wait Packet” in Figure 6.6. 
The Figure 6.7 shows a simplified example of negotiation without any pending and 
retransmissions. The Server waits for packets (“Wait Packet”). After receiving a ClientHello 
(“Policy”), the MS verifies it (“Verify CH”) and sends the ServerHello message (“SH Update 
SAM-DB”). After receiving a ClientResponse, the MS verifies it (“Verify CR”) and generates 
ServerResponse (“SR Update SAM-DB”).  
 
6.7.2 Client state diagram  
The state diagram of client is shown in Figure 6.8. The state diagram is very similar to the 
server diagram. The main differences to the server state diagram are because the client 
implements retransmission and pending. The server does not retransmit packets or pending 
(see 3.5). There can be multiple negotiations and therefore, the client must keep different 
states for every negotiation. The negotiation state is shown on the grey background in the 
Figure 6.8.  
The client matches a received packet and performs the following actions:  
• If the packet is non M-KE and non M-SE, and must be protected, then new 
M-KE negotiation in created in SAM-DB. In state “CH Update SAM-DB”, 
the ClientHello is prepared and sent to server. Then the client goes to state 
“Wait ServerHello”, where the client may retransmit the packet if no answer 
is received within certain time. The negotiation may be terminated by timeout 
too. If ServerHello message is received, the negotiation goes to “Verify SH”, 
where the message is verified. If the message contains pending notify, the 
client goes to state “Pending CH”, where after expiring the polling intervals 
the message is resent (state “CH Update SAM-DB”). If the received 
ServerHello contains all information, the client goes to state “CH Update 
SAM-DB”, where the client prepares and sends the ClientResponse message. 
After sending the ClientResponse, the node goes in state “Waiting 
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Create M-KE entry
gen.SH
Verify CH
Header/Payloads
Algs supported
DH values
[ new M-KE ]Policy
match M-SEP
and M-KE
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[ OK ]
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Figure 6.7: Example of MS state flow 
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ServerResp”. When the ServerResponse is received, it is verified in state 
“Verify SR”. If the message is pending notification, the client waits in 
“Pending CR” for resending the message. If the ServerResponse contains all 
information, the client creates the M-SE session. The packets, which match 
the M-SP, are encrypted according this entry. 
• If the client receives M-KE packet, it goes to the corresponding state of the 
negotiation. 
• The M-SE packets are decrypted according to the M-SE entry. 
• The packets matching to M-SP and are non M-SE/M-KE are encrypted with 
the M-SE entry linked the M-SP. 
A simple example is shown in Figure 6.9 without any pending and retransmissions. The 
MC wait for IP packet to be protected (“Wait Packet”, “Policy”). After receiving the packet, 
the MC sends ClientHello message (“CH Update SAM-DB”). The MC waits for ServerHello 
message (“Wait ServerHello”, “Policy”). The received packet is verified (“Verify SH”) and a 
ClientResponse is generated (“CR Update SAM-DB”). After receiving (“Wait 
ServerResponse”, “Policy”) and verification of ServerResponse (“Verify SR”) the M-SE 
session is created. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Client state diagram 
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6.8 Considerations regarding buffer overflows and injection attacks 
Buffer overflows [16] are attacks based mostly on poor implementation of old C code. 
The basic idea of the attacks is to overwrite some memory segments using oversized 
variables. The overwritten segment can contain executable codes and in this way, an attacker 
can place code instead of the original one. If the programmer checks for the size of all 
variables, the overflow attack cannot happen. The most modern programming languages 
(Java, Net) have strict definition for the size of the variable and buffer overflows are not 
possible. The format must be checked strictly additionally for every variable to avoid 
injection code attacks [17].  
6.9 Conclusion 
The M-VPN is a strong protocol based on the experience of IPSec and SSL/TLS. The 
protocol transforms these security strategies in mobile environments. The security 
architecture is simplified to achieve clear design and fewer states. The M-VPN has no 
vulnerabilities to the known attacks, which are discussed in this chapter.  
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7 Mobile Location Update protocol 
The Mobile Location Update (M-LU) protocol is a mathematical algorithm description 
rather than a technical specification. The protocol answers the question when to update the 
mobile host’s PoA? (see the definitions in 2.2). In the ideal case, the mobile host must update 
its PoA at the communication peers instantaneous after a movement. Otherwise, the 
participants keep sending packets to vacant PoA that is not used anymore by the mobile host. 
Consequently, the sent packets get lost.  
Unfortunately, the ideal target for immediate update after relocation cannot be fulfilled. 
The mobile host is practically unaware of its PoA as shown in 2.4 and 2.5. The host is not 
notified when its PoA changes and it cannot initiate an update. The application must 
proactively check if the PoA has changed for a certain remote peer. Depending on the result, 
some actions are carried out. The PoA can be different for the different peers (see 2.4), thus 
the PoA status must be checked for every connection.  
Choosing the optimal update time point is a general problem not limited only to mobility. 
The same issue can be found in protocols, like VoIP (SIP), IKE, XMPP etc. The issue 
oscillates in mobile environments, where PoA changes are frequent. The current applications 
overcome this problem by performing updates at constant intervals and by assuming static 
environment. The receiver of the update notification extracts the sender’s PoA from the IP 
and UDP headers. The sender does not know its PoA, but by sending an authenticated packet, 
it delivers the PoA in the header of the packet. Involving an expert knowledge of networks 
together with the application requirements, the update interval is set in advance. Commonly, 
short constant intervals from 10 to 90 sec are used in VoIP SIP applications for example.  
The constant intervals are not adapted to the changing network conditions and 
movements of the mobile host. This leads to underperformance regarding the network load 
and CPU resources, as shown in 11.2.1. In a mobile environment, the problem leads to 
frequent packet losses and overload on narrowband links. 
The main idea is to make the location updates proportional to the probability of a PoA 
change. During the time with high probability of PoA change, the updates must be frequent. 
The updates must be rare when there is a low probability of PoA change. In this way, 
network resources and packet losses can be minimized.  
 
The Figure 7.1 shows the principle: high Probability Density Function (PDF) means more 
updates and vice versa. Let us take the example of a typical person working during the day. 
There is a high probability of PoA change in the rush hours. Therefore, the updates should be 
Figure 7.1: Updates proportional to PDF of PoA change 
t [sec]
PDF function of PoA change
Location Updates
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frequent. At midnight there is less probability for PoA change and consequent less update are 
sufficient.  
Considering the probability for PoA change helps to achieve much better results then 
using constant intervals. Better results mean less disconnection time with less network and 
CPU resources. 
The main difficulties are: (1) how can classical mathematical algorithms be used for 
estimation and (2) how can the probability density function be constructed.  
7.1 Challenges of the update procedure 
The main challenge with M-LU is how to generate the Probability Density Function 
(PDF) of the PoA change. Every mobile device has different behaviour and a different PDF. 
The quality of the PDF is decisive for the performance of the algorithm. The key idea is to 
use the past changes to estimate the probability of a PoA change. The past values give quite a 
good estimation of the real PDF. The estimated function can be updated with every new 
occurrence of a PoA change. 
The well-developed classical estimation methods cannot be deployed in a straightforward 
way. They require numerical values typically delivered by some measurement, like for 
example interval of 5 sec. The measurement consists commonly of signal with added noise. 
The target is to separate the noise of the signal and to obtain better estimation in this way. 
The update procedure in M-VPN delivers Boolean values and not numerical values as 
required. The Boolean values contain the information if the PoA has changed or not. The 
time point of the PoA change is unknown to the mobile host. There are not numerical 
measurements and therefore, the classical estimation method cannot be used directly. The 
time point of PoA change is not measurable in sense of estimation theory. The time can be 
narrowed down to the update interval. This is the time interval between two following PoA 
updates. For example: if the update interval is 300 seconds, than the disconnection occurs 
somewhere within these 300 sec.  
Decreasing the update interval improves the estimation’s precision of the PoA’s change 
time point on the one hand. On the other hand, it increases the resources expressed in update 
packets and CPU utilization. There is clear trade off between the intervals size and the 
resources.  
The reason of the update dilemma is that update procedure consumes resources itself, 
which must me minimised. Expressed in classical terms, the measurement is in the same time 
setting of the signal. It can be compared to calling the information desk of the railway station 
and asking if the train has passed. It becomes quite intensive task to detach the arrival time 
when getting answers only “yes or no”, since the phone call costs money. The simple 
question is how to minimise the telephone costs and in the same time understand when the 
train is at the platform with sufficient precision. 
7.2 Solution methods  
Three novel frameworks are developed in this thesis. They estimate the PDF and 
calculate the update time points.  
The frameworks represent general concepts for solving the problem, thus using statistics, 
analytical and Fuzzy method. Understanding and evaluating these three strategic possibilities 
gives objective comparison between the methods. The choice of optimal method depends on 
the implementation scenario, like mobile phones, cars, slowly moving vehicle etc. The 
methods have different properties and perform differently depending on the scenario. The 
frameworks are based on the following estimation methods: 
7.3 Abstraction model and terminology 115  
• Stochastic solution using Sequential Monte Carlo is the first method 
presented in chapter 8. Gathering sufficient number of past PoA change 
events helps to construct the PDF, regardless of whether the system model is 
linear or not. The method represents a solution of the Bayesian equation 
using the statistics of past events. The method is known as Particle filter. It is 
expected that this method performs well in complex moving scenarios 
(complex PDFs), which cannot be approximated to same known curve, like 
e.g. Gaussian distribution curve.  
• Adaptive Fuzzy controller using expert knowledge and training methods is 
the second method described in chapter 9. Fuzzy logic deals with subjective 
knowledge equivalent to verbal descriptions with multivalent values. The 
advantage of Fuzzy logic is the ability to use expert knowledge descriptions 
of the nodes movements. The experts can pre-define some raw rules to 
provide the main properties of the Fuzzy controller, like for example the 
weekly cycle of an ordinary employee. The training of the controller is made 
with the help of One Pass (OP) method. The rules are optimised with 
Recursive Least Square (RLS) method. This method is expected to be good 
for patterns, which change in time, in the time in combination with some 
predefined knowledge, like the day cycle of worker. 
• Analytical solution based on extended Kalman filter is the last method 
developed in chapter 10. The famous Kalman filter [1] solves the Wiener 
problem [3] analytically and in this sense is optimal. Unfortunately, the 
Kalman filter can by applied only to linear and Gaussian models. Linear 
models cannot describe the movement of Mobile Node. A common solution 
presents the extended Kalman filter (EKF) [3], which approximates a non-
linear system by a linear one. This is not an optimal solution as the Kalman 
filter, but achieves very good results. The EKF is used in the context of M-
LU for estimating the next PoA change time point. The update times are 
calculated using here defined transformation functions. The method 
represents the classical analytical solution. This method is expected to be 
good for slowly changing patterns without any previous knowledge, like train 
movement. 
7.3 Abstraction model and terminology 
This chapter provides terminology definitions and abstractions before going deeper into 
method presentation. 
The location update denotes the procedure of updating the PoA at the communication 
peers (see 2.2). In the context of M-LU, it returns also feedback to the mobile host if its PoA 
has changed. It consists of request and response packet for this reason. The request packet 
informs the receiver of the new PoA and the response returns the feedback to the sender. The 
feedback is called return code of location update procedure. The procedure is part of the M-
SE protocol and defined in 5.8.1.  
The return code of the update procedure is Boolean – true or false. The “true” means that 
the PoA is the same in the last and the current execution of the procedure. The PoA has not 
changed in this interval. The return code “false” means that the PoA has changed between the 
last and the current update. The PoA is unknown to the participants between the PoA change 
time point and the following update. This interval is called the Disconnections Interval (DI). 
All sent packets get lost in the Disconnection Interval since the participant send the packets to 
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an unused PoA. The M-LU concentrates on the prediction of the “false” events, thus changes 
of PoA.  
 
Definitions: 
 
Update Time Point (UTP) is the time point of performing the update procedure. The 
update procedure does not have zero execution time. We consider the point, when the 
Boolean result is received.  
 
Event Time Point (ETP) is the time point, at which the host changes its PoA (moves).  
 
The filters try to predict the coming Event Time Point (ETP), thus prior estimation of 
ETP. The prior estimation and prediction are synonym in this text. 
The filter consists of two stages: prediction and update. They are executed in cycles 
following each other. In the prediction phase, the prior estimate is made. After the 
measurement becomes available, the coefficients of the filter are updated, thus posterior 
estimation is used. Each cycle begins with setting the Update Time Points and their execution 
point After the PoA change occurs, the cycle begins again. The new cycle begins from the 
first Update Time Point (UTP) after the Event Time Point (ETP).  
In general, to work with absolute time values is very inconvenient. The values increase 
constantly and patterns are difficult to compare. A much better solution is to work with 
intervals between critical points. The points of interest in the filter cycle are set relative to the 
beginning of the cycle, thus to the Update Time Point (UTP) after the Event Time Point 
(ETP). This is a very important conclusion for the further works with filters in this thesis. 
Estimation of the probability function is made always in one filter cycle. It must be noticed 
that the filter cycle cannot begin with the ETP since it is not measurable as already underlined 
in the previous chapter. The newly defined points and intervals are show in Figure 7.2 and 
their definitions are following. 
 
Definitions: 
 
Beginning of the filter cycle is the Update Time point following the Event Time Point. In 
Figure 7.2, it is tn+1 and tn+5.   
 
Disconnection Interval (DI) is the interval between the Event Time Point (ETP) and the 
first following Update Time Point (UTP). The packets send by the mobile host in the DI get 
lost.  
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Figure 7.2: Abstraction 
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Update Interval (UI) is the interval between two following Update Time Points. 
 
Event Interval (EI) is the interval between Event Time Point and the beginning of the 
filter cycle. 
 
Absolute Event Interval (AEI) is the interval between two subsequent Event Time Points. 
 
Relative Update Interval (RUI) is Update Interval relative to the beginning of the filter 
cycle. 
 
Measured Time Point (MTP) is measured Event Time Point according the filter model. 
This is generated value depending on the algorithm described later in 8.4.1.2. It is called 
measured because it served as semi measurement point in the classical filter theory.  
 
Measured Interval (MI) is interval between Measured Time Point and the beginning of 
the cycle. 
 
Active Connection (AC) is ability to exchange packets bidirectional between the hosts, 
thus the PoAs are known to the both hosts. This is the opposite of Disconnection Interval, 
where the host cannot exchange packets. 
 
Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI) is the time without active connection tolerated 
by the application. This is typically a couple of seconds for real time applications, such as 
VoIP. For non real time applications, it can be some minutes, like email for example. The 
maximum Disconnection Interval value must not be exceeded. Even if there is less 
probability of disconnection, the maximum disconnection must not be exceeded. Practically, 
there must be an update at least once in this interval. Otherwise, there is a chance of 
disconnection with more then MDI. This value is set by the application. The interval is 
denoted as 
maxx .is the mathematical equation for readability.
 
7.4 Targets 
The Disconnection Interval (DI) is less than or equal to the smallest Update Interval (UI) 
surrounding the Event Time Point (Figure 7.2). It follows that the smaller the Update Interval 
the smaller the Disconnection Interval becomes. The target is to minimise the UI where the 
event (ETP) happens and to maximise the interval where it does not. This is done by making 
the update proportional to the PDF. The Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI) must not be 
exceeded at the same time. The suggested methods consider also the hardware and network 
properties in parameters explained for every method in chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
7.5 Simulation and performance evaluation 
The simulation is proof of concept and shows the properties of the designed methods. It is 
done for the three methods using Matlab 7.0. The results are compared to updates at the 
constant intervals and in between. In this way, the qualities of the new method are verified.  
Fair comparison is achieved using the same resources for the methods, thus the same 
number of updates during the time of simulation. Every method runs with the same number 
of updates in the same experiment time. The better the method is, the shorter the 
Disconnection Interval. Statistics of the disconnection intervals are compared, such as mean, 
max, min, variance etc. 
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Analysis of the results is provided in 8.6, 9.5, 10.9 and 12.3. There is no best performance 
or winner algorithm (see 12.3) since the optimal algorithm varies for the different usage 
scenarios. The algorithms choice depends on the concrete deployments. It is also possible to 
switch between the algorithms. 
7.5.1 Simulation input data 
Many simulations were carried out to test the properties of the algorithm. Five of them 
were chosen to demonstrate the qualities of the new algorithms. They are used to test all 
suggested algorithms, see chapters 8, 9 and 10. In this way, the results of the algorithms can 
be compared to each other. The first four input data (movements) are generated with 
mathematical equation. The last case is simulated with real dialup access statistics.  
Representative scenarios are difficult to choose since the scenarios are consequence on 
the usage. The M-VPN can be deployed, for example in cellular networks in 3GPP, mobile 
vehicle with WLAN or mobile smart devices in campus building (office). The speed of 
IP/port changes and the moving patterns are different. Furthermore, the M-VPN can be used 
in VoIP environment with requirement of minimal disconnection or non real-time application 
like HTTP information with low requirement on disconnection. The chosen four simulation 
cases represent the most common cases building the primitive scenarios, which are: 
1) In the first scenario, the intervals between the ETPs are white noise with some 
constant shift. Figure 7.3 presents a practical case where a mobile host is moving 
with a constant speed in a wireless environment, like a car moving at direct road. The 
wireless access networks cover similar areas transparently connected to the Internet. 
The changes of the PoA are at semi equal intervals because the wireless areas and the 
host speed cannot be constant in the praxis. For this reason, there is a deviation 
expressed in white noise. The white noise represents the differences between the PoA 
changes. No doubt, there could be other representations of this case. The equations 
are expressed by: 
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where 
raEI is the r
th
 Event Interval. N() denotes normal distributed random values 
with a mean value of 200 sec and a standard deviation of 10 sec. The mean of 200 
means the host stays mean 200 sec in wireless area. Practical representation of these 
values is for example: wireless cell (aria) with radius less has 1,4 km and the car 
(mobile host) moving with 50 km/h. The deviation of 10 gives changing intervals 
mostly from 170 sec to 230 sec, which represents the variation of the speed and size 
of the wireless cell. 
 
2) In the second scenario, the intervals of PoA change (ETPs) are generated by two 
rotating white noise sources. A practical representation could be similar to the 
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Figure 7.3: Host moving in wireless environment with constant speed 
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previous case with an additional NAPT as an intermediate devices. The wireless 
access points typically have an NAPT device, which can lead to PoA change before 
the host leaves the area. The PoA can be changed due to host movement or an NAPT 
table reset. This is shown in Figure 7.4. There are two white noise sources, which are 
rotating. They can be described by: 
10,10
),100(),100(
21
21
==
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σσ NorNaEI r
 
The operator or denotes the rotation with 50% probability. Half of the values are 
generated by the first distribution and half by the second. The mean values of 100 sec 
gives the mean of PoA change. A practical representation my be a wireless aria (cell) 
with radius of 0,7 km and car (mobile host) speed of 50 km/h. The deviation of 10 
represents the variation of cell size and speed. The values are the values mostly 
between 70 sec and 130 sec. 
 
3) In the third scenario, sinus based Event Intervals with some white noise are defined. 
This occurs by repeating patterns in the Event Intervals, like a day cycle. The 
intervals are small in morning hours and large at night. The values go smoothly 
between these states. A sinus-based signal with white noise is defined as: 
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The variable S indicates the total number of samples, S=5000. The number of 
samples is set to 5000 because it is sufficiently large to generate meaningful results, 
thus the results do not change significantly with increasing the number of samples. 
The k is the index of the calculated sample. The σ is equal to 10 to and represents 
minimal changes of the day cycle. 
 
4) In the fourth scenario, recursive non-linear values with added white noise are the 
intervals between the ETPs. This is very challenging for every prediction method. It 
can represent a complex movement of the host with out any evident simple logic, 
shown in Figure 7.5. (The equation is also used in [6]). The equation defined as: 
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5) The fifth experiment is made with real data gathered from L2TP over IPSec dial up 
network, thus remote access. The intervals between the ETPs are the user’s remote 
login in the corporate network. The deployment M-VPN can be very different from 
cell phone to trains. The remote access expresses the relocation of the mobile phone 
to some degree. There is a peak in the morning and afternoon. In the night, there is 
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Figure 7.4: Host moving in wireless environment with NAPT 
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less activity. The anonymous data was available to the author and used for the 
testing. 
 
The constant parameters in the simulation are chosen to represent real cases, where small 
disconnection is required and the mobile host moves fast. For the first four experiments, the 
following parameters are used: The application requires 5 sec of Maximum Disconnection 
Interval (MDI). The simulation is made with 5000 samples, thus there were 5000 prediction 
cycles. The specific parameter are defined in 8.6, 9.5 and 10.9 
7.5.2 Statistics and diagrams by the simulation  
There are four diagrams showing the properties of the simulated algorithm. They are 
presented for each simulation case in 8.6, 9.5 and 10.9. The first diagram shows the Event 
Intervals and the posterior estimated Event Intervals (see example in Figure 7.6). It can be 
used for the optical evaluation of signal and the prediction.  
A second diagram shows the histogram of the Disconnection Intervals (DIs) and gives 
qualitative numerical results (see example in Figure 7.7). This is the most important diagram 
since it compares the current method to the constant Update Intervals in a fair way. The fair 
way means that the same resources are used in the suggested method and in method with 
constant intervals. Both methods use the same number of location updates for the same time 
of simulation. In this way, the DIs can be directly compared between the methods which 
allows qualification of the better algorithm.  
The constant update algorithm is the simplest and mostly used method, see chapter 1. The 
nodes send updates in constant intervals, thus there is no optimisation. The maximum 
Disconnection Intervals (DI) is equal to the Update Interval. This is reference method and all 
suggested methods are compared to it. 
The DI corresponds to an error in the filter theory and must be minimised. The 
distribution of the DI is presented in the histogram on the second diagram. The following 
vertical lines mark the following values: 
• A dotted black line shows the mean Update Interval (UI), thus the mean of 
maximal disconnection. 
• A dashed black line shows the maximal Disconnection Intervals (DIs) by 
constant Update Interval see Variable const UI. 
• A red dashed line marks the maximum Disconnection Interval (error) in this 
simulation by the method. 
• A grey dotted line shows the user defined maximum disconnection (MDI). 
Certain very important qualitative values are shown in the bottom-right corner of the 
histogram. Their definitions are: 
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Mean Disconnection Interval {mean DI} is the mean of all Disconnection Intervals, see 
2.2. The mean DI must be minimised and it corresponds to the error in filter theory. The 
value can be calculated only in simulation environments since the Event Time Point is 
unknown to the hosts in practical environments. 
 
Mean Update Interval {mean UI} is the mean of the Update Intervals containing the 
Event Time Point. The value is measurable at the hosts and can be used in real environments. 
Minimising the mean UI consequently minimises the mean DI. 
 
Maximum Update Interval {max UI} is the maximum of all Update Intervals during the 
simulation. 
 
Maximum user defined Disconnection Interval {max user def DI }.The maximum 
disconnection tolerated by the user application, denoted as
maxx .  
 
Maximal disconnection by constant Update Interval {const UI} is the maximum 
disconnection achieved by constant update method using the same resources as the suggested 
method. The value is calculated as follows: Let us assume that 
meast  is the total simulation 
time, thus the sum of all generated intervals (EIs). The number of updates during the 
simulation is denoted as LUsN  . The updates are uniformly distributed at constant intervals. 
The Update Interval is LUsmeas Nt
.
. It is the maximal Disconnection Interval by constant UI 
with the same resources.  
 
Mean disconnection by constant Update Interval {const UI mean DI }. This is the mean 
of DI by constant UI with the same resources.  
 
Proportion of mean Update Intervals by constant updates and the mean Update Interval 
by suggested method {const UI / mean UI}. This value gives the ratio between the const UI 
and mean UI. This is a direct comparison of the performance of the algorithm in a simple 
way. The higher the value the better the algorithm.  
 
Update Intervals with ETP smaller than constant Update Intervals {LU < const UI}. This 
is the number of UI with ETP smaller than the maximum disconnection by constant interval 
(const UI). The value is a percentage of the total number of ETPs. This is a simple direct 
comparison of how good the filter is to constant LU interval. If the value is fifty percent, then 
there is probably no difference between the methods. This value gives a very raw 
comparison. 
 
The DI for filter by sample is plotted at the third diagram, see example in Figure 7.8. The 
last forth diagram shows the PDF constructed by the suggested method and the PDF 
constructed by the Event Time Points (Figure 7.9). Both functions must be proportional. The 
second PDF is normalises to the first one, so that the maximum values fits. In this way, the 
curve forms can be compared. The more the functions look similar, the better the quality of 
the update is. 
7.6 Porting of updates algorithm in further protocols 
The location update protocol creates a new framework, which can be deployed in many 
other protocols. The update problem and its solution with M-LU are not specific to mobile 
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environments. The M-LU contributes to all procedures, which can be abstracted according to 
7.3. An example of protocols with potential M-LU deployments is shown in chapter 11. 
These can be routing protocols like BGPv4 or DPD in IPSec, or even Mobile IP. 
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8 Mobile Location Update with Sequential Monte Carlo methods 
This chapter presents a framework for setting the Update Time Points proportional to the 
Probability Density Function (PDF) of PoA change as defined in chapter 7. The PDF is 
estimated using the Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) method also known as Particle filter or 
Sequence Importance Resampling (SIR). 
The section 8.2 provides an overview of the Sequential Monte Carlo method and in 
particular the Sequence Importance Sampling. The implementation of Particle filter in M-LU 
is not straightforward, as already discussed in chapter 7. The new method for M-LU is 
defined in 8.4. The qualities of the new method are verified in a simulation described in 8.5.1. 
The results of the simulation are presented in 8.6. 
8.1 Contributions 
The author’s contributions can be found in many parts of this chapter. The major 
theoretical ones are: First, the development of a model for an implementation of Particle filter 
in mobile updates, see 8.4.1. Second, the calculation of the update time-points dependent on 
the PDF of EI, see 8.4.2. Third, the new algorithm for update of the weights is implemented 
in 8.4.4. Forth, new mechanism for moving the particles is introduced in 8.4.5. A practical 
contribution is the simulation of the method and comparing the results to the constant updates 
in 8.5. The author has published the method in IEEE and part of the simulation results in 
IEEE [15].  
8.2 Theory of Particle filter 
8.2.1 Bayesian estimation 
The estimation and prediction of values is an important part of the real world. 
Unfortunately, the knowledge for the most natural phenomenon is limited. It is practically 
impossible to consider all parameters of influences, like for example in the weather forecast. 
Due to these limitations, the models are simplified in general forms with some random 
variables representing the parameters, which are not directly considered. Models developed 
for a phenomenon allow the formulation of the Bayesian estimation.  
8.2.2 Bayesian inference  
The relationship between the conditional probability and the marginal probability 
distributions is provided by the famous Bayesian theorem. It can be interpreted as an equation 
for recalculating the belief in a certain hypothesis when obtaining new evidence. This 
interpretation is a core idea in the creation of inference process for hypothesis probability 
using evidence.  
Bayesian inference uses the degree of belief in an event before (prior) the evidence has 
occurred and calculates an estimation of belief in the event after the evidence (posterior) has 
occurred. In other words, the Bayesian inference provides the relationship between the prior 
and the posterior distribution using likelihood characteristics. Mathematically it is defined as: 
)(
)()|()|( 000 Ep
HpHEp
EHp =
, 
where 0H  is the prior or null hypothesis and E is the evidence.  
)|( 0 EHp is the posterior conditional probability of 0H  given E . 
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)|( 0HEp  is the likelihood function, the conditional probability of E  given 0H . 
)( 0Hp  is the prior probability of the hypothesis. 
)(Ep is the marginal probability of E , i.e. the probability of E  under all mutually 
exclusive hypothesis. 
 
The evidence is the observed value, mostly called measurement in the filter theory. It is 
denoted as y further in this text. The hypothesis is the target value, thus the value of interest. 
It is an unobservable value, referred to x in this text. The relation between observation and 
unobservable value manifests figurative in FM radio example: The antenna measures values 
of signal and noise, thus the evidence y. We are interested only in radio signal x without the 
noise, called hypothesis. Only the signal cannot be measured directly and must be extracted 
from the antennas output.  
In our case, the observed values are not available continuous in the time. The values are 
obtained sequential on certain intervals. Here, ky denotes the k
-th
 observation. The sequence of 
observations 1 to k is denoted as ky :1 . Following the same logic, the unobserved values 
become also available sequential and are referred as kx :1 . The behaviour model for 
unobserved values is called Hidden Markov Model (HMM). 
Every time a new measurement ky  is received, a recursive filter is deployed to calculate 
an estimate of the target signal kx . The advantage of the recursive calculation is that it is not 
necessary to store all past measurements. It is not necessary to recalculate from scratch. The 
result is updated with the new value.  
The filter consists of two stages: prediction and update. The prediction stage uses the 
system model to predict the future state. The word prediction is synonym for prior estimation 
in this thesis. In the update phase, the PDF of signal is recalculated considering the received 
measurement, thus posterior estimation or update. Both prediction and update phases are 
executed sequentially. 
In the prediction phase, it is assumed that posterior the PDF function at time k-1 is 
known )( 1:11 −− kk yxp . The Chapman-Kolmogorov equation gives the prior estimation 
(prediction): 
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After a measurement ky becomes available, an update for the posterior estimation can be 
done using Bayesian rule for calculation the posterior density: 
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This is the optimal solution in all aspects, but has only a theoretical and general character. 
The integral cannot be solved for all density functions and therefore, it cannot be exactly 
calculated. 
8.2.3 Problem statement  
The Bayesian inference cannot be solved analytically for all possible cases, because it 
requires the evaluation of complex high-dimensional integrals. For particular cases, such as a 
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linear model with Gaussian noise, an analytical solution has been available since the end of 
the 50s - the famous Kalman filter [1]. The solution is optimal in all aspects because it uses 
the optimal estimation known for linear systems. Unfortunately, most natural processes are 
non-linear and without Gaussian noise. 
Many suboptimal solutions were proposed considering non-linear systems. The Extended 
Kalman Filter (EKF) is a typical example described in chapter 10. The Extended Kalman 
Filter approximates the non-linear equations to linear ones using truncated Taylor series. 
Through this approximation, an analytical solution was found to the problem. The filter is 
called suboptimal since its efficiency strongly depends on the approximation of the signal. 
The algorithm suffers from a lack of adequacy in some cases as shown in [2].  
8.3 Monte Carlo methods 
Monte Carlo methods solve the Baysesian inference in a different way. With the increase 
in the computational power of the computer, the Monte Carlo Methods become a reasonable 
alternative to the analytical ones.  
The source idea is that the PDF of every function can be calculated from a sufficient 
number of samples (observations). This property is used in the Monte Carlo integration 
method. The PDF of the PoA changes is estimated in a Location Update context.  
The clear advantage is that the method performs for non Gaussian and non-linear models. 
A disadvantage is that the convergence of the method depends on the number of observations 
and the choice of importance function as shown in 8.3.3.  
8.3.1 Sequence Importance Sampling (SIS) 
The Sequence Importance Sampling (SIS) is the most basic of all sequence Monte Carlo 
filters implemented nowadays. Various names are used to refer to this method, such as 
Bootstrap filter, condensation algorithm or Particle filtering. In our text the term Particle filter 
is used, since it is the most popular one.  
The Particle filter is a recursive Bayesian approach with Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) 
method. The key idea is to represent the required probability density function by a set of 
random samples with associated weights. In this way, the SIS filter approaches the optimal 
Bayesian estimate. 
Lets assume that N independent measurements { }N
i
i
x
1=
 are available for an observed 
phenomenon. The posterior density of the samples can be expressed by:  
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Here, )( ixx−δ is the delta-Dirac mass located at ix . Regarding the strong law of the large 
numbers, the calculated discrete distribution converges to the signal density distribution with 
a sufficiently large number of measurements.  
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The number of observations to achieve almost certain convergence is extremely large. In 
practice, an algorithm with fast convergence is needed. 
The observation can be presented by{ }N
i
ii wx
1
,
=
 where iw  denotes the weights of the 
samples ix . The weights stress the high values of the PDF. The weights are normalised, 
thus 1=∑ iw . The PDF can be expressed as: 
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The choice of the weight coefficients is made according to the importance 
sampling [9]. The weights are split into two components. 
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Here, )(xpi  is proportional to the distribution of )|( yxp , thus )|()( yxpx ∝pi .The sign ∝  
means proportional. The )(xq has the distribution of x, thus xxq ~)( . The sign ~ means same 
distribution. The )(xq  is called importance function. 
This representation is the base for particle definition. Each particle consists of one weight 
coefficient and multiple unobserved values (hypothesis). The particles are independent and 
together build the PDF. The weight stresses the importance of this particle, i.e. if the PDF has 
a high value at this point. The measurements (observations) become available sequentially in 
periods. A new value x is added in particle each time a measurement y becomes available. 
By receiving a new value, the particle weight must be recalculated. If there are 0 to k 
observations, there will be k+1 values in every particle, namely{ }Niiki k wx 1:0 , =
. 
. The Equation 8.1 
can be rewritten: 
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The data is obtained sequentially and the filter coefficients must be recomputed every 
time data becomes available. Increasing the number of observations increases the required 
resources to store all past values. After a certain point, they are not affordable even for the 
modern computers. To solve this issue, the important density function must be factorised into 
recursive multiplication. In this way, the following values are calculated recursively from the 
previous one. 
)(),()( 1:11:0:11:0:1:0 −−− ⋅= kkkkkkk yxqyxxqyxq
 
The equation gives the possibility for factorised calculation of )(~ :1:0:0 kki k yxqx based on 
the previous values )(~ 1:01:01:0 −−− kki k yxqx
. 
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The update of the importance weight is achieved using the Bayesian equation introduced 
shortly in 8.2.2: 
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Equation 8.1 
Equation 8.2 
Equation 8.3 
Equation 8.4 
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By substituting Equation 8.5 and Equation 8.3 in Equation 8.2 the update for the 
weighted coefficients is obtained: 
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8.3.2 Degeneracy of SIS 
The main drawback of the SIS is that the variance of the weights cannot decrease. The 
variance increases or stays constant over the time. After a few interactions, all coefficients, 
except one, become zero in practical terms. The computational power is wasted in calculating 
particles having zero weights and therefore are useless in the PDF calculation. The 
degeneracy problem cannot be avoided and will persist for all ),( :11:0 ki kik yxxq − functions to 
some degree. 
This is a property of the importance function defined with recursion in Equation 8.3. The 
increase of the variance of the importance function leads to an increase in the variance weight 
coefficients, when the weights are interpreted as a random variables. This is obtained directly 
from the definition:  
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When the variance of )( :1:0 ki k yxq  grows, then the variance of division also grows and the 
variance of the weights grows consequently. Increasing variance means the difference 
between the values increase. When the difference increases and the weights are normalised, 
some values go to zero and some values to one. There are no intermediate values in the 
interval. 
The effective sample number was defined to measure the level of degeneracy size [9, 8]: 
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The variance of the weights can be estimated: 
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The effective size is always smaller than the number of particles N. The degeneracy 
problem increases when the effective sample size decreases. The defined equation is very 
important because it quantifies the degeneracy problem. 
Observing the definition at Equation 8.7, it can be concluded that increasing the number 
of particles automatically decreases the degeneracy. This property cannot be used to stop the 
degeneracy directly, but urges use of a large number of particles.  
The effect of the degeneracy can be limited trough: (1) a good choice of the importance 
function or (2) resampling. Both of them are described in the next chapters. 
Equation 8.5 
Equation 8.6 
Equation 8.7 
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8.3.3 Choice of the importance function 
There is no restriction for the importance function: every function leads to convergence. 
The question is to find a function, which performs well for a small number of samples and 
particles. Some of the functions lead to convergence for a very large number of samples. 
These functions cannot be practically used. 
In order to limit the degeneracy, the common strategy is to minimise the variance growth 
of the importance function. Zeroing the variance of importance function stops the degeneracy 
of the weights. This strategy provides the best results because it adopts the impotence 
function to the posterior PDF. The variance of the weights regarding the importance function 
is [4]: 
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The variance becomes zero for ),(),( 1:11:0 ikkikkkik xyxpxyxq −− =  as shown in [4]. This is the 
optimal importance function. The Equation 8.6 with the new importance function can be 
rewritten considering that the weight is dependent only on the last particle value k and not all 
values 0 to k gives: 
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The optimal function has some limitations. The first shortcoming is that we need to 
sample from the ),( 1 kikik yxxp − to calculate the PDF function. The second problem is the 
calculation of the )( 1ikk xyp − : 
∫
∞
∞−
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= k
i
kkkk
i
kk dxxxpxypxyp )()()( 11  
This integral cannot be solved analytically for all functions. A solution can be found in 
some particular cases. When kx  has finite states, then the integral becomes the sum through 
all states. The integral and the ),( 1 kikik yxxp −  can be solved numerically. In general, if the 
model is with finite states, then the optimal importance function can be used. 
There is an existing solution of the integral when observation equations are a linear and 
Gaussian noise mixture. The integral )( 1ikk xyp −  can be analytically solved. The 
values ),( 1 kikik yxxp −  can be calculated. Notice that there are no restrictions for the transition 
equation (hidden Markov equation). 
Implementation of the optimal importance function gives the best results and limits the 
degeneracy problem. Unfortunately, it is not possible to use the function in M-LU, because 
the model is neither linear nor with finite states which are the requirements for optimal 
solution. 
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8.3.3.1 Suboptimal importance functions  
The optimal importance function cannot be used in non-linear models with infinite states 
as in M-LU case (see 8.3.3). Suboptimal functions and methods are implemented for these 
scenarios.  
One suggested method is with approximation to linearisation. This is called the local 
linearisation method. It works in a very similar way to the Extended Kalman Filter. The non-
linear observation equation is approximated with truncated Taylor series.  
A different approach is the choice of a convenient importance function. The most popular 
one is using the prior density function [3, 4]: 
)(),( 1:11 ikikkikik xxpyxxq −− =
 
)(* 1* ikkikik xypww −=
 
Using the prior density seems a reasonable alternative because it is easy to implement. It 
is used in this thesis for the M-LU method with Particle filter. 
There are other alternative importance functions and methods suggested for different non-
linear methods. There is not an universal function covering all cases. The right choice of 
method and importance function is critical for the performance of the algorithm.  
8.3.4 Resampling 
The degeneracy becomes a significant problem for the implementations when using 
suboptimal importance functions. Resampling is method for solving the problem by 
suboptimal function. The idea of resampling is to eliminate particles with small weights 
values and to stress ones with high weights. The resampling involves generation of a new set 
{ }Niikx 1* =  where ikx*  denotes new values. The new set approximates the posterior PDF given by: 
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The new set approximates the PDF function without certain particles. Generally, it is 
discrete density sampling: 
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The number of new particles -
rN can be different after the resampling. To keep it simple, 
we assume NN r = . To get a parallel to { }Niiki wx 1, =  the new generated sets also have weights 
which are all equal to
N
1 . After the resampling, the particles have the form { }N
i
i
Nx 1
* 1
,
=
. The 
weights coefficients are reset, so the degeneracy problem disappears. 
The resampling from the PDF can be carried out in different ways. The straightforward 
method is taking N samples uniformly distributed in [0,1], denoted as { }Niir 1= . For every sample 
point kr , where k=1 to N, the new particle values are selected by: 
l
k
k
k
l
i
i
kk
l
i
i
k xxwrwif =





<< ∑∑
=
−
=
:: *
1
1
1
 
The Figure 8.1 graphically shows the algorithm. The intervals at the abscise (x-axis) are 
equal to the weight-coefficients, so they build a sector representing the i-th  particle. The sum 
of the weights is one (1), thus they are normalised. The r
 
is uniformly distributed, thus the 
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points have
N
1
 
distance between them. The sector in which the r  point is falling defines the 
value of particle. For example: in Figure 8.1, the second point of r  is within the first sector. 
This means the new value of the second particle is equal to value of first current 
particle 12* kk xx = . The number of points falling in a sector gives the number of particles with 
the same value. Some old particle values will not be transferred in the new values. For 
example: in Figure 8.1, there is no r falling in the second sector, thus the second particle 
value will not be taken in a new particle.  
Generally, particles with small weights are ignored and with large weights are 
emphasized. After resampling, the new approximated density converges with the original 
one. 
This procedure solves the degeneracy problem but has theoretical and practical 
disadvantages. Theoretically: the particles are not independent variables as assumed in the 
beginning after resampling. This is disadvantageous for the diversity, since large weights are 
emphasized and small weights are discarded. Practically, the implementation of the filter 
cannot be parallelised. The parallelisation speeds up the processing. For resampling all 
particle and must be present.  
 
Considering the mentioned disadvantages, it can be concluded that: resampling should be 
performed only when the degeneration becomes a significant problem. It could be done in all 
interactions, but this can lead to the tampering of the good results. 
On which interaction a resampling should be carried out, can be chosen using the 
equation for degeneration quantification (Equation 8.7). A threshold value 
thresholdN  for the 
degeneration must be pre-defined. Resampling is done if the degeneracy gets higher than the 
defined threshold. This is expressed in the equation: 
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Figure 8.1: Resampling selection algorithm 
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8.3.5 Algorithm summary 
The major steps by the Particle filtering are summarized at the following figure: 
 
The number of particles N is defined before beginning the calculations. The number of 
particle gives the accuracy of the approximated function. On the one hand, a large number of 
particle decreases the degeneracy problem and improves the quality of the approximated 
function. On the other hand, the more particles are used, the more computational resources 
are required.  
Distribution of N random samples )( 0xp
 
is generated for the first initialisation. The 
weight coefficients are set to 
N
1 . The N particles are { }N
i
i
Nx 10
1
,
=
now. If there is no 
information about )( 0xp , any constant value can be used. This will slow down the 
convergence.  
The update procedure is used to compute the weights after obtaining the first 
measurement. Most of the cases use sub optimal functions: )(* 1* ikkikik xypww −= . After 
normalisation the results are set for the particle with weights:{ }Niikik wx 1, = . The PDF can be 
calculated using Equation 8.2. If the degeneracy size of the weights is higher than the 
threshold value, then resampling is performed. 
The new state k+1 is predicted through the equation for the Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM). When the new measurement is obtained, the interaction is repeated from the 
beginning. The algorithm steps are written again in a semi program code: 
 
 
     Particle filter 
 
 ● Initialisation 
 
        N samples with distribution )( 0xp are generated. 
  The particles are: 
    
{ }Nii Nx 10 /1, =
  
 
 
{ }Niikik wx 111, =−−
{ }Niik Nx 11* 1, =−−
{ }Niik Nx 11* , =−
{ }Niik Nx 111, =−−estimation (k-1)
update (k-1)
resampling (k-1)
estimation (k)
Figure 8.2: Particle filter 
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 ● Importance sampling 
 
  By receiving the measurements the weight are calculated: 
  
)(* 1* ikkikik xypww −=
, 
  where 
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. The new set of particle is { }Niikik wx 1, = . 
  The density function can be approximated. 
  
 ● Resampling 
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  For all N uniformly distributed r[0,1] 
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       The result is { }Niikik wx 1* , =  
 
 ● Prediction 
 
  The new particles are estimated using HMM equation. For example : 
  , where ),0(
2σNv =
 
 
      Go to step Importance sampling 
8.3.6 Rao-Blackwellisation  
Particle filters suffer from degeneration as mentioned previously. To limit the 
degeneration either particles or resampling are commonly used. Both methods have some 
disadvantages. In this section, a further method is described, known as Rao-Blackwellisation 
based on the Rao-Blackwell theorem. 
The Rao-Blackwell theorem describes that if we have an unbiased estimator, then it is 
always possible to find another unbiased estimator. The variance of this is lower by 
conditioning on a sufficient statistic. Proof can be found in [13]. 
Rao-Blackwell Theorem: If random variables have the joint distribution ),( LRpi , then for 
a function of interest :()f  
( )( ) ( )( )RfVarLRfVar pipipi ε ≤)(
. 
The key idea of Rao-Blackwellisation [12] is to make use of the information inherent to 
the problem itself. The problem space is partitioned in two analytically inferring sub-spaces. 
Assuming partitioning the state-space of X into two sub-spaces L(leaf) and R(root), so that 
),( kkk lrx = . The chain rule of probability can be written: 
)(),(),()( kkkkkkkkkk yrpylrpylrpyxp ==  
Let us assume that ),( kkk ylrp  can be updated analytically and therefore efficiently. The 
probability )( kk yrp  can be calculated using Monte Carlo Sequence Methods, if the conditions 
for analytical update are not fulfilled. Partitioning decreases the variance.  
vxfx ikik +=+ )(1
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For the update of ),( kkk ylrp , the L and Y must be Gaussian or have a finite state space for 
the existence of an analytical solution. The update can be carried out with an optimal method 
such as Kalman filter or jump Markov liners system [12]. The methods are optimal in 
minimising the Mean Square Error and cannot be out-performed by any other algorithm. 
The graphic representation of dynamical Bayesian Networks in Figure 8.3 can be used to 
understand the Rao-Blackwellisation Particle Filter (RBPF). The Bayesian network is a 
directed acyclic graph where nodes represent variables and arcs represent dependence 
(relation) among the variables. Dynamic Bayesian Networks extend Bayesian Networks with 
the probabilities which evolve over the time. The transition equation of the state space can 
also be graphically represented.  
 
 
The simple Particle filter network with two time steps is shown in Figure 8.3 (a). The 
Particle Filter with Rao-Blackellisation is represented in Figure 8.3 (b). The grey-blue cycles 
R are the variables, which we evaluate with the Particle Filters method. The white nodes are 
analytical updates. 
The main initial difficulty with RBPF is how to identify the conditional relationship 
between the state variables, so that the state variables can be meaningfully partitioned into 
two groups. The second issue is what kind of analytical filter should be used to estimate the 
leaf variables conditional on the root variables. The RBRF con not be implemented in M-LU 
directly. It is described in this chapter for completeness of the topic. 
8.4 Location Update procedure with Particle Filter 
The implementation of the Location Update procedure is not straightforward for the 
Particle filter. There are some significant differences (see chapter 7), which are solved in 
order to use the mechanism.  
8.4.1 Model  
The natural phenomena are described with two models in order to be simulated. The first 
one describes the natural properties process, thus in our case the PoA changes. The second 
describes the measurement (observation). Typically, the observed variable is not the required 
one. The models for M-LU are described in the following chapters.  
8.4.1.1 The natural properties of the Event Time Point 
The natural properties of the PoA change can be expressed in this state-space equation. 
The equation describing the natural properties of the phenomenon is important to the 
efficiency of the algorithm. 
The PoA changes are a reflection of the habits of the mobile user and properties of the 
access network. The PoA changes will usually follow the physical movements of the host. 
For example: The urban employee has typically high activity between 8:00h and 22:00h 
during the week. At night, the worker is less active. 
Figure 8.3: Dynamic Bayesian Network for Particle Filter with Rao-Blackwellisation 
Xt-1 Xt
Yt-1 Yt
Xt-1 Xt
Yt-1 Yt
Rt-1 Rt
(a) (b)
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In this simulation, no prior knowledge of the ETPs (PoA changes) is deployed. It 
assumed that zero knowledge of the network and user’s behaviour is present. This is the 
worst-case scenario and will show the qualities of the method well. The estimated particles 
are equal to the updated particle values. 
8.4.1.2 Observation model  
The second model describes the measurement (observation). Every measurement device 
has some characteristics, for example noise and dispersion. These characteristics are 
expressed in this model.  
The measurement consists usually of the modified signal of interest and noise. In M-LU, 
the PoA changes (ETPs) cannot be measured, as described in 7.1. An observation model 
cannot be created directly. To solve this problem some assumptions are made, so that 
measurement values are produced. The measurement is created artificially to satisfy the 
classical methods and in the same time to represent reasonable values. 
The distribution of the Event Time Point (ETP) within the Update Interval is unknown. 
The ETP can be everywhere in the Update Interval, see Figure 7.2. The only sure knowledge 
is that the ETP is within the interval with the event, but we require numerical value. 
To work this problem out, we assume that the measurement value is in the middle of the 
Update Interval (LU). The maximum error in this case is the length of the Update Interval. A 
further important assumption is that the measurement error in the Update Interval (UI) is 
Normal distributed (Gaussian). The standard deviation is proportional to the length of the 
interval.  
 
 
 
The PoA change point and PDF are shown in Figure 8.4. The PDF function of the 
Gaussian error distribution is drawn in red, the famous Gaussian bell. It is important to stress 
that a PDF of M-LU distribution is infinite and it is not possible to be limited to an LU 
(update) interval. Practically, there is zero probability for the PoA occurrence outside the UI. 
This is a controversy since the Gaussian distribution is infinite and cannot be limited in finite 
interval. The Gaussian probability is used although it cannot satisfy this condition. There are 
not solid objective arguments but reasonable subjective ones. Big advantage of the Gaussian 
PDF is that is gives a smooth reduction of the probability. Values close to the LU interval are 
better weighted than values far from the LU interval, there is a smooth evaluation of the 
weight. Furthermore, many of the natural processes are Gaussian distributions.  
The relationship between the size of the interval and the standard deviation is called 
stretching coefficient. The higher the stretching coefficient, the more values are considered 
outside the LU interval. Increasing the stretching coefficient decreases the degeneracy 
Figure 8.4: Measurement and PDF Function in update interval 
UEn UEn+1ETPk
timeDIn
σn
Ev
en
t t
im
e 
po
in
t ‘
s 
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
de
n
si
ty
PDF
Update IntervalI
Ev
en
t t
im
e 
po
in
t ‘
s 
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
de
n
si
ty
8.4 Location Update procedure with Particle Filter 139  
problem, because it avoids strong particle concentration. Less degeneracy means less 
resampling. Less resampling is always good for the result, as described in 8.3.4. The 
disadvantage of a high stretching coefficient is the low PDF accuracy. A compromise in this 
coefficient must be found. There is no analytically optimal value. Depending on the 
application an interval between 1 and 3 times LU seems to give good results in our 
simulation. 
The measurement is expressed using f() function, which returns the middle of the Update 
Interval with PoA (ETP). The interval depends on the PDF of ETP and the ETP. Furthermore, 
the function returns the maximal measurement error as second value. The model equation is: 
[ ] ( )Nkkkk xxfey :1,, =
 
( )( )ecxxfNxyp stNkkkk ⋅= ,,)( :1 , 
where ky is the measured value (in the middle of the Update Interval) and ke denotes the 
maximal error (UI size). The first equation returns the measured values. The second equation 
expresses the probability distribution function. The ( )σµ,N is the Normal Gaussian 
distribution with mean µ
 
and σ standard deviation. The standard deviation kst ec ⋅ depends on 
the maximum error multiplied by stretching coefficient
stc .  
8.4.2 Location Updates distribution 
The core idea is that the Update Intervals should be proportional to the probability of PoA 
change, as already discussed in chapter 7. In the areas, where probability is high, there should 
be high LU density. The principle is shown in Figure 8.5 for one filter cycle. The points must 
be proportional to the PDF of the Event Time Points (ETP). 
 
The PDF built by the Relative Update Intervals iRu  for M points, is: 
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The PDF of Event Intervals (EI) is defined by the Particle filter. The PDF for N particle 
is:  
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Figure 8.5: LU and PDF of ETP 
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where the ipart is the position of the particle.  
The PDF by EI should be proportional to the PDF by the Relative Update Intervals (RUI) 
within the filter cycle. This is the ideal case, which can be expressed by: 
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This is a key equation for determining the update points. The PDF functions must be only 
proportional. This is an important property used in chapter 8.4.3. 
Observing Equation 8.8, the first suggestion is to set the Update Time Points (UTP) equal 
to the particle values (positions). Where the concentration of particle is high, there will be 
more updates, thus smaller UIs. It is absolutely correct and reasonable from a mathematical 
prospective. Unfortunately, it is not possible. The Update Intervals must not be greater than 
the Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI) defined by the user, see 7.3. Direct copy of the 
values will not work, since there will be intervals bigger than the maximum disconnection. 
These are intervals with very low probability of ETP. 
The condition that the Update Intervals must not be bigger than certain interval (MDI) is 
very critical. This means also that the PDF of the Relative UI (RUI) could not be proportional 
to the PDF by EI since there must be updates also in areas with zero probability of ETP. As a 
consequence, the condition of PDF proportionality is ideal. The RUI must be distributed 
almost proportional to the PDF of EI. 
A practical suboptimal approach is suggested for defining the LU points, which is easy to 
implement. It delivers very good results although it is suboptimal. The simulation results are 
presented in 8.5. 
The first step is to set an Update Time Point (UTP) at every maxxxbin ≤  (smaller than 
Maximum Disconnection Interval). The condition for maximum disconnection is fulfilled in 
this way. The resulting intervals are called bins. A number of uniformly distributed UTP is 
added in each interval binx (bin) depending on the PDF constructed by the particle. If the PDF 
is high in the bin, then a large number of LU points is added. Certainly, the PDF is not a 
constant in the bin intervals. The reference value is the middle of the bin. Different reference 
values can be considered involving interpolation, mean etc. This is out of scope in this 
general method description. 
The total number of additional UTPs added in all bins is defined by the user before the 
simulation begins. The higher the number added UTPs the lower the disconnection time is 
and therefore, the lower the measurement error is. Unfortunately, the higher the number of 
added updates the more resources are required. The performance of the algorithm becomes 
poor because of the wasted resources. If there are zero added UTPs, then there are constant 
intervals. It is the same as if no PDF considerations are done. Both extremes are bad for the 
performance. In current experience, values between 20 and 200 added LUs for 10 seconds of 
Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI) produce good results.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: location updates distribution according the PDF 
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The total added UTPs is denoted as 
sumLUl .The number added points in a bin depends on 
the PDF of the Particle filter as previously described. The PDF must be normalised before 
calculation. The number of added UTPs in the bin is calculated by multiplying the PDF value 
at the middle of the bin by the total number of added UTPs. The PDF value in the middle of 
the bins is denoted as binsih 1}{ . The number il  of added updates in the ith bin will be: 
sumLUii lhl ⋅=  
The distribution of the additional updates in the bin is uniform. There is no other 
information about the distribution, so uniform distribution seems to be the proper one. 
The location updates and the PDF function are shown in Figure 8.6. The PDF in bin is 
approximated to constant values equal to the middle PDF values in the bin. The uniform 
distribution of the updates dependents of bins high (PDF value in the middle). The size of the 
update intervals in the bin is division of binx to the number of added UTPs in bin: 
sumLUi
bin
i lh
x
u
⋅
=
 
The UPTs can be calculated and executed in the following summarizing steps:  
 
Location Update points 
 
● PDF of the Event Time Point (ETP) with Particle filter is { }Niikik wx 1, =   
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● Number of added UTPS in the bin j is: 
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● Location Update position  addit in bin j is 
             
            for (i=0; i<lj; i++) { 
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The size of the bin in the time is very important for the algorithm’s performance. It can be 
equal to the
maxx . In this case, the size is influenced by the user and not by the algorithm itself.  
This can lead to underperformance when the bins are larger than the Event Interval. This can 
be easily proven in the extreme case, where there is only one bin. On the other side if the 
value is smaller than the
maxx , there is underperformance. The reason is that there are UTPs at 
binx also in areas where the probability of ETP is zero. In this areas, the update must be as rare 
as possible, thus best case at 
maxx . 
In our simulation we set 
maxxxbin = . The optimal binx  depends on the movements and 
therefore on the usage. For example: a VoIP application over M-VPN in car with WiFi 
connection. 
8.4.3 Resampling and particle position degeneration 
The resampling limits the degeneracy problem through reordering the particle values in 
areas in which the PDF function is high. The weight coefficients are reset to constant and the 
degeneracy is eliminated. The PDF is constructed only by the distribution of the particle 
values and the weight plays no role at this stage. 
Resampling is not suitable for the Location Update procedure. In case of zero knowledge 
of the natural model, the degeneration problem moves from the weight coefficients to particle 
position values. The variance of the particle decreases. 
After few interactions the particle concentrates on a few values, thus the majority of the 
values are the same. The main reason is the missing noise component in the estimation 
prediction model. For comparison in literature, there is always noise in the natural model 
equation. The noise component scatters the particle values with every resampling. Without 
this scattering component, the particle values at the maximum increase after every 
interaction. All particle values have the same values at some point due to the finite number of 
particles. The result is that the PDF function cannot be constructed by the particle. No 
resampling is implemented in M-LU. The issue with degeneracy is solved using new weights 
update strategy described in 8.4.4. 
8.4.4 Particle update 
The main goal of the update procedure is to evaluate new values for the weights using the 
measurement. The weights represent the PDF function. The updated coefficients are a 
multiplication of the previous weights with the conditional probability in the classical Particle 
filter. 
)(* 1* ikkikik xypww −=
 
Using multiplication has the advantage that it can be easily implemented and is not 
influenced by normalization (factorization). A disadvantage of the multiplication with a 
Gaussian importance function (conditional probability) is the extreme decrease of the 
coefficients at the low Gaussian values. The variance of multiplication increases with every 
interaction. This is also one of the reasons for the degeneracy of the coefficients. 
The PDF of EI must be proportional to the PDF of the RUIs as already mentioned (notice 
not equal). Making use of this fact at the update, the multiplication can be exchanged by 
addition:  
)(* 1* ikkikik xypww += −
 
The big advantage is that there is no degeneracy of the coefficients. The variance does not 
increase rapidly. The resulting function is proportional to the PDF and there is no degeneracy. 
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A major disadvantage of the method is the permanent commutation of the coefficient values. 
The values can only increase. Modern computers work with finite numbers, so the hardware 
will be overloaded at some point. Normalisation is a way of solving the increasing in the 
weights.  
∑
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Unfortunately, the normalisation changes proportionally between the updated 
coefficients. The prior updates become less important to all posterior following updates after 
normalisation. This follows directly from the mathematical equation for normalisation. For 
example: one weight after two normalisations at step k-1 and k-2 is: 
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The conditional probability at k-1 and k-2 is divided to different divisors, thus the updates 
are not considered fair. 
There must be as little normalisation as possible in M-LU to avoid unfair treatment. The 
normalisation is carried out only when the coefficients reach the threshold to overload. 
Using addition instead of multiplication increases the performance of the algorithm. 
There is no degeneration of the weights or the particles. The solution is acceptable, since the 
LU distribution procedure only requires proportionality to the PDF of EI. The effect of 
normalisation does not lead to underperformance, as the simulation shows. 
An interesting fact is that normalisation on regular basis can be considered as a forgetting 
factor. This could have a positive influence on an environment with a dynamic PDF. 
8.4.5 Particle moving  
The particle positions (values) are very important for building the PDF. The particles 
must not be distributed in the same way as the PDF function since the information for the 
function is carried by the weights. There are two requirements for the particle positions. First: 
the number of particles must be sufficient to represent the PDF. Second: the particles must be 
distributed at the higher points of the PDF. The distribution of the particles is very important. 
For example: if the PDF has almost zero values up to 1000, than there is no sense in keeping 
positions at less than 1000.  
With zero knowledge and no use of resampling, the particle positions are constant 
throughout the whole simulation. To overcome this shortcoming an algorithm has been 
developed for moving of particle. Moving is a synonym for changing the value and stressing 
that the old value is dropped.  
If there is no particle value closer than binx  to the measured value than the particle with 
the lowest weight is moved to the measured value. The weight of the moved particle is set to 
zero. The procedure is executed before updating the weights.  
The algorithm moves the particle with the lowest weight to cover the PDF high values. 
The high values of the PDF are represented by large weights. Only particles with lower 
weights are moved. The distance size of binx is considered sufficient, since the LUs are 
uniformly distributed (constant) in the bin of binx .  
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8.5 Simulation 
The main target of the simulation is to achieve proof of concept, thus to show the 
qualities of the new method. The results are compared with the currently used monotone 
constant interval update in a fair way. The analysis includes many parameters for the 
performance of the algorithm. The simulation shows the advantages and the practical 
difficulties. A benefit of the simulation is also the possibility to test the algorithm with 
different threshold values, so that the limits of the method can be found. 
8.5.1 Simulation structure 
The MATLAB 7 software is used for the simulation. The software is very suitable for this 
type of simulation. On the one hand, it provides many integrated mathematical functions: 
array sorting, histogram, approximation etc. On the other hand, it is a flexible programming 
language for creating non-standard functions. The simulations are done on PC hardware: 
AMD Athlon, 512 MB RAM and 1.15 MHz CPU.  
The simulation is offline using the update/Event Intervals rather than absolute time, thus 
the clock is not used, see 8.5.2. The code efficiency is out of scope for this simulation. The 
stress is the accuracy of the predicted values, thus the minimum number of updates with 
smallest possible error (disconnection).  
The simulation focuses on gathering statistical information for predefined Event Time 
Points (ETPs). Therefore, the structure of the code is inverse to the real implementation. The 
simulation code calculates for given Event Time Points the needed Update Time Points, 
Measured Intervals etc. The structure of the code is presented in Figure 8.8. It consist of six 
main blocks, their purpose and implementation are as follows: 
 
Initialisation The semi-random intervals are generated in this step. Five representative 
semi-random cases are used in this thesis, see 7.5.1. The intervals correspond to the distance 
between the Event Time Points (ETPs). The Event Intervals (EI) are relative to the start of the 
filter cycle and the intervals are relative to each other. Intervals between the ETPs can be 
generated in advance. In contrarily, the start of the filter cycle depends on the quality of the 
estimation and cannot be pre-calculated. The Absolute EIs (AEIs) must be calculated 
systematically, thus cycle after cycle. The intervals between the ETPs are converted to EI 
using subtraction of remainder, explained later in this chapter. 
 
Location Update measurement The procedure finds the Update Interval where the event 
occurs. Then it calculates the error, i.e. the disconnection time. The Maximum Disconnection 
Interval (MDI) is the size of the Update Interval (UI) with ETP. The estimated value is in the 
middle of the UI. The number of updates needed to detach the event are calculated in order to 
get the method qualities. All values are stored in an array for later statistical analysis. 
Figure 8.7: Reminder  
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A remainder is used to align the Event Intervals and Relative Update Intervals in the filter 
cycle. It converts the initialised intervals to EI. Basically, it is the difference between the 
initialised intervals, the ETP, and the following UTP, see Figure 8.7. It is executed before 
every filter cycle of prediction. Otherwise, the Event Interval is unknown in the filter cycle.  
 
Update Procedure The particle weights are updated considering the new measured value 
in this block. The procedure is a straightforward implementation of the algorithm: addition of 
the weight with the conditional distribution expressed by Gaussian distribution.  
 
Normalisation The weights are normalised if the maximum weight has reached a certain 
threshold value. The weights are divided to their sum, see 8.4.4. 
 
Prediction If there is knowledge of the natural model (Hidden Markov Model), a 
prediction of the new particle position is carried out. In our simulation there is zero 
knowledge about the model, thus the predicted particle value is the same as the current one.  
 
Analysis This part presents variables important for comparing the quality of the results. 
The four diagrams explained in 8.6 are used to present the results.  
 
8.5.2 Periodic behaviour dependent of the absolute time 
The filter prediction mechanism uses only intervals between the events not considering 
the absolute time. The simulation code does not correspond to real implementation, where the 
absolute time can be considered. 
The performance of the algorithm can become poor when the Event Time Points 
dependend on the absolute time. The PDF cannot be built in the correct way, since it 
considers the intervals between the ETPs. For example: a mobile device owned by a daily 
worker. An active time is between 8:00h and 19:00h, where there are more events. There will 
be less Event Time Points after 22:00 to 6:00h. An inadequate PDF will be built if only the 
intervals are considered. The small size interval will dominate the PDF and small Update 
Intervals will be executed even in late hours. The performance of the algorithm will be even 
poorer than a constant interval since significant input is not considered in the simulation.  
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Figure 8.8: Simulation structure 
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A simple transformation helps to handle events dependent of the absolute time. The 
absolute time dependencies are circular since the absolute time is circular. For example, there 
is a day cycle. There is no need to change the code of the simulation to implement a time 
clock. The Event Intervals are made relative to one anchor time point within the cycle, if 
there is a periodic dependency. The Event Intervals are no longer relative to the start of the 
filter cycle. If there is a day cycle, then the Event Intervals within one day are set relative to 
midnight (00:00h). In other words, the Event Interval is equal to the intervals between the 
start of the day and the Event Time Point. If there are PoA changes at 7:00h and at 7:10h, the 
Event Intervals have the length 7:00h and 7:10h. The events in following days are relative to 
the 00:00h of the day, in which they happen. The length of the intervals is from 0 to 23:59h. 
The relative time point must be in the cycle, i.e. day, but it must not be 00:00h. This principle 
works well with all time points in the day. Other points then midnight will only shift the PDF.  
The Event Intervals can be handled properly using this simple pre-processing. The 
simulation works properly with cycle dependencies. The principle is the same for day, week, 
month etc. This requires knowledge of the cycle period in advance. This mechanism for a day 
is used in the simulation for simulating the real data. 
8.6 Simulation results 
The simulation is done with the input values generated in the same way, see 7.5.1, for all 
M-LU algorithms, thus Fuzzy controller und extended Kalman Filter. The representation and 
analysis is done as described in 7.5.2. In this way the M-LU algorithm can directly compared. 
8.6.1 White noise  
The intervals between the ETP are generated with the following equations: 
10
200),0(
=
+=
σ
σNaEI r
, 
where 
raEI is the r
th
 Event Interval. N() denotes normal distributed random values with 
parameters mean value zero (0) and standard deviation of 10. The 
raEI is shifted with 200. 
At the first Figure 8.9, the generated Event Intervals (EI) and estimated EIs are shown. 
This is the typical white noise distribution. 
Figure 8.9: White noise EIs and estimated EIs 
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The summary of the result is presented in Figure 8.10. The blue bars show the histogram 
of the Update Intervals (UI) with Event Time Point (ETP). In the best case, the histogram 
must have high values close to zero. This means the Update Interval was small, where the 
event happens. Consequently, the disconnection intervals (DI) are small. The red dashed line 
shows the maximum defined DI (5 sec). The blue bar near the maximum DI shows that the 
prediction algorithm has failed and the Update Interval is the maximum possible. The bars at 
maximum DI must be as small as possible.  
The green dotted curve shows the histogram of Disconnection Intervals when using the 
constant Update Intervals (const UI) with the same resources. The red line shows the 
histogram of the real DI by the new method.  
As described in 7.5.2 the results are compared in a fair way with the constant interval 
update. This means the constant intervals are calculated with the same number of updates in 
the simulation time. The vertical dashed red line shows the constant UI.  
The numerical results are shown at the bottom right corner of the Figure 8.10, for 
example the mean UI by the new method and by the const UI. The ratio between the two 
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Figure 8.11: White noise, UI with ETP by sample 
8.6 Simulation results 148   
values gives a simple qualifier for the performance. The ratio is 3.86. This means the new 
method significantly outperforms the constant UI by almost 4 times. Furthermore, 96.4% of 
the UI with ETP by the new method were smaller than the constant UI, thus almost all 
updates are better than with constant updates (Figure 8.10, LU < const UI). There are less 
failures of prediction, which is also acknowledged by the small size of the blue bar 
(histogram of UI) by the maximal DI by the user. 
One big advantage of the new method must be pointed out: it keeps the same 
performance by increasing the Event Intervals with constant shift. Currently, the EI lies 
between 150 sec and 250 sec. If we shift the values between 1150 and 1250 the performance 
of the algorithm stays the same. In contrast, the performance of the constant Update Interval 
decreases since more updates are executed in vain. The outperformance of the new method 
increases by shifting.  
Figure 8.11 shows the UI by sample. It can be clearly seen that UI in the first samples is 
not very good because the PDF is not yet estimated. The PDF generated by the Particle and 
the one estimated at the end of the simulation are shown in the following Figure 8.12. The 
PDF fits very well, which is also verified by the results. 
8.6.2 Two rotating white noise sources 
There are two white noise sources, which are rotating. They can be described by: 
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The operator or denotes the rotation with 50% probability. Half of the values are 
generated by the first distribution and half by the second. The results are shown in Figure 
8.13.  
The histogram of the results in Figure 8.14 acknowledges the good performance of the 
new algorithm. The mean UI is 2.37 smaller then the constant UI. 94.7% of the updates are 
smaller than the UI by constant updated. It can be concluded that the new method performs 
independent from the PDF form, as designed (Figure 8.15). 
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Figure 8.14: Two rotating white noise sources, histogram results 
Figure 8.15: Two rotating white noise sources, PDF by particle and estimated 
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8.6.3 Sinus based EI with white noise 
For this simulation, a sinus-based signal with white noise is used: 
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The variable S indicates the total number of samples, S=5000. Here, k is the index of the 
calculated sample and σ is equal to 10. In Figure 8.16 the EI are presented. The Figure 8.17 
presents the result histogram. The results show that this is an even better case for the new 
algorithm. The 97.8% of the updates are better then the constant Update Interval. The 
constant UI is 3.84 times bigger then the mean UI. This is generally due to the bigger values 
of Event Interval, compared to the previous simulations, the values lie around 500 sec. 
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8.6.4 Non linear EI with white noise 
The Event Intervals are generated with recursion, where the next value depends on the 
previous one. The equation used in [11] and defined as: 
)20,200()2.1cos(8
1
25
2 2 1
11 Nk
r
raEI
aEI
k
kk
k ++
+
+=
−
−−
 
The EI and the estimated EI are shown in Figure 8.18. The results in Figure 8.19 again 
show a very good performance of the algorithm. The mean UI is 2.24 times better than the UI 
with constant UI. Over 93.1% of the updates are better than the constant UI. 
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Figure 8.19: Non linear, histogram results 
8.6 Simulation results 152   
8.6.5 Real data 
The algorithm was tested with real data. The data contains the login activities in 5 days of 
dial approx.1000 users. The EI is the time points when the network is accessed. More than 
2500 EI were captured. 
The users do not generate events fast so the input parameters of the method are increased, 
i.e. the maximum Disconnection Interval is to 300 seconds (5 min), EIs are 2000, there are 
2000 particles, 500 added updates, and stretch coefficient of 10. The parameters are fit 
manually.  
Further important optimisation is the assumption that the data is based on a day cycle. As 
described in chapter 8.5.2. The EIs are set relative to midnight (00:00h) of the same date. 
Without this pre-processing, very poor results are achieved. The PDF within one day is 
shown in Figure 8.22. The typical working cycle with low activity in the night and high 
activity during the day is clearly shown. 
The results in Figure 8.20 show that the mean UI by the new method and the constant UI 
are almost the same. The 77.3% of the updates are better then the constant UI. The Figure 
8.21 presents the UIs with ETP by sample.  
The input data represent a difficult test case. The outperformance is not as good as with 
the generated EIs. The main difficulty is that the assumption of the day cycle is partially 
right. Additionally, there are also week, month etc. cycles. All these are overlapped, where 
the day cycle has ca learly dominating role.  
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8.7 Conclusion and future work  
The Particle filter has advantages over the constant interval trough using the history of the 
PoA changes. The performance of the Particle filter stays constant, independent of the PDF 
curve, noise, offsets etc. The algorithm requires sufficient samples to estimate the PDF. 
Although Monte Carlo is a suboptimal method, it delivers very good results for non-linear 
systems. 
The simulation clearly shows the advantage of the new algorithm. In all cases, there was 
better performance than the constant UI. There are still areas in which the algorithm can be 
improved. Future work could contain the following optimizations, which are out the scope of 
this thesis: 
• The parameters, such as the number of particles, added updates etc are 
chosen manually. The values for the simulation are selected through tests. 
Optimisation of the parameter must be implemented in real deployment. This 
is automatic control engineering task and out of scope in this document. 
• The cycle events, such as day, week etc, are not considered in overlay. 
Currently the algorithm can apply only one of them. For example: day, week 
or month. It must be enhanced to consider more of them in an overlaying 
manner. 
• The PDF can change over the time. The algorithm will slowly adapt the PDF 
by every new EI. A forgetting factor can be added to the PDF to support fast 
changing PDFs.  
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9 Mobile Location Update protocol with Adaptive Fuzzy controller 
This chapter describes an adaptive Fuzzy controller for realisation of the Mobile Location 
Update protocol. This is an alternative solution with Fuzzy controller to the ones described in 
chapters 8 and 10.  
The section 9.2 gives a brief overview of Fuzzy system in order to align the readers and 
clarify the notations. A basic understanding of Fuzzy logic is required by reading this. The 
deployment of Fuzzy controller in M-LU is presented in 9.3. The controller predicts the next 
Event Interval. The Update Time Points are calculated using a transformation function 
described in 9.3.4. This function converts constant intervals into non-liner Update Intervals 
proportional to PDF of Event Time Point. The controller rules are generated with One Pass 
(OP) training and optimised with Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm.  
The simulation program structure and implementation are described in 9.4. The 
simulation provides proof of concept, where the properties of the method can be verified. The 
simulation results are presented in 9.5. In order to compare the performance of the methods, 
the input’s equations are the same as in the Sequential Monte Carlo method (chapter 8) and 
extended Kalman Filter (chapter 10). 
9.1 Contributions 
The main theoretical contributions of the author in this method are: (1) First, the creation 
of a model for the Mobile Node behaviour on which an adaptive Fuzzy controller can be 
deployed, see 9.3. (2) Second, the position of Update Time Points is calculated with a novel 
transformation function, see 9.3.4. (3) Third, handling periodic ETP dependent on absolute 
time, see 8.5.2. The practical contribution is the simulation of the new method and comparing 
the results to the classical constant update method in 9.4.  
The novel method with the simulation results has been published and presented by the 
author at IEEE conferences [9, 10]. The method can be applied to other protocols as shown in 
chapter 11. 
9.2 Fuzzy Logic Systems  
This chapter gives an overview of Fuzzy controller. There are two types of descriptions 
when exploring a phenomenon: objective and subjective. The objective knowledge creates a 
system model with univalent mathematical equations based on known physical properties. A 
typical example are engineering solutions using the dynamics of a falling body. The majority 
of engineering implementations are based on objective knowledge since the mechanisms and 
the relations have been very well studied in classical disciplines, thus mathematics and 
physics. The second possibility for system description uses subjective knowledge 
representing expert experience. The subjective description cannot be expressed with exact 
values but only by human understandable quantities. For example: “it is quiet early in the 
morning”. The subjective description of the problem is usually gathered over a long time and 
is more intuitive than exact.  
The objective description has the advantage of delivering precise values. It can be 
processed by computers and furthermore it is universal i.e. no matter in which country and by 
which person the result of the procedure will be the same. All calculations are obtained from 
strict mathematical definitions. For this reason, it is popular for solving engineering 
problems.  
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The subjective knowledge, in contrary to objective knowledge, is based on classification 
and expression. There is a large scale of possible interpretations in the implementation. For 
example, the sentence “it is quiet early in the morning”. There are many possibilities for 
understanding this expression and it is difficult to conclude something for practical 
implementations. Still such expressions contain valuable information for solving the problem. 
The description is gathered with human experience and is known as expert knowledge. When 
dealing with complex problems where solutions cannot be found with objective methods, the 
subjective solution is a reasonable alternative. The subjective knowledge is often the only 
alternative, like for example in historical descriptions. 
The discipline for defining, creating operations and processing a subjective knowledge is 
called Fuzzy logic. It defines rules for working with multivalent values, which is not directly 
possible in the classical mathematics. 
9.2.1.1 Description of Fuzzy logic systems 
This chapter gives a very brief overview of Fuzzy system. More details can be found in 
[1, 2].  
 
Fuzzy systems consist of the following blocks: fuzzifier, Fuzzy rules, inference and 
defuzzifier, see Figure 9.1. The crisp input values are transformed by the fuzzifier in a Fuzzy 
set. The Fuzzy set extends the classical set theory by adding assessment belonging. The 
Fuzzy set consists of elements with a membership function. The function value acts as an 
indicator of belonging to some element. The membership function is denoted as µ and has 
values in the interval 0 to 1, thus [ ]1,0→xµ . Then the Fuzzy set A
~
of value x in space of X is 
defined by: 
( ){ }XxxxA A ∈= ,)(,~ µ  
A typical set can be the water temperature for example: hot with membership of 0.3 
degree, cold with 0.2 degree, normal with 0.5 degree. The water temperature belongs to 
different degree to different elements. Multivalent values are not possible in the classical 
mathematic, where the water temperature can be 27 degrees for example and this is an exact 
crisp value. 
The membership function can have a different form. It should represent in the best way 
the belonging to an element. Some popular membership curves are shown in Figure 9.2. 
 
The membership functions can be: triangular, Gaussian bell, trapeze, single point or any 
other. Depending on the design, the form can be chosen freely. The most popular is triangular 
membership function, since it is easy to calculate and it delivers smooth transaction between 
the values. 
A triangular membership function is defined by: 
input
Crisp Values
Fuzzifier
Fuizzy rules
Infrence
Defuzzifier
output
Crisp Values
Figure 9.1: Fuzzy system 
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 where xi denotes the maximum of the triangular at the abscise i.e. mean point. The 
constant c defines the spread of the membership function. The higher the c value, the more 
uncertainty there is. Another important membership function is singletone. It is defined as: 
( ) iX xxx == ,1µ and ( ) iX xxx ≠= ,0µ . The advantage of singleton membership function is its 
simplicity, when providing defuzzification [2]. The opposite nonsingletone membership 
function has no zero values at more than one point: ( ) iX xxx == ,1µ  and ( ) iX xxx ≠≥ ,0µ . The 
triangle membership function is nonsingleton according the definition. 
 
The crisp inputs are processed through the fuzzifier. Then the sets are evaluated using the 
Fuzzy rules with inference. In every Fuzzy system, there is an associated set of rules. The 
rules represent the linguistic interpretation of the system behaviour. The rules are the result of 
exploring the system over the time. Each rule expresses a sentence of the experience (expert 
knowledge). The rules have the form: 
lll
nn
lll GisoTHENFisuANDFisuANDFisuIFR .......: 2211
, 
where lR is l-th rule, u is the input variable, F is element of the Fuzzy set, o is the output 
and G is an element of the output Fuzzy set. There is an antecedent part and a consequent 
part. The antecedent part may consist of multiple inputs (u). The consequent part has one 
output variable (o). Multiple consequent variables can certainly be implemented, when the 
multiple variables are subsets of a singe consequent set. A single consequent variable is 
considered further in the text. 
The different antecedent membership functions are joined with logical AND or OR. The 
logical operations in Fuzzy logic are defined differently from the classical mathematical 
understanding. All T-Norm operations can be used for the definition of AND and OR. The T-
Norm (t-norm) operations are simple relations between values [3]. In most of the Fuzzy 
implementations the AND of variables means the minimal of these. The maximum variables 
are implemented in OR operation. 
The resulting Fuzzy elements are aggregated in one set using T-Conorm operation [3]. In 
practice, T-Conorm operation is the maximum of all input elements. Let o be the output of a 
single rule and O be the output the Fuzzy set. It can be denoted by: 
l
M
l
oO
1=
Λ=
, 
where Λ is the T-Conorm operation and M the number of rules. Expressing the 
consequent set with the antecedent part gives: 



 Τ∗Λ=
==
)()( sup,11
l
kQ
n
k
l
o
M
l
xyO µµ
, 
1
0
x
Figure 9.2: Membership functions 
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where 
oµ and Qµ is the membership functions of consequent and antecedent. The 
Operation * is a single T-norm operation. The Operator T denotes the sequence of T-norm 
operations in the antecedent part of the rules. The system has n input variables. The centre of 
the consequent membership function is y. 
 
This Fuzzy set output must be transferred into a crisp value by the defuzzifier. Let the 
function D() express the defuzzifiyer . The most popular methods are Centre of Gravity 
(centroid) and Height defuzzifiyer. The centre of the mass is the crisp output value in the 
centroid method. In the second approach, the crisp output is the highest values. The centroid 
method favours the output of greatest area. The height method favours the rule with the 
greatest output value. 
The output of crisp value is written as: 
( ) 







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 Τ∗Λ==
==
)()( sup,11
l
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n
k
l
o
M
l
xyDODf µµ
 
Let us define that the centroid method is used for defuzzification. Furthermore, the 
singletone membership functions are used for the rule output. The singletone has little 
deflection by large number of elements when compared to nonsingletone. The output can be 
expressed using these two definitions, as: 
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The )(xp lfb  is called Fuzzy Basis Function [4]. It will play an important role in the 
creation of the Fuzzy controller. The last two equations are central to the evaluation of the 
Fuzzy controller with the method proposed here. 
This classical Mamdani Fuzzy model is shown in Figure 9.3, where A and B are inputs 
and the membership functions are triangular. The crisp values for the input are A=0,191 and 
B=406. The crisp output is 0.526 calculated with centroid method, shown in the figure with a 
thick red line. 
Figure 9.3: Fuzzy rules example 
Equation 9.1 
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9.2.2 Creating Fuzzy rules with training methods 
The Fuzzy rules express the expert knowledge on a certain phenomenon. In many cases, 
there is insufficient information to create exact membership functions and rules. 
Consequently, acceptable results cannot be achieved. If actions-reactions of the system have 
already been observed, then they can be used to create Fuzzy rules and adjust the membership 
functions. Appling known system input and output values to adjust the values of the 
controller is called training. 
The training data should include all possible system states and changeovers in the best 
case. Poor performance is the result when some system states are not included in the training 
data.  
9.2.2.1 One Pass method  
One Pass [5] is a simple and fast method for creating Fuzzy rules using known input-
output pairs. Let the observed value pairs be ),,....,(),,,....,( )2()2()2(2)2(1)1()1()1(2)1(1 yxxxyxxx nn ,...., 
where x is the crisp input value and y is the output value. There are n input variables and 
single output variable. 
1) The intervals of input and output variables are expected and set 
in [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]+−+−+−+−+− yyxxxxxxxx nn ,,,,...,,,,,, 332211 . The intervals can be adjusted dynamically, 
but are initially constant for clarity. Each interval is divided into Mi regions, where 
the number of regions can be different for every variable. The number is dependent 
on the required precision for the variable. Variables that are more important should 
have more regions. A membership function is assigned to every region. The 
membership function is greater than zero within the interval and zero outside the 
interval. Every membership function can be labelled, for example: very small, small, 
normal, big, very big etc. The label is to facilitate the verbal association. The exact 
form of the membership function is freely chosen. In this thesis, the triangular form is 
used because of the smooth transaction between the values.  
2) Every pair of input-output values is evaluated against the membership functions. The 
input-output values are assigned to the region with the highest membership function. 
For example: a certain value has a maximum degree of membership when assigned to 
the “very small” element. One rule is created for every training pair in this way. 
3) The degree of strength is calculated for every rule, in order to resolve conflicting 
rules. The degree lD  of l
-th
 rule is calculated as follows: 
 
( ) ( )∏
=
=
n
i
l
iXi
l
Yl xyD
1
µµ
, 
 where  XnXY µµµ ,...., 1 are the membership functions for the rule. 
4) Conflicting rules have the same antecedent memberships, but different consequent 
membership. One rule must be selected for a certain combination of antecedents, thus 
only one output is possible for a certain combination of input values. If there are 
conflicting rules, only the rule with the highest degree is kept and the others are 
discarded. 
5) After evaluating all values as described in 2) and 3) the rules base is ready for use. 
The new input values can be evaluated in the rule.  
The One Pass (OP) method is widely used because of its simplicity and good results. 
Typical, a large number of training data must be processed before starting to use the rules. 
We recommend the use of the OP method together with rules created by the experts. The pre-
defined expert rules can be used as a major part and the OP method can be involved for fine-
tuning and supplementary rules. Simulation results for the OP method can be found in [2]. 
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9.2.2.2 Recursive Least Squares method for optimisation 
A major drawback of the OP method is the centres of the membership functions. These 
values are pre-defined without knowledge of the system. The optimal centres require prior 
knowledge of the variables distribution. The distribution is unknown at 1) of the OP method. 
The membership functions may misinterpret important data, since the centres must be 
distributed at the high values of the Probability Distribution Function. 
The Recursive Least Squares method (RLS) is used to adjust the centre of the output 
membership values assuming, that the membership functions are symmetric over the mean 
value. Optimising the consequent centres leads to faster convergence to the real PDF of EI. 
The input rules are not changed. 
The main idea of the RLS method is minimising the sum of square error. The error is the 
difference between the crisp Fuzzy output and the training data. It is denoted as RLSj . 
Let id be the training data, )( ixf be the Fuzzy controller function and t be the number of 
training samples. The error is: 
[ ]∑
=
−
−=
t
i
ii
it
RLS xfdj
1
2)(λ
 
Here, λ
 
is the forgetting factor with values [0,1], where 1 means considering all past 
values and 0 means forgetting all past values. The ix variable represents the input variables in 
our case. The main goal of the RLS method is to minimise RLSj  with respect to
 
)(xf . The 
)(xf
 
is dependent only on the means (centres) of the output membership functions. 
The )(xf is according to Equation 9.1: 
∑
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, 
whereY and P are the matrixes. If there is a training sequence of t values, then the matrix 
P  has t rows (training data) and M columns (number of rules). Y  is a matrix with a column 
of t training values. Using matrixes simplifies the notation and the processing. The RLS 
algorithm can be applied to the equation since )(xf is the linear function with respect to Y . 
The recursion for Y  is obtained by minimising RLSj . The input-output pairs following the 
recursion must be evaluated for every training data set k [6]: 
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The ,*1+kfbP  denotes the Fuzzy basis function at the k-th training pair. It contains a column 
with M values, one for each input. The kG  is the gain vector at step k. kL  denotes the inverse 
correlation matrix at step k. kL  is MxM and is initialised with the identity matrix.  The value 
ke is the priory error. Y  is the matrix with the centres of the consequent membership 
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function. It is initialised with M zero values. More background information can be found in 
[6].  
After evaluating all training sets sequentially, Y  contains the centres of the consequent 
membership functions. The centres are chosen to minimise the RLSj  values. A great advantage 
of the RLS method is not finding some local minimum, but the function minimum [6].  
The same principle can be applied by adjusting centres of the input membership 
functions. The RLS method optimises the membership centres of already developed Fuzzy 
rules and it is used in the simulation.  
9.2.2.3 Other training methods 
There are different methods for optimising the rules, such as Back-Propagation, Singular 
Values and Least Mean Square. They minimise different errors and therefore have different 
qualities. The performance and comparisons can be found in [4, 1, 2]. The minor differences 
in the algorithms are not decisive for the M-LU procedure. The author believes, without 
insisting on this, that RSL method performs very good in this framework. Certainly, other 
methods can be used without changing the concept. In this thesis OP is used with the RSL 
method. 
9.3 Fuzzy controller for the Location Update procedure 
In this section 9.3, the implementation of Fuzzy controller in the M-LU is described. The 
general idea is to create a Fuzzy controller for predicting the Event Interval (PoA change) 
using the past Measured Intervals (MIs). The controller works as black box. The input is 
several past MIs and the output is the prior estimated EI. This is the common method for 
predicting chaotic time series [2].  
The Update Time Points are calculated from the prior estimated EI and the Maximum 
Disconnection Interval (MDI) according to 9.3.4. 
The Fuzzy controller uses the intervals rather than absolute time values as already 
discussed in 7.3. The Event Intervals can be set relative to some point in the period if there 
are periodic events, as described in 8.5.2.  
 
The membership function must be defined first, as described in 9.3.1. Then Fuzzy rules 
must be using expert rules in combination with training data see 9.3.2. Training data is 
collected during the training period using constant Update Intervals equal to Maximum 
Disconnection Interval (MDI). These intervals are sufficiently small to satisfy the application 
requirement and give good precision. The posterior estimated Event Time Point (MI) is 
assumed to be in the middle of the Update Interval to minimize the absolute estimation error. 
The MIs build the training pairs described in 9.3.2. The following Figure 9.4 shows all 
elements again. 
After the rules are created, the centres of the consequent membership function are 
updated according to the OP method, see 9.2.2.1 and 9.2.2.2. 
Figure 9.4: Training intervals 
LU1 LU2 LU3 LUn
MTP1 MTP2 MTP3
ETP2ETP1 ETP3
LUn – Update Time 
MTP – Measured Time Point 
ETP – Event Time Point 
time
Error
UI UI
UI – constant Update Interval
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9.3.1 Defining the interval ranges and membership functions 
The range of possible EI values must be defined before starting to train the controller, 
thus minimum and maximum values. When an EI is out of min-max value, it cannot be 
predicted. The predicted value will be at the extreme of the domain, but still within it. 
Increasing the difference between the defined domain and real values increases the prediction 
error. On the other hand, unnecessarily large intervals require more membership sets to 
achieve sufficient precision of the controller. More membership sets require more Fuzzy rules 
to cover all possible value combinations. More rules means more CPU and memory resources 
at the device. To recapitulate, the value range cannot be increased to infinite. An interval 
between 0 and 24 hours is defined in M-VPN, which seems to be a good value. The domain 
(range) should not cover all Event Intervals, but it should cover the majority of them. The 
output and input domain are the same in M-LU because the input and the output are the same 
variable types. 
Each domain must be divided into regions of the membership functions. The number of 
regions defines the precision of the prediction. The higher the precision, the more regions are 
needed. The Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI) defines the precision necessary to some 
degree. The membership region is proportional of the maximum disconnection. The 
membership functions overlap by 50% on the left and right side. An overlapping is very 
important since it covers directly not considered values combinations. The total number of 
regions in the input-output domain is:  
sizeregion
sizedomain
regionsofnumber R
D
N
.2
=
, 
where 
sizedomainD is the domains size, sizeregionR  is the region size proportional to the maximum 
Disconnection Interval. The region size is set 3 times the MDI in this simulation. This value 
is chosen trough multiple simulation for delivering good results. It is an optimization task to 
find optimal values and it is out of scope in this thesis. 
The antecedent membership functions are triangular. The advantages of the symmetric 
triangular form are the ease of calculation and good performance.  
9.3.2 Creation of rule base  
The expert rules provide raw information on how the controller should act. For example: 
they can be created using the assumption that the M-LU is implemented in the device used by 
an employee. As generally known, there are two maximums in business days: in the morning 
and after lunch. The maximums are higher on Monday than on Friday. There is a reduced 
level of activity at the weekend. Typical diagrams for day and week activity can be seen in 
Figure 9.5. Since there is no real data real data of mobile usage available, the data has been 
gathered from the Internet exchange point - PARIX. The Mobile Client movements depend 
on the usage, like smart phone, train etc. 
Abstracting rules can generally describe the day and week activity and can be involved  
in covering the main extremes. They could consist of two rules, for example: 
 
 IF 7:oo h < time AND time < 20:oo h THEN Location Update Interval IS small 
 IF Monday < day AND day < Friday THEN Location Update Interval IS small 
 
In the next step, the rules are created trough training as described in chapter 9.2.2.1.  
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Figure 9.5: Day and week activity 
9.3.3 Number of inputs of the Fuzzy controller 
Before starting the OP (One Pass) method, the number of inputs of the Fuzzy controller 
must be set, i.e. how many past values must be considered in the prediction. Increasing the 
number of inputs improves the prediction precision. This can be compared with the 
interpolation of curves using more given points. The interpolation becomes more realistic 
when involving more points.  
Unfortunately, increasing the number of inputs requires more rules to cover transition 
cases. The exact number of rules cannot be determined, since the form of the interval 
transition plays a major role. It is factorial incensement of the number of inputs according to 
the authors subjective experience. In the simulation, about 100 rules were required for 
domain 0 to 700 sec with 3 input variables. Using more than 10 past input values requires 
many thousands of rules.  
The input values (Measured Intervals) are typical sequentially following values, thus 
values with index k, k-1, k-2...k-n where k is the current index and n is the number of inputs. 
Reducing the number of inputs reduces the past time period considered in the controller. 
Reducing the considered past values decreases the prediction ability. To overcome this 
problem, not sequential following sequential values can be involved. For example series such 
as k, k-1, k-3, k-5, k-10,…. The considered period increases and the precision decreases. It is a 
trade off between the precision and the considered past values. The use of not sequential 
following past values is only mentioned and it is part of future work. M-LU uses monotone 
following values. 
After the rule base is created, the centres of the consequent membership function must be 
updated according the RLS optimisation method. The implementation is straightforward from 
the theoretical part, see 9.2.2.2. 
9.3.4 Distribution of the Update Time Points 
The Fuzzy controller predicts the coming Event Interval using past Measured Intervals 
(MIs). The predicted Event Interval (EI) shows the highest probability where the event (PoA 
change) could happen. The Fuzzy controller does not deliver the PDF of the EI but only a 
single value in contrast to the Particle filter described in chapter 8. The PDF cannot be 
constructed from this single value. This is a general issue of the Fuzzy method. The 
requirement of the chapter 7 cannot be met directly, i.e. the Update Intervals(UIs) to be 
distributes as the real PDF. This shortcoming is solved with the assumption that the 
probability of EI is in approximately Normal distributed with the standard deviation 
proportional to the Update Interval(UI). This principle is also applied in the extended Kalman 
Filter for M-LU presented and derived in 10.3. 
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Normal distribution of EI is continuous and not zero for all values. Implying this would 
mean that there is a nonzero probability at all time points, even in the past. This is certainly 
not the case. To overcome this controversy, we define the first condition: the probability for 
ETP is Normal distributed except for the past points. Using subjective knowledge, it is 
defined that the distribution must have very low values at the start of the filter cycle (zero 
time). The standard deviation is three times of the predicted EI as described in chapter 10.3. 
The second condition is that the size of the Update Interval(UI) must also not exceed the 
Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI) defined by the application.  
An abstract curve of UI satisfying both conditions is shown in Figure 9.6. 
Setting the UI proportional to the Normal distribution (PDF of EI) and not exceeding 
MDI is derived in chapter 10.5. The main idea is to create a transformation function for 
converting constant Update Intervals in a non-linear interval proportional to the PDF of EI.  
The transformation function has an input the time point of the constant updates relative to 
the filter cycle. It depends on the parameter: the prior estimated EI (predicted EI) and the 
Maximal Disconnection Interval (MDI). The output of the function is Update Time Point 
considering the PDF of EI. 
The transformation function T() derived in chapter 10.6 is: 
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Figure 9.6: Location update interval and the probability of PoA change 
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The +kP  is the prior estimated Event Interval (PoA change interval) and x time point of 
the constant updates. An example of the function is shown in Figure 9.7. The detailed 
derivation is presented in 10.3. 
9.3.5 Implementation procedures and structures 
An overview of the implementation is provided in this chapter. The main blocks of real 
implementations are presented in Figure 9.8. 
The user defines the Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI), the training period, user 
profile etc, see Figure 9.8 step 1. The MDI is different for different types of applications such 
as VoIP, FTP etc. The user profile contains the raw Fuzzy rules. For example: working 
employee, travelling sales man, night shift employee. The profile can be omitted if there is no 
exact idea of the behaviour. The rules can only be created using the self-learning OP 
methods. The training period must be sufficiently large, so that all possible situations can be 
observed. 
During the second step (Figure 9.8, step 2) the Fuzzy rules are loaded from the profile. 
The training data is collected during step 3 (Figure 9.8). The OP rules are created in step 4. 
The centres of the output membership functions are optimised according to the RLS method 
in step 5. The Fuzzy controller is ready for use in the LU procedure.  
Let n be the number of past values considered in the Fuzzy controller. The last n 
Measured Intervals (MI) of the training data are used as an input for the newly designed 
Fuzzy controller, step 6 on Figure 9.8. The result of the Fuzzy controller - predicted Event 
Interval is a parameter of the transformation function. Additional parameters of the 
transformation function are set as described in 9.3.4. The input of the transformation function 
is the time point of monotone constant updates equal to the MDI. The result of the 
transformation function is the Update Time Point. During step 7, the Location Update 
procedure is executed. The result of the LU procedure is Boolean - true or false, dependent on 
whether an event (PoA change) has occurred within the interval or not. If an event has 
occurred then the middle of UI is the Measured Interval(MI). The prediction is repeated 
again, where the last n MIs are the input of the Fuzzy controller at step 6. If there is no event 
(PoA change) in step 7, then the next LU Update Interval is calculated and LU executed at 
the time point. Step 7 is repeated until the PoA change event occurs. The implementation 
runs infinitely and it interrupts when the user stops the execution.  
Figure 9.7: Transformation function 
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It is possible that multiple PoA changes (Event Time Points) occur in one Update 
Interval(UI). The main problem is that this cannot be detected by the LU procedure. There is 
practically no difference between one ETP and multiple ETP in single UI. The procedure 
returns Boolean values: true if at least one ETP happened and false if not. It is not possible to 
detach multiple ETP in UI and this is not a problem limited to Fuzzy controllers but extends 
to all algorithms. Two or more events (PoA changes) in one LU interval lead to a wrong 
calculation of the MI and this introduces incorrect input values to the Fuzzy controller. If 
there are only a few UIs with two or more PoA changes, there is no observable impact of the 
long-term performance. Multiple PoA changes within the intervals in the training time are 
very difficult to handle and lead to incorrect rules bases. Incorrect training causes incorrect 
predictions. To recapitulate: multiple ETP in the training could have an impact on the 
performance and must be minimised. In the simulation experience, less than 3% double 
events do not cause measurable result problem.  
9.4 Simulation of M-LU with adaptive Fuzzy Logic  
A practical simulation of the Location Update procedure was carried out and it is 
described in this chapter. The simulation was made with Matlab 7.0 on a PC with 1.1 GHz 
and 512 RAM. The simulation is performed offline, so the PC speed aspect is irrelevant. The 
Matlab program is written with objectives to deliver precise results. 
The simulation is programmed without involving the absolute time in any direct form. 
There is no indicator for the absolute time in the simulation. The Event Intervals are handled 
sequentially in loop (s. Figure 9.9). To handle dependencies on the absolute time, the method 
described in chapter 8.5.2 is used. The absolute time dependencies are circular since the time 
component is periodic. For example: there is a day cycle staring at 0h to 24h. These absolute 
time dependencies are solved with a simple pre-processing of the Event Intervals. The events 
are set relative to a point in the period (for example midnight of day). 
The Fuzzy rules in the simulation are created trough training with the One Pass method. 
There are no expert knowledge rules. The simulation is proof of concept of the suggested 
method. Involving expert knowledge can tamper the results. Poor or optimal expert rules 
significantly influence the performance. In this test, the target is to test the PDF 
approximation and OP method. In an extreme case, if there are optimal expert rules, then 
there is not need of other rules or any PDF.  
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OP method
Trainning data
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Input data Fuzzy Controller prediction of ETP 
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Figure 9.8: Implementation in real environment 
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The simulation is not carried out in the same way as the real time implementation, since 
only the precision of the method is of interest. For each Event Interval the necessary updates 
and their size is calculated. In contrast, in real implementation the updates are executed one 
by another until they reach the Event Time Point. The simulation consists of the following 
major blocks shown in Figure 9.9: 
 
1) Initialisation. The general parameters are defined, such as: number of Event 
Intervals, number of training samples, number of inputs, number of Fuzzy rules in the 
controller and maximum connection lost (MDI) tolerated by the application. The 
parameters are set manually. 
2) Generation of absolute Event Intervals. Function generates semi random Absolute 
Event Intervals. The data varies from sinus function to real gathered data. The values 
are defined in 7.5.1. 
3) Calculation of the training samples. The Update Intervals in the training are constant 
and equal to the MDI. The Measured Interval is in the middle of the Update Interval.  
4) Generation the Fuzzy rules. The Fuzzy rules are calculated in the extra procedure 
named op. The function returns the centres of the antecedent/consequent membership 
bases. There is no need of the linguistic name of the membership functions. The 
centre of the membership function defines the rules fully because the membership 
intervals are predefined. All antecedent membership functions are triangular. The 
consequent functions are single tone. 
5) Optimization of the consequent membership rules. The function - training_rls – 
implements the RLS to optimise the performance.  
6) Event interval procedure. For each EI, the size of the UI is calculated. Furthermore, 
the number of UI needed to achieve this result is calculated (s. Figure 9.9). The 
variable remainder is calculated in every repetition. The remainder is used to align 
the starting point of the Event Interval to the filter cycle beginning as described in 
chapter 8.5.1. All results from the calculation are stored in an array for later analysis. 
7) Simulation result presentation. The last procedure (results_plot) generates statistics 
and creates plots. This last procedure provides information on the quality of the 
Fuzzy controller. The statistics compare the given method to monotone constant 
intervals with the same number of updates. The result can be compared also to 
Particle Filter (chapter 8.6) and extended Kalman Filter (chapter 10.9). The 
monotone constant interval is currently the most implemented algorithm for this type 
of algorithm. The results anaysis in the same way as described in chapter 7.5.2. 
Practically, the same Matlab procedure is used with the same reference variables. 
Figure 9.9: Simulation structure 
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9.5 Simulation results 
The absolute Event Intervals are generated in the same way for all algorithms described 
in 7.5.1, thus the Particle filter (chapter 8) and Kalman Filter (chapter 10). The results are 
presented and analysis is described in 7.5.2.  
The Fuzzy controller contains 100 rules. The 4 past values are considered in the 
prediction controller (input values). The Event Intervals are generated by the program code in 
the first 4 cases. There are 6000 intervals (samples) generated. The first 1000 of them are 
used for the training of the method, thus in the performance simulation is carried out on 5000 
Event Intervals (samples of 1001 to 6000). The training is done with 1000 samples, which is 
16.67% of all samples. 
9.5.1 White noise  
The Absolute Event Intervals (AEIs) are generated by white noise with some constant 
shifting as defined in chapter 8.6.1. The maximum Disconnection Interval is 5 sec. The 
membership interval is 75 sec. The membership interval is 15 times greater then the 
Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI). In this way with fewer rules, more value 
combinations can be covered. The Event Intervals and the Measured Intervals (estimated EI) 
ones are shown in Figure 9.10. The results are summarised in the histogram Figure 9.11. 
 
Figure 9.10: White noise, Event Intervals and posterior estimated Event Intervals 
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The histogram (Figure 9.11) shows excellent results. In conjunction with the 
transformation function, the Fuzzy controller delivers a very good Update Interval 
distribution. All updates executed achieve better performance than the monotone constant 
Update Interval. To remind the readers, the constant Update Interval is calculated considering 
the same number of updates for the simulation time. The mean Disconnection Interval (mean 
DI) by constant Update Interval (const UI) is 3.32 times greater then the Fuzzy mean UI. 
There is a clear out performance of the Fuzzy method over the Particle filter method for the 
white noise values (see chapter 8.6.1). The result is an effect of the transformation function. 
The transformation function has the same form as the PDF of white noise, see 9.3.4. The 
Fuzzy controller plays no major role in this case, since the only prediction is the mean value. 
The results of the simulation are impressive. The Update Intervals for Event Intervals are 
shown in Figure 9.12. This can be considered as best case. 
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Figure 9.11: White noise, histogram results 
Figure 9.12: White noise, update intervals with Event Time Point 
9.5 Simulation results 172   
9.5.2 Two rotating white noise sources 
In this experiment, the Event Time Points are generated using two randomly rotating 
white noise sources. The equation is the same as that described in chapter 8.6.2. The 
Maximum Disconnection Interval, membership interval etc are the same as in previous 
simulation run in chapter 9.5.1. 
 
The Event Intervals can be seen in Figure 9.13. The PDF of the Event Interval was 
already shown in chapter 8.6.2.  
 
 
The resulting histogram shows that the Fuzzy algorithm is overstrained with this task. 
The algorithm cannot detach the data’s nature in the training period. Only 8.12% of the 
updates are better then the referenced constant updates. The mean constant Update Interval 
(const UI) is smaller than the mean Update Interval with ETP(mean UI) by a factor of 0.616. 
The results show the poor performance of the Fuzzy controller. It cannot handle the rotating 
signals. Examining the Figure 9.15 (Update Interval by sample) shows that the problem is not 
Figure 9.13: Two rotating white noises, Event Intervals and estimated EI 
Figure 9.14: Two rotating white noises, result histogram 
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concentrated on certain regions of the updates. The algorithm systematically fails to predict 
the signal.  
 
 
The reason for this underperformance is the random rotation of the two signals. This 
overlay random behaviour cannot be captured by the training of the Fuzzy controller. The 
transformation function cannot compensate for this failure in the prediction as in the previous 
case. The method cannot be recommended for this type of moving pattern.  
9.5.3 Sinus based EI with white noise 
In this simulation, a sinus based signal with white noise is used, as described in chapter 
8.6.3 (σ
 
is set to 5). The idea of this simulation run is to show the importance of choosing the 
right parameter. The simulation is made with a membership function interval of 15 sec, which 
is quite little. In the previous two experiments, the membership interval was 75 sec.  
Figure 9.15: Two rotating white noises, update intervals with ETP 
Figure 9.16: Sinus base EI with white noise, event time intervals and estimated EI 
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The Event Intervals (EI) and the posterior estimated EI are shown in Figure 9.16. The 
typical sinus-like form is easy to see. After sample 3800 there is quite a big difference 
between the real value and the estimated ones. Obviously, the algorithm fails to predict the 
values in this region. This can also be verified by examining Figure 9.17, where the Update 
Intervals are shown with ETP. The intervals are at the Maximum Disconnection Interval after 
the sample of 3800, thus 5 sec. The algorithm has falls back to the maximum values in this 
range.  
 
The algorithm fails to predict in this region because of the insufficient training time. The 
training has not included this type of input-output values and consequently no rules were 
created. The even intervals are smaller than the previous ones and the training did not include 
them. Here, the issue of too short training is manifested. It can be concluded that the training 
must contain all possible combinations of input-output in order for the method to deliver 
good results. This can be partially compensated by choosing a sufficiently large membership 
Figure 9.18: Sinus based EI with white noise, result histogram 
Figure 9.17: Sinus based EI with white noise, update intervals with ETP 
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interval. The interval was set smaller than was optimum in the simulation, to demonstrate the 
effect. 
The histogram is shown in Figure 9.18. The results are very good in general, although 
there is a problem in the last region. The Update Intervals are small (Figure 9.17). 78.8% of 
the updates were better then the constant update and the Update Interval is 1.64 times smaller 
then the constant Update Interval.  
Repeated simulation with a membership interval of 75 significantly improves the 
performance. More than 90% of the update with ETP is smaller then the constant update. The 
results are similar to the first case with white noise. The method can excellently predict this 
type of signal when the training is sufficient.  
9.5.4 Non linear EI with white noise 
The Absolute Event Intervals are calculated with recursive non-liner equations with white 
noise defined in chapter 8.6.4. The membership interval is 75 sec. 
The results are presented in Figure 9.20. The method has a 91.1% advantage in 
comparison to the constant update by sample. The mean update value is smaller than the 
constant Update Interval by a factor of 2.04. In this difficult case, there is a significant 
improvement in performance over the constant intervals. The performance is even better than 
the method suggested by Particle filter in chapter 8.6.4. The Update Interval histogram has 
the typical exponential distribution, having a high bin at small Update Intervals. The 
prediction was excellent in the majority of cycles. The good performance can be explained by 
the recursive form of the Fuzzy system, which is the same as the generated data. The Event 
Intervals are shown in Figure 9.19. The Update Intervals with ETP are in Figure 9.21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.19: Non linear recursive EI, Event Intervals and estimated EI 
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Figure 9.20: Non linear recursive, results histogram 
Figure 9.21: Non linear recursive, update intervals with ETP 
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9.5.5 Real data 
Real data gathered from operation networks is used in this simulation, see 7.5.1. The 
Maximum Disconnection Interval is 300 sec. There are 2500 gathered Event Intervals within 
5 days. The first 1000 are used for training (2.5 days). The membership interval is 4500 sec, 
which aids improved interpolation of the states. There is a day cycle in the Event Time 
Points. The Event Intervals are pre-processed set relative to midnight. In this way, the 
algorithm can handle cycle events, see chapter 8.6.5.  
 
The PDF is presented in Figure 9.22. It is easy to notice the day cycle with high activity 
during the day and less activity in the night. 
The results are presented in Figure 9.23. The new method performs twice as well as the 
constant update. The mean UI of the new Fuzzy method is smaller than the constant update 
by a factor of 2.05. More than 92% of all updates are smaller than the constant updates. It can 
be concluded that the method shows impressive performance in the real time data. The 
method has much better results than the Particle filter on the same data. Again, there is the 
typical Update Intervals histogram (blue bins) with definite concentration on the small 
values. There are no blackouts (failures) of the algorithm, which means that the training 
parting terms of the real data was sufficient to create the necessary rules. The Update 
Intervals with sample are presented in Figure 9.24. The method can be recommended for this 
type of data. 
 
Figure 9.22: Real data, PDF of Event Intervals 
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Figure 9.23: Real data, result histogram 
Figure 9.24: Real data, Update Intervals with ETP 
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9.6 Conclusion and future work  
The simulation has verified that the new method delivers very good results. The method 
has shown excellent performance on the real data, even better than Particle filter (chapter 8). 
The method achieves very good results with sinus based and recursive data. An important 
requirement is to have sufficient training samples. Otherwise, poor result can be expected. 
Fewer training samples can be partially compensated by increasing the membership interval 
and interpolating in this way.  
A major failure of the algorithm occurred when working with two randomly rotating 
white noise sources (see 9.5.2). The algorithm did not manage to create an adequate Fuzzy 
rule base. The reason was the large interval between the mean values of the noises, the small 
standard deviation and the random rotation of the generator. Better results could be achieved 
by drastically increasing the number of Fuzzy rules. 
There is future work for improving the algorithm. It is out of the scope in this thesis since 
it is a more classical optimisation engineering problem. The main points can be summarised 
as: 
• The Fuzzy controller parameters are set manually for obtaining good results. 
The parameters were chosen through making numerous simulations. These 
are selected systematically. The parameters should be fit automatically for 
practical implementation. It must be stressed that a bad parameter decreases 
the performance significantly even under the constant Update Interval. This 
is an optimisation task for the control engineering.  
• Training should be implemented during the operation. The training period is 
limited to the interval before the normal operation of the controller. The 
method can be extended, so that the rule base is updated after every 
update/prediction cycle. The algorithm can handle a dynamically changing 
PDF function in this way. Furthermore, the risk of missing rules decreases, 
because of a steady feedback of the rule base (see 9.5.3). The implementation 
must regenerate the Fuzzy rules after every value received.  
• Overlaying of multiple periodical dependencies should be implemented, as 
described in 8.7 
. 
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10 Mobile Location Update protocol based on extended Kalman 
filter 
An alternative approach for M-LU is developed in this chapter, which is based on 
extended Kalman filter [3]. The filter is used to predict the coming Event Interval (EI) and its 
variance. A model for the distribution and measurement of EI is developed in order to use the 
extended Kalman filter. The Update Time Points are generated with a transformation 
function. This function converts constant update intervals into non-linear inverse proportional 
to the PDF of EI, as defined in chapter 7. The function has a parameter the predicted EI and 
the Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI).  
The text is organised as follows: The model definition is given in 10.2. The distribution 
of UTPs and the ideal transformation function are derived in 10.3. A suboptimal 
transformation function is created in 10.5 and 10.6. The extended Kalman filter is derived in 
10.7. The simulation structure and results are presented in 10.8 and 10.9. 
10.1 Contributions 
The author contributions in this text are: (1) First, creating a model for Mobile Node 
movement on which Kalman filter can be applied, see 10.2. (2) Second, derivation of the 
extended Kalman Filter for the prediction of EI with semi standard deviation, see 10.7. (3) 
Third, creation of a novel transformation functions for the calculation of UTP according the 
predicted EI. Practical contribution is the simulation of the method and analysing the results 
in section 10.8. 
The author has published the method and the simulation results in relation to SIP protocol 
in [7] at IEEE. 
10.2 Model for extended Kalman Filter 
At least two models are required for the description of dynamic system with Kalman 
filter. The first one describes the time evaluation of variable of interest. It expresses the 
natural properties of the process, for example the velocity on a free-falling body. The second 
describes the measurement. The measurement typically returns indirect the variable of 
interest, thus with uncertainty and noise. The equation gives the relation between the variable 
of interest and the result of the measurement. The variable of interest is also called 
unobserved (hidden) variable. 
The system equations are commonly described with a state-space model [3]. The model 
works in a time domain and is very suitable for Multi Input Multi Output systems (MIMO). 
State-space notation uses differential equations for which the mathematical theory is very 
well developed. 
Major requirement for deploying Kalman filter [2] is that the system must be linear and 
Gaussian. The extended Kalman filter works with non-linear system. It achieves linearization 
of the signal with truncated Taylor series and then uses the Kalman filter. Still the system 
must be Gaussian to be used with extended Kalman filter. The model equations must contain 
only Gaussian (Normal) noise component [6, 3]. The created two models for mobile Node 
movement must obey this requirement.  
10.2.1 Natural properties of the Event Intervals 
The natural properties of the Event Intervals (EIs) distribution in time are unknown, thus 
movements of the Mobile Node cannot be defined at this stage. Unfortunately, the Kalman 
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filter cannot be implemented without the evaluation model as already mentioned. An 
equation must be defined which has Gaussian distribution on the one hand and on the other 
hand, does not restricts the potential behaviour of the Mobile Node. 
A random walk is assumed for the EI time evaluation. Let kx  be the Event Interval at step 
k. The random walk is defined by wAxx kk += −1 , where ( )σ,0Nw =
 
is white noise and vector 
A called transformation matrix (Vector is matrix with one dimension equal to 1). Later on, the 
vector A is set to 1 (one) in the simulation.  
The standard deviation of the noise component should not restrict the values of the EI. 
For this reason, the standard deviation is calculated recursively from the past Measured 
Intervals at every filter cycle. 
10.2.2 Measurement model  
The second model represents the measurement of the Event Interval (EI), denoted as 
Measurement Interval. The exact measurement of the EI is not possible. The EI can only be 
narrowed down to the Update Interval (UI) with the EI but not to an exact numerical value. 
The Kalman filter requires numerical values, so some assumption must be made. 
The assumed Measured Interval (MI) is in middle of the Update Interval (UI) with EI. 
The absolute error of MI is minimized at this point. Let ky  be the Measured Interval of the 
kth prediction/update cycle, thus: )( kk xfy = . The kx is the EI of the kth cycle. The 
measurement function ()f is returning the MI of the EI 
The MI depends on the UI. The UI depends on the predicted (prior estimated) EI, since 
the Update Time Points (UTP) are calculated with transformation function, see 10.4. The 
predicted EI is denoted as −kxˆ , see 10.7. Let T() be the transformation function and maxx be the 
MDI. The measurement function is then: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )max1maxmax1max  modˆ1 modˆ2
1)( xxxTxTxxxTxTxfy kkkkkk −−−− −⋅++−⋅==  
The extended Kalman filter requires the standard deviation of the measurement. Without 
this definition it is impossible to derivate the filer. Unfortunately, the standard deviation of 
measurement function cannot be found analytically, since the function is interrupted.  
Numerical value of standard deviation is not directly important for the M-LU method. 
The value in M-LU must be proportional to some degree to the standard deviation. The 
standard deviation in sense of the Kalman filter is small for values with high probability and 
large for values with low probability. A variable called semi standard deviation can replay the 
standard deviation when it has the same characteristic. In this way, the extended Kalman 
filter will deliver correct prediction values but numerically wrong standard deviation. The 
resulting semi standard deviation will be proportional to some degree, which is sufficient of 
M-LU. The semi standard deviation can be Update Interval with event, which is defined by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )max1maxmax1max modˆmodˆ1 xxxTxTxxxTxTv kkkkk −⋅−−⋅+= −− , 
where kv denotes the semi standard deviation of the k the cycle. 
10.3 Distribution of the Update Time Points 
The extended Kalman filter delivers singe value of the predicted EI and the semi standard 
deviation. These are not sufficient to construct the Probability Density Function (PDF). The 
PDF is necessary because the UIs must be set inversely proportional to the PDF, as required 
in chapter 7. For this reason, some assumption must be made. 
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The PDF of EI has Normal distribution with maximum at the predicted EI. The standard 
deviation of the Normal distribution is set proportional to the result deviation. The proportion 
is defined later on by the derivation of the transformation function. 
10.4 Transformation function 
As already discussed in chapter 7, the length of the UI must be inversely proportional to 
the PDF of EI. Low values of PDF define large Update Intervals and high PDF the Update 
Interval must be small. An abstract curve of PDF (Normal distributed) and Update Interval is 
shown in Figure 10.1 (and previously shown in Figure 9.6).  
The Update Intervals must not exceed the Maximal Disconnection Interval (MDI) as 
additional requirement in chapter 7. Together with the condition for inversely proportional to 
Normal condition, the Update Intervals can be defined generally by: 
( )σµ,,)( tNbatL ⋅−=
, 
where )(tL  is the length of the Update Interval at time t. The ),,( σµtN denotes the Normal 
distribution of EI at point t with parameter mean µ and standard deviation σ . The constant a 
denotes the Maximal Disconnection Interval (MDI) defined by the application. Variable b 
defines the pitch of the bell curve. The popular normal distribution is defined by: 
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piσ
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. 
The Equation 10.1 is the general form of the Update Interval length, so that it satisfies the 
requirement of chapter 7. Next, the coefficient values must be precisely calculated in order to 
deploy it.  
 
The key idea in this work is to derived transformation function, which converts constant 
intervals in ones satisfying Equation 10.1. This is very suitable for practical implementation. 
The input/output values are easy to calculate. The transformation works as black box from the 
perspective of the application. 
The transformation function has as input the time point of the constant Update Interval. 
The output is the Update Time Point considering the PDF of EI and the Maximal 
Figure 10.1: Probability of Event Interval distribution and length of Update Interval length 
Equation 10.1 
ETP
Time relative to estimated ETP
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
/ I
n
te
rv
al
 
le
n
gh
t
Probability of event time point and update interval
maximal user defined
disconnetion interval
PDF of ETP
Update interval
lenght
10.4 Transformation function 184   
Equation 10.2 
Disconnection Interval (MDI). Let ()T  be transformation function. 
Then ( )iii xLxTxT =−+ )()( 1 , where ix , 1+ix ,.. are the constant update time point. This key 
equation is transformed as follows: 
( )iii xLxTxT =−+ )()( 1
 Let 01 →−+ ii xx  
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is called error function. C is constant. The coefficients of ()T can be generalised for 
simplification to:  
C
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x
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where a, u, k and C are new constants.  
This is the definition of the ideal transformation function, so that linear update intervals 
are transferred into non-linear ones. The function satisfies fully the Equation 10.1, which is 
inversely proportional to the PDF of EI and does not exceed the MDI. An abstract plot of the 
function is shown in Figure 10.2. The constant update intervals are at the ordinate (y-axis). 
The result at abscise (x-axis) shows the non-linear Update Intervals. The intervals become 
shorter near the predicted Event Interval (zero in the figure) and increase infinitely to the 
MDI. The predicted EI is set to 0 at the diagram and all other points relate to it.  
Important properties of the function are at the extremes. In infinite ( ∞± ), the second 
term of the function goes to zero: 
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The transformation function at infinity is:
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The transformation function becomes linear with coefficient a and shift C. The linearity 
means constant interval. The Update Interval is reaching the defined maximum and it is not 
10.5 Approximated Transformation function 185  
growing any further, thus the Maximum Disconnection Interval (MDI). The linear intervals 
are transferred into smaller intervals for values near to the predicted EI (zero point) because 
the probability of EI increases there. 
The coefficients of T() are calculated in the following section 10.5 
10.5 Approximated Transformation function 
Equation 10.2 has only theoretical character. Unfortunately, it cannot be implemented 
since the straight and inverse transformation does not existing. The function 
C
k
x
erfuaxxT +





−= .)(  is a complementary function and its inverse )(1 xT −  cannot be 
found analytically.  
The idea is to approximate the T() by a function that has an inverse. The function is 
approximated to the sum of functions in different intervals. Analysis the Equation 10.2 shows 
that the term 





k
x
erfu .  dominates for small x values and the term ax
 
dominates for big x. 
The transformation function can be approximated to these terms in different intervals. The 
approximation is: 
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Splitting the function in this way leads to a sub optimal solution but it can be 
implemented. This approximation can be done in other ways but the author considers this one 
to be the most convenient one because of its simplicity.  
10.6 Coefficients of the transformation function 
The coefficients of the approximated function must be derived in order to use the 
function. Conditions must be defined so that coefficients can be calculated from them. There 
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Figure 10.2: Transformation function example 
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are not sufficient objective conditions and therefore subjective ones are used additionally. 
They are listed here: 
 
1) The first condition is that the transformation function and its inverse must be 
continuous (not interrupted). Otherwise, it is not possible to find the inverse for some values. 
This gives a relation between the two functions at the crossover point l: 
( ) 21 ./. ClaCklerfu +=+  
The functions must have the same value at this point. 
 
2) The Update Interval at the most probable point, predicted EI, must tend to zero. This 
means that 01 =C . 
 
3) The cross point l  is defined using subjective knowledge. The cross over point defines 
the region (-l, l) where the intervals become inverse proportional to the probability. Updates 
are constantly outside this interval since the transformation function is linear there. The 
predicted Event Interval is reasonable to be equal to l. Let += kPl , where +kP
 
is the predicted 
Event Interval. The k index denotes the prediction cycle. The plus sign stress that it is the 
predicted value – prior estimation. In this way, the Update Intervals decrease until reaching 
the estimated ETP and then increase until reaching one constant value. 
 
4) The linear update interval is the Maximum Disconnection Interval defined by the 
application. It is the input of the transformation function. The value is chosen to simplify the 
calculation. Any other constant can be used and this will lead to the same performance. 
 
5) The output of the transformation function (the non-linear Update Interval) must also 
not exceed maximum Disconnection Interval. Following from condition 4), the derivative of 
T(x) must be greater than 1 in ),( ++−∈ kkk PPx : 
( ) ),(1/. ++−∈≥
∂
∂
kkkk PPxkxerfu
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The linear function must be equal to MDI outside the interval ),(
++
−∉ kkk PPx
. The result 
must be equal to 1 outside this interval: 
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6) Using the subjective observation of erf(), it can be seen that the erf() reaches its 
maximum at infinity. On the other hand, the function reaches 95% of its maximum quite 
rapidly at approx. x=1.38k, see Equation 10.2. The last 5% of the increase can be 
approximated to an almost horizontal line. The linear part of the function is not relevant to 
our transformation. The condition is defined with this empirical and subjective consideration: 
The erf() function reaches 95% of its maximum at the cross point between the components 
functions. The conditions 1) and 2) give: 
( ) 2/. CPkPerfu kk += ++
 
The result by setting the erf() is: 
( ) uCPkPerf kk 95.095.0/ 2 =+⇒= ++
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7) The transformation function has its minimum at the predicted EI, where the probability 
is highest. The predicted ETP is set to zero and all points in relation to it. The transformation 
function is an odd function returning positive values. This condition facilitates the practical 
implementation and does not change the performance. 
 
These seven conditions deliver the solution for the coefficients of the transformation 
function. The following system equations are obtained by setting all of the conditions 
together: 
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The first equation can be transformed to: 
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The exponential function has its minimum at the edge of the interval [ ]++− kk PP , .The 
condition will be always true if the exponent of the function is set to 1 for the minimum. This 
is a partial solution of the equation and can be written as: 
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Following, the partial solution of system in Equation 10.3 is: 
uCP
CP
k
P
erfu
k
P
k
u
k
k
k
k
95.0
.
02ln
2
2
2
=+
−=





=





−





+
+
+
+
pi
 
This system delivers a single solution of Equation 10.3 and not necessarily all solutions. 
One solution is sufficient for M-LU calculations.  
 
The new system has three variables and three equations, thus it can be solved. It results 
are:  
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To recapitulate, the transformation function is: 
Equation 10.3 
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An example of the approximated function with a linear Update Interval of 1 and prior 
estimation of 2 is shown in Figure 10.3. The zero point at the abscise is a predicted Event 
Time Point (ETP). The time values at abscise are relative to ETP, see condition 5). The 
function obeys the required conditions: it becomes linear at infinite and is not linear for 
values near to the ETP. The intervals become smaller upon nearing the zero point, thus the 
probability becomes greater – the intervals smaller. 
 
10.7 Extended Kalman filter for M-LU 
There are two phases in the filter model: update and prediction. They are executed 
sequentially at every filter cycle. The cycle is denoted at the sub index of each variable. The 
Bayesian inference (see 8.2.2) expresses the optimal dependencies. The equations are briefly 
repeated here. Let the posterior PDF function at k-1 th filter cycle be )( 1:11 −− kk yxp . The priory 
PDF is calculated in the prediction phase using:  
∫ −−−−− = 11:1111:1 )()()( kkkkkkk dxyxpxxpyxp
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Figure 10.3: Transformation function example 
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The posterior PDF is calculated after the measurement becomes available with:  
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∫ −− = kkkkkkk dxyxpxypyyp )()()( 1:11:1
 
This is the optimal solution and has general character since the posterior density function 
cannot be calculated analytically in all cases.  
The Kalman filter solves the equations analytically when the models are linear and the 
posterior PDF has Normal (Gaussian) distribution. The linear system obeys the superposition 
principle [2]. The model developed in 10.2 is non-linear, so the Kalman filter cannot used. 
The extended Kalman Filter deals with non-linear models and it will be implemented here. 
The extended Kalman filter (EKF) approximates the system to linear and then uses the 
analytical Kalman filter. This linearization is carried out with truncated Taylor series 
representation for the measurement model. The model is approximated to linear at the 
estimation point and therefore, the method is sub-optimal. More information can be found in 
[3].  
The predicted value of Event Interval (EI) at k th filer cycle is −kxˆ , called prior estimation. 
The minus sign at superscript expresses that the measurement at step k is not available, thus 
the prediction is done at state k-1. The estimation of EI after the measurement becomes 
available is +kxˆ , thus the posterior estimation of EI. The plus superscript denotes that the 
measurement at k-th cycle is available.  
The term prior estimation is used frequently than prediction in Kalman filter literature [3]. 
Both are synonyms in context of this thesis, but the term prior estimation is used here to be 
closer to the text sources. The posterior estimation is synonym to the estimation in the same 
manner [3, 2, 1]. 
Let us assume first that there is a relation between the measurement, prior estimation and 
posterior estimation. The relation is expressed generally by:  
kkk yKxKx .ˆ.ˆ +′=
−+
 , 
where K and K´ are time varying matrices and unknown at this point. The model in 10.2 
has a single input variable, so x is number – matrix with 1x1 dimensions. Consequent, K and 
K´ are single-sized matrices or simply coefficients. 
Let kx~ be the estimation error at step k. The prior and posterior estimation error can be 
expressed with: 
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Substitution with Equation 10.3 and Equation 10.2 gives the result: 
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The prime target is to find a posterior estimation with zero error. This means the real 
value can be calculated without an error after the measurement is available:  
0)~( =+kxε , 
where ()ε denotes the estimation. 
Equation 10.4 
Equation 10.5 
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The Equation 10.5 with the zero estimation becomes: 
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Let us denote the expectation of f() as )(ˆ))(( xfxf =ε  .  
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It gives the relation between K and K´. Substituted in Equation 10.4, one obtains: 
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We shall use f instead of writing )( kxf  for simplification further in the text.
 
The posterior error should be minimised in the second step regarding K. This is done with 
the minimisation of the standard deviation of the posterior error, thus the covariance matrix. 
The covariance matrix P of the estimated prior error is:  
( )Tkkk xxP +++ = ~.~ε
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where  
( )Tkkk xxP −−− = ~.~ε
 
To minimize the error covariance ( +kP ) regarding K, the Jacobian must be minimized. 
The Jacobian is 
( )+= kPtraceJ
 
The derivate of J is set to zero. The solution gives the extreme point, which is the 
minimum value in this case. The following mathematical properties are used: 
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where A, B are matrices. The derivation of the Jacobian is: 
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The minimum of J regarding of K is at zero point of partial derivate.  
Equation 10.6 
Equation 10.7 
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Substituting K in Equation 10.7 gives the following result 
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In order to calculate the expectation of f() it is necessary to know its density functions. If 
the p() is density function of f() then: 
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The PDF is not analytically defined, thus the equation cannot be solved directly. It is 
approximated instead. A Taylor series is used to calculate an approximation. The Taylor 
series for f() is defined as:  
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With a higher degree N, the function z() approaches f() at point 
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Taking an expectation of both sides gives: 
Equation 10.8 
Equation 10.9 
Equation 10.10 
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The result is substituted in Equation 10.8: 
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The first two terms of the Taylor series can be truncated and then we obtain:   
−−−
−
−+
′−=
∂
∂
−= kkkk PxfKIP
x
xfKPP )).ˆ(.(´)ˆ(
  
The PDF is approximated to a linear function through the truncated Taylor series. The 
integral can be analytically calculated. Substitution of Equation 10.11 in Equation 10.8 gives 
the result for K, which can be analytically calculated: 
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The posterior maximal error is used instead of the posterior standard deviation. This must 
be done since the standard deviation of the measurement model in unknown, see 10.2. The 
posterior maximal error, thus the UI with EI, is approximately proportional to standard 
deviation. Consequent, the resulting standard deviation of the Kalman filter is approximately 
proportional to the standard deviation of the predicted value. There is no impact on the M-LU 
implementation because the M-LU is interested in an estimation value. The semi standard 
deviation gives the degree of believe in the prediction. 
Using the truncated Taylor series in Equation 10.6 provides an approximation for update 
estimation: 
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The state estimate propagation is 
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Equation 10.11 
Equation 10.12 
Equation 10.13 
Equation 10.14 
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The derivation of the extended Kalman filter for M-KE is concluded with this final step.  
 
The result can be summarised by: 
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10.8 Simulation 
The simulation is a proof of concept showing the qualities of the new algorithm. The 
simulation is carried out with Matlab 7.0 on PC 1GHz, RAM 512 MB. The objectives were to 
gain accuracy of the prediction and estimation. The processing time is out of scope.  
The differences between the real and the simulation deployment are shown in Figure 10.4 
and Figure 10.5. In real deployment, the prior estimated EI (predicted) is calculated using the 
extended Kalman filter see Figure 10.4. The UTP are calculated using the transformation 
function. The update procedure is executed until ETP happens. Then the filter cycle begins 
again. In contrast, the simulation is performed in the reverse way see Figure 10.5. The 
absolute EI are generated. For every absolute EI is generated the UI with ETP. The gathered 
statistic is analysed at the end. It must be underlined that a remainder must be used to 
generate EI from the absolute EI. The remainder is described in 8.5 
 
 
 
The statistical variables are the same as for the Particle filter in 8.5 and Fuzzy controller 
in 9.4. The variables are described in 7.5.2 and are: {mean DI}, {mean UI}, {max UI}, {max 
user def DI }, {const UI}, {const UI mean DI }, {const UI / mean UI} and {LU < const UI}. 
The statistics are presented in three plots generated in the same way as in the previous 
methods.  
Figure 10.4: General structure real time deployment  
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Figure 10.5: Offline simulation structure 
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10.9 Simulation results 
The same equations and parameter, see 7.5.1, are used for the generation of the absolute 
EI as in Particle filter (see 8.6) and Fuzzy controller (see 9.5). The results can be compared in 
this way. The first four simulations are carried out on 6000 Event Intervals with MDI of 5 
sec. The real data is used in the last (fifth) simulation with 2500 Event Intervals and 300 sec 
of MDI.  
10.9.1 White noise 
The generated values for the absolute Event Intervals and the estimated ones are shown in 
Figure 10.6. The estimated and real Event Intervals almost overlap which speaks for the good 
qualities.  
The results histogram is presented in Figure 10.7. The Update Intervals with ETP are 
concentrated in both extremes. There is a high concentration at the MDI, which shows poor 
prediction. On the other hand, there is a concentration at the small intervals, which 
corresponds to a good prediction. The mean UI by constant update is 4.11 sec and it is 1.53 
times bigger than the new method using the Extended Kalman filter (see 8.6.1). The new 
algorithm shows an outperformance of about 153%, considering the means. More than 62.4% 
of all updates were smaller then the constant Update Intervals.  
It can be concluded that the method has a good performance on shifted white noise. The 
performance is worse than the Fuzzy controller (section 9.5.1) and the Particle filter (section 
8.6.1). The Update Interval with Event Time Point is shown in Figure 10.8. The errors are 
systematic, thus there are not region with high errors. The good results can be explained 
because the input data (signal with white noise) correspond the chosen variable model, i.e. the 
random walk model. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.6: White noise, EI and estimated EI 
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10.9.2 Two rotating white noise sources 
The absolute Event Intervals are generated with two rotating shifted white noises sources. 
The data is already described in 8.6.2. The estimated and real Event Intervals are shown in 
Figure 10.9. 
This case is very problematic for the new method. It can be concluded from the results 
histogram in Figure 10.10 that the new method does not have any advantages when compared 
to the constant update. About 50% of the updates are better then the constant update, which is 
not advantage at all (50% are worst). The constant Update Intervals with the same resources 
are smaller than the new method (0.79). The constant update is better than the new method 
when one considers the mean Update Interval. It is obvious that the new method has a 
problem in this case. The reason is the form of the PDF, which is not similar to the bell curve, 
Figure 10.7: White noise, results histogram 
Figure 10.8: White noise, Update Intervals with ETP 
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see Figure 10.11. The random walk model approximates to bell curve, which is definitely not 
optimal for this simulation data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
max user def DI:   5
mean UI:              2.93
max  UI:               5
mean DI:              1.46
const UI:              2.32
const UI mean DI:   1.15
LU < const UI:       49.4% 
const UI/mean UI:  0.791
Update Interval [Sec]
De
n
si
ty
Histogram of the Update and Disconnection Intervals (UI and DI)
Two rotating white noises
(samples=6000, max.DI=5)
hist. UI
constatnt UI
mean UI
max user def DI
max UI
hist. DI
hist. DI by const UI .
Figure 10.9: Two rotating noise sources, EI and estimated EI 
Figure 10.10: Two rotating noise sources, result histogram 
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10.9.3 Sinus-based EI with white noise 
The absolute Event Intervals are calculated using a sinus-based function with white noise. 
The equation is specified in 8.6.3. The generated Event Intervals and estimated intervals are 
plotted in Figure 10.12. 
 
The results in Figure 10.13 show excellent qualities of the method. In over 92.5% of the 
updates, the method is better than the constant updates with the same resources. The mean UI 
with the new method is smaller than the constant updates by a factor of 2.63. There is clear 
outperformance of the new method. The result histogram has higher concentration at the left 
side (small values). This is a sign for good prediction. The method is better than the Fuzzy 
controller in 9.5.3 and worse than the Particle filter with the same data, see 8.6.3. It must be 
underlined the Fuzzy controller had not received successful training and this probably 
explains the poor results.  
Figure 10.11: Two rotating source noises, PDF of the Event Intervals 
Figure 10.12: Sinus based with noise, EIs and estimated EIs 
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The Update Intervals with ETP are shown in Figure 10.14. It is interesting to notice that 
the intervals are dependent on the derivate of the Event Intervals, thus the change of the curve 
direction causes a change in the prediction error. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.13: Sinus based with noise, result histogram 
Figure 10.14: Sinus based with noise, Update Intervals with ETP 
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10.9.4 Non-linear EI with white noise 
Non-linear absolute EI are generated by recursive equation with added noise at each 
interaction as described in 8.6.4. The Event Intervals are shown in Figure 10.15. The results 
in Figure 10.16 show a histogram with a nice distribution with maximums at the extremes. 
The histogram is higher at small intervals, which means that the algorithm has produced a 
good prediction of EI. 69.5% of the updates are smaller than the constant updates. The mean 
UI is 1.45 times smaller than the constant one. The extended Kalman method delivers good 
results, but they are poorer than the Fuzzy controller and Particle filter. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.15: Non Linear recursive data, EIs and est. EIs 
Figure 10.16: Non linear recursive data, result histogram 
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10.9.5 Real data 
The last simulation is real data with 2500 Event Intervals and maximum Disconnection 
Interval of 300 sec. The data represents the successful login of dial up uses over 5 days. The 
same data is used as in the previous chapters for Fuzzy controller and Particle filter. The 
Event Intervals have day cycle properties and the EI are set relative to midnight. The pre-
processing is described in 8.6.5. 
 
 
The results are excellent, see Figure 10.18. The extended Kalman filter achieves smaller 
Update Intervals with ETP in 99.6% of the samples. The mean Update Intervals are 3.21 
times smaller than the constant update. The suggested method is better than the Particle filter 
and Fuzzy controller. The algorithm solves the real data task excellently, although this is 
considered as the most difficult case. The real case can be compared to a smooth changing 
signal (such as sinus) with some white noise. This is treated better by the Kalman method 
Figure 10.17: Non linear recursive data, update intervals with ETP 
Figure 10.18: Real data, result histogram 
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than by any other method. The UIs with ETP are presented in Figure 10.19. The Figure 10.20 
shows the PDF.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.19: Real data, UI with ETP by sample 
Figure 10.20: Real data, PDF 
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10.10 Conclusion and future work 
The suggested method has an impressive performance in the most important simulation 
run with real data. It is even better than the Fuzzy controller (chapter 9) and Particle filter 
(chapter 8). On the other hand, the algorithm shows poor performance in the case with two 
rotating white noise sources (section 10.9.2). There is no constant performance in all cases. 
The real data covers a case with a typical employer day cycle. Every algorithm tested (see 
chapters 8 to 10) has its advantages and disadvantages. There is no universal algorithm and a 
winner cannot be chosen. The exact EI behaviour can be used for choosing the algorithm. 
An important advantage of the EKF algorithm is that it requires only one parameter 
before starting and namely the Maximum Disconnection Intervals. The Fuzzy controller and 
Particle filter require a number of parameters, such as the number of rules, particles etc. 
These parameters must be set to optimal values. Otherwise, the performance becomes poor. 
There is no need of evaluation of optimal parameters in the suggested method. 
There are still open points for future work, which can improve the performance: 
• Using overlay cycle behaviour, such as week cycle and day cycle for 
example. Currently, the algorithm can only perform one type, such as day. 
Implementation of a multiply cycle will improve the performance, like 
considering weekday and day hour in the same time. 
• The cross point of the linearisation equals predicted EI, thus += kPl , see 10.3. 
The Update Intervals begin to decrease by the beginning of the updates. 
Setting the cross point dependent on the semi standard deviation can improve 
the performance. The non-linear part should be close to the estimated Event 
Interval for small prediction errors and vice versa. This is more an 
optimisation task of the algorithm. 
• Other transformation functions can be developed and tested 
10.11 References in chapter 10 204   
10.11 References in chapter 10  
[1]  Arulampalam, Sanjeev, Maskell, Simon, Gordon, Neil, Clapp, Tim, “A Tutorial on Particle Filters for On-line Non-
linear/Non-Gaussian Bayesian Tracking (2001), IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 
[2]  Kalman, R. E., “A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Problems“, Copyright © 1960 by ASME 
[3]  Gelb, Arthur,"Applied Optimal Estimation", MIT Press, 1974, ISBN: 0262570483 
[4]  Wiener, N., “The Extrapolation, Interpolation and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series,” John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
New York, N.Y.,1949. 
[5]  Maybeck, Peter S, Academic Pr “Stochastic Models, Estimation and Control.”, Mathematics in Science and 
Engineering, Juni 1979 
[6]  Grewal, Mohinder S. und Andrews, Angus P., “Kalman Filtering. Theory and Practice using MATLAB: Theory and 
Practice Using MATLAB”, Wiley & Sons, Januar 2001 
[7]  Tzvetkov, Vesselin, “SIP registration optimization in mobile environments using extended Kalman filter”, IEEE 
ChinaCom, August 2008 
 
205 
11 Application of M-LU in external protocols 
The M-LU can contribute to all protocols that have an update mechanism, which can be 
abstracted to the M-LU location update. The update efficiency can be improved without any 
significant change in the protocol’s specification. The M-LU defines the intervals for 
executing the update procedure. 
The requirements on the protocol are that the update procedure must be executable in 
variable intervals and there must be a Boolean feedback of the execution. Through the update 
procedure, the status is proactively verified. The initiator asks for the status and the responder 
replies as shown in Figure 11.1. Important is that the status (feedback) is Boolean, thus true 
or false. Depending on the feedback, some actions are taken at the initiator. It is irrelevant 
what type of status information is requested. For example: The update can be the verification 
whether or not the connection is still active. If there is a reply, it is active and if not, then 
some actions must be initiated. 
 
Every procedure, which can be abstracted in this way, is a candidate for the deployment 
of the new framework. It can be implemented in routing, security, application protocols etc. 
Some examples of possible applications are provided in the following sections. 
11.1 Optimisation of Dead-Peer-Detection in IKE using M-LU 
The Internet Key Exchanged protocol [2], described in A.2.2, includes a mechanism for 
detecting dead peers (DPD). It is specified in [1] and consists of two notification messages: 
”R-U-THERE” and “R-U-THERE-ACK”. The initiator sends the “R-U-THERE” message to 
verify, whether the connection is still active. The receiver replies to it with “R-U-THERE-
ACK”. The time interval of DPD is constant, for example every 120 sec. The DPD is 
executed in idle time only, where no traffic is exchanged. 
The Event Time Point in M-LU corresponds to failure of the DPD execution, thus 
missing “R-U-THERE-ACK“ reply. In the location update procedure, true corresponds to 
receiving DPD reply and false corresponds to missing DPD reply. The DPD is very similar to 
the M-LU update procedure. Using the history of DPD failures, it is possible to achieve much 
more efficient update intervals. The algorithm suggested for M-LU can be implemented in a 
straightforward way. There is no need to change the DPD specification. The method is 
descried by the author in [3]. 
11.2 SIP optimisation through M-LU 
SIP [4] is the most widely implemented protocol for VoIP communication. Almost all 
Service Providers offer telephone services based on SIP. The SIP has two methods for 
dealing with dead peers, NAPT router and firewalls: registration and options request.  
The first method requires frequent registrations of the SIP client. The registrar sets the 
validity period for every registration. Before the registration expires, the client must register 
Initiator Responder
Status question ?
Reply
Figure 11.1: Abstraction of the update procedure 
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again. The SIP registrar updates the client’s PoA parameter by every registration. If a client’s 
PoA has changed then it will be updated by the next registration. After a PoA change, the 
client is unreachable until it reregisters. The registration generates packet exchange, which 
updates the NAPT binding at the same time. When the SIP registrar uses this method, the 
typical registration intervals are 90 sec. To apply M-LU protocol, the SIP registrar must track 
the changes of client’s PoA by comparing the current and last values. It adjusts the 
registration intervals by setting the expire attributes. The registration interval corresponds to 
the Update Intervals in M-LU terminology. The Event Time Point corresponds to a change of 
the client’s PoA. The UI with ETP is the registration period in which the PoA has changed.  
In opposite to the M-LU, it is not the client but the server that sets the registration period, 
i.e. the Update Interval. The deployment is very simple, since there is no change in the 
standard. It is sufficient to extend the server to use M-LU algorithm. 
The second possibility for updating the PoA is the SIP Options [4] request. The SIP 
registrar or the SIP client sends proactively empty options request according [4]. The receiver 
replies to the message with its status. The initiator gets feedback whether the connection is 
still active or not. The Event Time Points are the failures to receive a reply, i.e. the client or 
registrar has changed its IP/UDP parameter. The request intervals can be optimised 
depending on the reply status. 
The M-LU implementation in SIP will reduce the number of messages processed by the 
SIP server (proxy or registrar). This will directly improve the efficiency and reduce the 
investment see [8] and 11.2.1. 
11.2.1 Resources consumed in SIP 
To obtain a feeling for the wasted resources let us consider a real example: VoIP Service 
Provider (SP) with 200 000 online clients per SIP server host (proxy or registrar). The 
registrar sends an empty option header (dead-peer-detection mechanism in SIP) every 20 
seconds to check the status of every client. Let us consider the minimal load threshold (the 
best case), thus these dead-peer-detections are equally distributed in time. The server must 
process 10 000 updates per second in order to keep the status of all clients up to date. The 
usual performance of the server machine with a simple firewall and connection processing 
can handle maximum of about 200 000 packets per second (Test made on Dual Intel Xeon 
2.4GHz see [7]). This means that about 5% of the server utilization will be consumed by 
updates. The example shows, that the network and CPU resources for updates must not be 
underestimated. 
11.3 Binding update message in Mobile IP  
Mobile IP [6, 5] can benefit from the M-LU protocol for optimising the Binding update 
procedure described in 2.10.1.1. The Mobile Node resisters its current location to the Home 
Agent or/and to the Correspondent Node. The binding update procedure will be performed 
typically at certain intervals. To integrate M-LU, the binding update procedure must be 
extended to deliver a feedback to the sender if the PoA has changed. The Home Agent or 
Correspondent Node must reply to the Mobile Node if the IP/UDP parameters have changed. 
This information only requires one bit, which must be carried in the reply. A new payload 
type can also be implemented. 
The execution of the binding update corresponds to the Update Interval in M-LU. The 
change of Mobile Node’s PoA maps to the Event Time Point. The Mobile Node can 
implement M-LU with the optimisation of its Update Intervals in this way.  
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12 Conclusion 
Secure IP mobility is not a trivial task and has many aspects, as shown in chapter 2. The 
potential solutions have many deficits presented and analysed in 2.10. They do not cover the 
requirements on secure IP mobility.  
The first group of solutions consists of mobile and secure protocols at different layers 
(see 2.10.1). Since the security protocol runs over the mobility layer, the signalling is not 
sufficiently protected. The signalling is protected only be the mobility build-in methods, as 
for example the authentication in MIPv4. This is the major disadvantage. The second group 
brings mobility features to the secure protocols (see 2.10.2). This solution is getting much 
closer to the desired target. The main issues are caused by the core protocols design. The 
original protocol (IKEv2) is static and is not designed to work in a mobile environment. 
Despite adding some extensions for mobility, the protocol is always far from optimum in 
terms of packets formats and state behaviour (see 2.10.2). The third group contains research 
projects on mobility covering certain security aspects (see 2.11). They have slightly different 
targets, for example assuming IPv6 or homogeneous infrastructure with certain features at 
every host. These are interesting concepts targeting Intranet solutions of IPv6 networks. The 
problem with tracing user movements is unsolved in all approaches. 
12.1 Development of Mobile VPNs 
A new protocol, called M-VPN is developed and specified in this thesis, since the 
existing approaches cannot fulfil the requirements defined in chapter 2. The new protocol has 
a protection against movements tracing, protection of mobile signalling and of application 
data. A further major objective is to develop a practical protocol, which is not over-
engineered and easy to integrate into the existing infrastructure. The development of Mappers 
gives the advantage of physical separation between the Mobile Node, Tunneling Node and 
application. The M-VPN integrates excellent in the existing Authentication, Authorization 
and Accounting (AAA) structures. The M-VPN uses existing cryptographic techniques such 
as AES, RSA, DH, which assures cryptographic robustness of the algorithms. Because of the 
similar structure to IPSec and TLS, is not expected to have any vulnerability (see chapter 6). 
12.2 Mobile Location Update protocol 
The major part of this thesis is a mathematical model for the location update (M-LU). The 
protocol is part of the M-VPN and answers the question when to send a location update. The 
question is very important in mobile environments. Constant updates, like every 10 seconds, 
are not efficient for mobile environments. They lead to unnecessarily resource consumption 
and poor performance.  
In this thesis, a novel framework is developed with a mathematical solution for the update 
problem. A model representing the update procedure in M-VPN was developed, which 
enables the use of known mathematical methods. Based on classical theory, three types of 
solutions were developed: 
• Sequential Monte Carlo Sampling (see chapter 8) is a solution constructing 
the probability based on history of PoA changes.  
• Adaptive Fuzzy controller (see chapter 9) is based on Fuzzy logic for dealing 
with multivalent values, suitable for subjective description.  
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• Extended Kalman Filter solution (see chapter 10) uses the popular extended 
Kalman filter, which is a fully analytical derived sub-optimal solution.  
The contribution of the M-LU is not limited to M-VPN alone. The novel framework can 
be implemented in a variety of protocols for improving their performance, see chapter 11. 
12.3 Simulation results 
An important part of every new development is its simulation. It provides a proof of 
concept showing the qualities of the new method. Simulation of M-LU protocol is conducted 
and presented in 8.5, 9.4 and 10.8. The simulation was carried out in Matlab 7.0 with a 
standard PC. The results are compared to constant updates involving the same resources. 
Furthermore, the comparison between the suggested methods was also made, i.e. Fuzzy 
controller, particle Filter and Extended Kalman filter.  
Many simulations were executed to test the qualities of the new methods. Five of them 
were chosen as representative for the majority of scenarios. The first four use pseudo random 
input values generated with Matlab. The last one uses real data gathered from the network 
statistics for dial up access.  
The new methods outperform the constant update. There are fewer resources consumed 
for the same disconnection interval. In practical terms, the new methods require less CPU and 
network resources and achieve less disconnection. It is difficult to choose a winner between 
the three methods. Different algorithm can be favoured depending on the usage. A general 
recapitulated can be made as follows:  
• Fuzzy controller has excellent performance when some expert knowledge has 
already been gathered. The expert knowledge can be easily integrated in 
profiles, like typical employee day cycle (working hours, days etc.). 
• The Monte Carlo Sampling is suitable when multiple sources for the PoA 
changes are involved. The PoA changes can be linear and not linear, like 
changes caused by user movement and NAPT devices at the same time. The 
method can rebuild sophisticated Probability Density Functions (PDF). 
• The extended Kalman filter gives excellent results for typical employee 
usage without any prior knowledge. It performs very well on Mobile Nodes 
with abrupt changing behaviour, like workers with early and late shifts. The 
method has poor performance for complex PDF with multiple sources of PoA 
change. 
12.4 Future work 
The simulation clearly shows the advantage of the new algorithms. In all cases, there was 
better performance than the constant UI. There are still areas in which the algorithms can be 
improved and they are part of future work: 
• Optimisation of the input parameter must be implemented in real 
deployment. These are selected systematically in the simulation through 
multiple tests. The optimization can be made using automatic control 
engineering methods. The input parameters for optimisation are the number 
of: particles, added updates, Fuzzy rules etc. 
• The cycle events, such as day, week etc, can be considered in overlay. 
Currently the algorithms apply day cycle. The consideration of week and year 
may improve the performance. 
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• In Fuzzy controller, training should be implemented during the operation. 
The suggested method in chapter 9 can be extended, so that the rule base is 
updated after every update/prediction cycle. The algorithm can handle a 
dynamically changing PDF function in this way. Furthermore, the risk of 
missing rules decreases, because of a steady feedback of the rule base (see 
9.5.3). The implementation must regenerate the Fuzzy rules after every value 
received.  
• The PDF can change over the time. A forgetting factor of PDF can be added 
to the Particle Filter in chapter 8.  
• Transformation functions in extended Kalman Filter in chapter 10 can 
consider other cross point in the approximation. They may be depended on 
semi standard deviation, see 10.3. 
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A Appendix - Internet structure and relevant protocols 
In order to examine the mobile and secure topic, it is very important to understand the 
Internet from technical perspective. The Internet structure has changed a bit over the last 
decade. The new protocols must consider the non-transparent access via NAPT. This chapter 
provides a description of the IPSec and NAPT, since they are very relevant for secure IP 
mobility. The here provided description is not part of the common literature and cannot be 
found in RFC standards in this form. This chapter focuses on implementation properties, 
deployments, popular not standardized features and drafts. Without understanding these 
properties of IPSec and NAPT, it is not possible to design robust secure IP mobility. The text 
is organised as follows: the Internet access is presented in A.1, the NAPT is described in 
A.2.1 and the IPSec is the scope of A.2.2.  
A.1 Internet access 
The Internet is not only growing but also evolving - the structures and protocols are 
steadily changing. The design targets and objectivities set decades ago cannot be met in the 
current Internet. In order to bring clarification to all readers, a brief overview is provided in 
this section. 
The Internet can be structured in different ways depending on the abstraction, like on 
dedicated OSI layer or depending on the technology. The ISPs (Internet Service Provider) 
classify on the purpose: access network, core network with its aggregation and backbone part.  
 
The Local Area Network (LAN) is the network connecting the end devices, like PCs. 
Typically, this can be WiFi [42] or Ethernet connection (Figure 12.1). The LAN is controlled 
by the end user. The Gateway for the LAN hosts is the Customer Promises Equipment (CPE). 
The access network stretches from the CPE to the Main Distribution Frame (MDF) where the 
ISP’s active hardware is installed. The connection is mostly copper wire (twisted pair) used 
for aDSL connection. The outer part of the core network is the aggregation network, which 
starts by MDF and finishes at Point of Presence (PoP). It concentrates the customer’s 
physical connection on one single cable. The customers are separated logically in VLAN 
[45], VCP/VCI on ATM [47] etc. The backbone network is between the PoPs. It transports IP 
packets, without any customer separation. The different network areas are shown in Figure 
12.1. The different ISPs backbones are connected at Interconnection Exchange Points, so the 
packets are routed globally. Currently, there is trend for moving the active hardware nearer to 
the customer in Serving Area Interface to achieve higher speeds. 
During the last decade, Internet was accessed mainly by fixed cable connection or 
through the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) with modems (narrow band access). 
The end hosts were assigned public IP addresses. The hosts are connected transparent to 
Figure 12.1: Access, Aggregation and Backbone network 
 
CPE MDF
PoP
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Internet, because bidirectional communication was possible without any restrictions. There 
were not NAPT (see definition in A.2.1) device. The layers of the Internet access trough 
PSTN and by fixed cable connections are shown in Figure 12.2. The AL 
  
  
The Internet is accessed nowadays in non-transparent way. The end host obtains private 
IP address, which is not routable and reachable from the Internet. The Network Address and 
Port Translation (NAPT) [1] is implemented in order to allow the communication with 
Internet. The general layer structure is shown in Figure 12.3. The major Internet access 
scenarios regarding the IP connection are: 
 
UMTS (3G) and GPRS (2,5G) 
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS) or shortly 3G enables fast 
IP Internet access for cell phones [40, 39]. The majority of modern cell phones support this 
standard and there is network coverage in the urban areas. The UMTS is a lower layer 
protocol and does not define the IP topology. The IP network is designed by the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP). 
 
The mobile devices are assigned private IP addresses in most of the cases. The ISPs 
involve NAPT gateways, which are part of the ISP network and cannot be influenced by the 
end customer. The consequences of NAPT for the hosts are described in A.2.1. The use of 
private IPs is not part of the UMTS standard but a common policy of the ISPs. Some ISPs 
uses public IPs for business services. Other providers restrict the usage of the Internet to 
certain applications, such as HTTP. In this way, they reduce the bandwidth demand and 
consequently offer cheap flat rates.  
 
 
 
Figure 12.3: Non transparent Internet access thought NAPT  
Figure 12.2: Transparent Internet connection without NAPT 
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Wireless LAN (WiFi) and Hotspots 
 
The Wireless LAN [42] or shortly WiFi is very popular technology for uncomplicated 
connection of devices. The majority of the modern CPEs and laptops support this technology. 
Typically, the ISP assigns one public IP address to the CPE device. It is shared between 
multiple end devices connected with WiFi (Wireless LAN). In order to enable Internet access, 
the CPEs involve NAPT [2]. The end devices use private IP addresses, which are translated 
to single public IP address. If the customer has some control over the NAPT router, he can 
configure static NAPT bindings (see A.2.1).  
 
DSL Router and Cable Modems (TV Provider)  
 
The DSL routers use private addresses on the LAN side and one WAN (Wide Area 
Network)\public address. The router can also contain Wireless LAN access. The Wireless 
LAN is simply another router interface and the principle is the same as Hotspots in terms of 
IP transparency. The Internet access is also through NAPT.  
 
Set-Top Boxes and Integrated Access Devices (IADs) 
 
Set-top boxes integrate functions such as video over IP, video on demand etc. The IADs 
have mostly VoIP functionality. They enable advanced services and are currently a target of 
ISP’s. These services require extended network features such as quality of service and traffic 
shaping etc. There are usually dedicated logical connections between the set-top box (CPE) 
and the ISP access network for every service. The logical separation enables flexible network 
topology. When the customer accesses the Internet behind the set-top box, NAPT is in 
between. 
 
Corporate and Campus Access 
 
Corporations and campuses operate on LAN/MAN , where the participants use major 
Intranet services. The users access the Internet using proxies or NAPT: the proxies provide 
application layer Internet access. The application proxies are more restrictive and therefore 
very popular in corporations. The Internet access can be also provided via a statefull 
inspection firewall and NAPT. Users of these networks suffer from the same disadvantages as 
exist when accessing the Internet behind an NAPT device. 
A.2 Overview of relevant protocols 
NAPT is major part of the Internet access and therefore, must present in details. The 
IPSec is used to secure most of the existing mobile solution, thus playing a major role.  
A.2.1 NAPT Overview 
Network Address and Port Translation [1, 2, 3, 4] is wide spread technology for 
connecting different IP realms, which are not directly routable. Through the translation of the 
IP/UDP header, both realms are able to establish indirect IP connection. The common 
implementation is the translation of private IP addresses used in LAN to public IP routable on 
the Internet. Translations of public IP to public IP or private IP to private IP are also possible. 
There is no consensus about the exact terminology, so clarification of the notation shall 
be provided here. The Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) [1, 2, 3, 4] are 
synonyms for other popular notations such as: NAT, PAT, Masquerading, Port forwarding, 
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static/dynamic NAT. The NAPT is a more general term and covers all facets of translation, 
thus with or without port translation and static or dynamic. It is used in this document. 
NAPT was first mentioned in 1994 by Kjeld Egevang and Paul Francis in [1]. The 
original motivation was to develop a technique that directly addressed the accelerated 
consumption of IPv4 addresses. The NAPT was to bring temporary relief during the 
development of IPv6: “provide temporarily relief while other, more complex and far-reaching 
solutions are worked out” [7]  
More then 12 years later, NAPT is implemented in all Internet capable devices and 
operating systems: Microsoft XP/2K, Linux, DSL Router, WiFi Hotspots etc. The pressure 
for the successor protocol IPv6 is low and the target has been met.  
A.2.1.1 NAPT Operation  
The NAPT device intercepts the IP packets and replaces the header and payload values, 
so that the IP packet can be forwarded to/from certain host. Let us concentrate on the 
translation private IP to public IP in the common DSL Router access scenario. In Figure 12.4, 
the NAPT device intercepts the packets from A to B and translates the private IP 10.0.0.1 in 
82.0.0.1. The new IP (82.0.0.1) address must be routable to the NAPT device from the 
Internet.  
NAPT table entry, called mapping or binding, is created for every session. The mapping 
(binding) is protocols dependent and can contain the IP and port parameters. The information 
in the entry (binding) must be sufficient for de-multiplexing the received packets to the right 
session. The combination of all parameters in the mapping entry must point to a unique 
session. Otherwise, the packet coming from the Internet cannot be mapped to the private IP.  
  
Without a NAPT, the packets can be routed to a destination (Figure 12.4 presents Host B 
with IP 192.1.1.1), but cannot be returned to the sender. The private IP’s overlap (are used 
multiple times), so there is no unique proprietor host. 
The NAPT device has interfaces in both IP realms (private and public in our example). 
The interfaces are known as inside and outside interfaces. The translation can be carried out 
prior to forwarding or after forwarding. This is defined by configuring the execution of 
translation at the inside or outside interface. For example, the DSL routers execute NAPT on 
the outside WAN interface. When packets from the Internet are received, the translation is 
executed prior to forwarding. The packets arriving on the LAN side are forwarded and then 
translated.  
The NAPT device translates the header values and the payload. A different procedure has 
been developed for every protocol. A comprehensive overview of the IP/TCP is provided at 
the following Figure 12.5. The translation procedure exchanges the address and port values. 
Host A
10.0.0.1
10.0.0.0/2410.0.0.0/24
InternetInternet
Dst: 192.1.1.1
Src:   10.0.0.1
NAPT
Dst: 192.1.1.1
Src:   82.0.0.1
Binding 82.0.0.1 ~ 10.0.0.1
Host B
192.1.1.1
Figure 12.4: Connecting IP realms with NAPT 
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Consequently, the checksum field must be recomputed. The replaced fields are marked (in 
blue and red) in the Figure 12.5.  
 
 
A.2.1.2 NAPT Types 
There are different types of NAPT, depending on the translation: 
1) static NAPT. The NAPT mapping is constant and pre-configured at the device. This 
type is also referred in literature as port forwarding, when referred to TCP or UDP 
(Figure 12.6) The translation can involve only IP addresses independent of the 
TCP/UDP ports, as shown in Figure 12.4. The main property of the static translation 
is that no session state monitoring is needed. The connection is bi-directional and 
every packet received can be translated without the knowledge of the UDP/TCP 
connection state. This feature is widely used for gaming and file sharing etc. The 
main condition is that the translation mapping must be exactly predefined, which is 
not always possible.  
 
2) dynamic NAPT. The entry is dynamic when some of NAPT mapping parameters 
cannot be predefined. The missing parameters are extracted from the packet headers 
during the establishment. In literature, this is known also as masquerading or PAT. 
The best example is the NAPT usage in the home network at DSL router. The host 
used random source ports by establishing a session. The port is unknown in advance. 
Therefore, the exact mapping cannot be predefined. During UDP/TCP establishment, 
the port information is extracted from the packet (on-the-fly) to create the binding. 
After closing the session, the entry is removed and the resources become available 
for new translation.  
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Figure 12.5: IP and TCP header overview in NAPT 
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Figure 12.6: Translation of IP address and port 
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A.2.1.2.1 Dynamic NAPT issues 
There is a problem when to remove the NAPT mapping once created. The unused 
mappings must be removed. Otherwise, the device and public resources will be overloaded. 
(The sense of NAPT is to aggregate resources through sharing). The main idea is the remove 
the mapping when the communication session is closed, thus the mapping is not used. The 
problem is when the session is closed. The UDP is connectionless protocols and there is not 
defined session finish at transport layer. In this situation, it must be used session definition at 
application layer. This is not always possible, for example: HTTP is sessionless protocol. A 
TCP session cannot be properly closed because of hardware failures.  
To handle this, an idle timeout is added to every NAPT entry. Idle timeout is generally 
used for all NAPT mappings. Typical values are 5 minutes for UDP and 15 min for a TCP 
connection. Unfortunately, a timeout increases the possibility of erasing connections still in 
use. For example: the hosts are not exchanging packets, but they need the connection. This is 
a major problem for protocols. In order to keep the entry, the applications use keep-a-live 
mechanisms described in section A.2.1.8. 
The connection using dynamic NAPT is unidirectional. The connection can be 
established from one side only. For example: Only on the LAN side in the popular DSL 
implementation. It is not possible to establish connection from the Internet. The advantages 
and disadvantages for the applications are discussed in chapter A.2.1.12. 
A.2.1.3 NAPT implementations 
There are different NAPT implementations having major influence on the functionality of 
protocols. Some implementations are friendly to definite protocols and some are not. 
Considering the Figure 12.3, the binding at CPE is created when PC sends packet to some 
Internet host. The Internet host responds to PC behind the NAPT and the NAPT device must 
de-multiplex the packet. The implementations for de-multiplexing are:  
1) Symmetric: The NAPT entry matches the local host address, source port number, 
destination address and port number. Any change to one of these fields requires a 
different NAPT binding. This is the most restrictive implementation. 
2) Full-cone: This is the least restrictive NAPT implementation. It establishes the 
mapping matches, when the destination IP and source port are correct. The source 
port and IP address are not considered.  
3) Restricted-cone: The de-multiplexing with the NAPT entry is done by comparing the 
destination port, destination IP address, source IP address, but not the source port. 
4) Port-restricted-cone: The matching criteria are the destination IP and port and the 
source port. The source IP address is not considered for the translation.  
A.2.1.4 Simple Traversal of UDP through NATs (STUN) 
The applications have different compatibility to the different NAPT implementations. An 
application must determine: first, if it is behind an NAPT device and secondly, what type of 
NAPT policy is implemented. For this reason, a Simple Traversal of UDP through NATs 
(STUN) [16] was developed. The protocol is widely used in VoIP clients. 
In general, the STUN defines the client-server (initiator-responder) relation. The client 
wishes to locate the NAPT device and the server assists this. The principle is that the client 
sends a request and the server answers. The server must be transparently connected to 
Internet. Currently, there are many STUN servers in the network.  
The client sends an initial request packet to the STUN server. The server responds with 
the IP address and port of the received packet in the payload. The client compares the payload 
values with the original ones. If the payload values and the original values are the same then 
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there is no NAPT in between. There is an NAPT device in between if the returned values 
differ.  
Involving the similar logic of request and responses, the client can determine most of the 
NAPT types. The client cannot determine whether there are multiple NAPT devices in 
between. Multiple NAPT routers are simplified to one. Unfortunately, STUN cannot detect 
all types of NAPT. For example, whether it is a static or dynamic NAPT. The worst case is 
always assumed for the application, thus dynamic NAPT. 
A.2.1.5 NAPT payload translation and bundled sessions  
Many protocols, such as SIP [50], FTP [49], NetBios etc. consist of bundled TCP/UDP 
connections. The packet payloads of the original session contain IP addresses and ports of the 
following sessions. The applications use IP/port values in the payload to establish new 
sessions. It’s very important for the NAPT device to translate the IP and port values in the 
payload. Leaving this information unchanged leads to a failure of the protocol. The receiver 
tries to establish a connection to an unreachable IP and port from the payload in original 
session.  
A practical case is demonstrated on the FTP [49] protocol in Figure 12.7, but the 
principle is the same for all bundled sessions. The FTP client establishes a signalling session 
to the FTP server in active mode (the working principle is different in passive mode). We 
assume there is an NAPT router in between, as in Figure 12.7. If the client executes “ls”, 
“get” or “put” commands, a new data session must be established from the server to the 
client, in which the data is transferred. The IP address and TCP port for the data session are 
defined by the client. The values are sent in the payload of the signalling session. The client 
asks the server to establish a TCP session to its specific local IP and port (active FTP). The 
client is behind an NAPT device, so it will use its private addresses and some open local port. 
Using these values, the server cannot establish the session, since the private address is not 
reachable from the Internet. The data transfer fails if the payload is not translated. In practical 
terms, the clients can login but cannot transfer any data, so there is no real use for the 
connection.  
In order to handle session bundles, the NAPT devices must also translate the payloads 
with the correct addresses. This requires that the NAPT device is aware of all protocols and 
knows which fields are to be translated. The encoding of the IP address and port in the 
payload is carried out in different way. For example: some of them can contain the 
parameters as string values or as binary bytes sequences. The task of the NAPT device 
becomes very difficult.  
 
The correct translation of the payload is not sufficient for working with bundled sessions. 
NAPT mappings (bindings) serving following sessions must be created in advance using the 
information in the original session. In the FTP example (Figure 12.7), the NAPT mapping 
must be set for the data session. The data session is established from the Internet to the host. 
Without the mapping, the packets will be dropped. The translation strategy is different for 
every application protocol.  
InternetInternet
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
Figure 12.7: FTP data transfer 
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The translation is not required by some protocols, such as the STUN protocol. If the 
NAPT device translates the STUN payloads, then the client cannot always determine that 
there is NAPT in between 
Modern protocol designers are aware of this short-coming in NAPT, so they try not to 
create bundled sessions or transmit IP or port information in the payload. This principle is 
also used in this thesis, as framework requirement for protocol design. 
A.2.1.6 Working with NAPT 
NAPT has strong associations with a client-server model of communications. As long as 
the servers have constant IP addresses and the clients initiate the TCP connection, NAPT will 
work without any significant problems. For client-server applications without bundled 
sessions, NAPT is semi-transparent without any limitation on the protocol. The widespread 
deployment of NAPT and the continued use of client-server applications attest its capability 
to perform transparently and effectively.  
Peer-to-peer applications and bundled sessions are highly problematic for NAPT, because 
they do not match the NAPT design model. The peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols require 
transparent bidirectional connection between the hosts. The connections can be established by 
both peers, there is no strict requirement for the side of initiation. In order to solve these 
issues, all P2P applications use the following methods: 
1) The P2P networks involve nodes with NAPT proxies functionality. The NAPT proxy 
remains between the peers. The communication is split in two client-to-server 
connections. The peers always communicate indirectly through proxy. Each peer 
contacts the NAPT proxy, which must be transparently reachable from the Internet. 
The NAPT proxy transports the data received from one connection to the other as 
shown in Figure 12.8. The NAPT proxy notation is different between the 
applications, for example in SIP it is RTP proxy or media gateway. Skype(TM) uses 
the term super node.  
2) The second possibility is changing the original protocol to become dynamically 
client-server and/or to use NAPT implementation properties. Using protocols like 
STUN, the peer is able to find out which type of NAPT is involved. The applications 
can open some port, to be reachable from Internet if there is a full-clone. 
Additionally, the application can dynamically check if one of the participants is 
transparently connected. This host can be used as the server. Modern P2P sharing 
protocols like DirectConnect try to use this type of option. They are client-to-server 
protocols but, abstracted to higher layer, they can be considered as P2P network. 
 
A.2.1.7 NAPT with ICMP, ESP and other transport layer protocols 
The NAPT mapping usually involves IP and port values. Protocols like ICMP[51], 
ESP[21] do not contain port information in their header, since they are network layer 
protocols. These types of protocols are very challenging. NAPT requires a unique header 
values for de-multiplexing the return packets. The destination IP address is equal for all 
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Figure 12.8: NAPT proxy 
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packets received from the outside interface. This is insufficient to match the right session. 
The NAPT device uses different mapping policies for every transport protocols to solve this 
issue. For ICMP, the NATP device usually adds the original ICMP header in the packet 
payload. The returned packet includes the original header and it can be correctly translated 
back by the NAPT device. The SPI number is used with the ESP protocol. This is unique part 
of the ESP header. The problem is that this type of binding creation must be defined for every 
protocol and it does not cover all cases see A.2.2.10.6. 
A.2.1.8 NAPT Keep-Alive 
When the hosts are behind dynamic NAPT, the bindings are removed after a certain idle 
timeout (see A.2.1.1). When an active binding is removed, the host becomes unreachable. 
The NAPT device cannot translate the packets and the packets are dropped. The applications 
use Nat-Keep-Alives (updates) in order to avoid this type of problems. The updates are 
usually empty packets including headers only. The only purpose is to keep the NAPT binding 
active. The updates packets are handled at the NAPT routers, which reset the idle timer. 
The Nat-Keep-Alive mechanism must not be mixed with Dead-Peer-Detection (DPD 
A.2.2.10.2). The Dead-Peer-Detection (DPD) detects an unreachable end host. It does not 
target any NAPT binding update. Although, its side effect is the update of the NAPT entry. 
A.2.1.9 NAPT and fragmented IP packets and PMTU  
NAPT has significant problem with the fragmented packets. When the host sends large 
packets on a link with a smaller MTU size [52] the packets are typically fragmented. This is 
carried out by either the sender or the intermediate router. A property of fragmented packets 
is that the transport header is contained only in the first fragment. The following fragments 
are chained by their fragment ID only. There is not TCP/UDP header in the IP fragments. 
When the NAPT device receives packets (fragments) without transport headers, the binding 
cannot be matched. There are two strategies available to overcome this problem:  
1) The NAPT device reassembles the fragment as the end host does. They perform the 
NAPT translation after the original IP packet has been reassembled with all its 
fragments. The packets are typically fragmented again after the translation. 
Assembling all fragments is question of resources at the NAPT device. There is a 
need of a buffer to save the fragments until the whole packet is available. The 
assembling of all packets slows down the connection, as all fragments must be 
available before proceeding. The end-to-end delay increases. 
2) The NAPT device uses the fragment ID’s and IPs to map the fragments to certain 
session. Forwarding is performed using the fragment ID’s. The advantage of this 
behaviour is that it works significantly faster then the previous one and does not 
require additional resource for buffers. Unfortunately, it has major problems: the 
checksum of the header must not be used; out-of-order fragments are dropped. 
A.2.1.10 NAPT and illusion for security  
Many users consider NAPT as security feature and not network issue. Probably, because 
it is was introduced in this way by some marketing people. In fact, NAPT has hardly any 
advantages for the end customers. It brings a lot of restrictions when working with P2P 
protocols. It is advantageous for the ISPs: there is no need for additional IP addresses for all 
end devices.  
The perfect NAPT device is invisible to the participants. It should not restrict the 
communication at all if possible. The perfect NAPT provides no protection to the 
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communication. In the use of full-clone implementations, the Internet host can easily reach 
the inside hosts with full scanning. 
It is very important to understand that NAPT is not a security mechanism and if there are 
some security properties, they are side effects and depend strictly on the implementation. 
Firewalls are the solution for increasing the security network. 
A.2.1.11 NAPT and the security protocols  
The use of NAPT is problematic for the security protocols, which use the IP addresses in 
their payloads or protect the IP/UDP headers. It is a principle question: On the one hand, the 
security protocols try to uncover any manipulation of the IP/UDP header and block potential 
attacks. On the other hand, NAPT manipulates the header and this is necessary for the 
connectivity. There are big issues with IPSec protocol, described in following chapter 
A.2.2.10.1. 
A.2.1.12 The controversy of NAPT  
NAPT is a very controversial function. It helps the administrator and ISPs to grow their 
networks without changing the routing tables and without providing more IP addresses. This 
keeps the resources and investments very low. Furthermore, the end customers are no longer 
restricted to having just one computer, since the ISP assigns just one IP. Most DSL customers 
have multiple devices, like laptops, PCs, PDAs etc. 
NAPT brings enormous restrictions to IP communication. The end host is unaware of its 
communication address. Many IETF standards are drifted away from the reality, since the 
assumed transparent bi-directional connectivity is not present. Some of the protocols become 
useless. There are many documents written about NAPT properties [9, 10, 11, 12]. The major 
disadvantage of NAPT can be summarised as: 
• The translation at the NAPT device is unknown to the participants. The hosts 
are unaware of their translated IP/port. The IP/port changes without any 
notification. 
• Bundled sessions require payload translation, which is not always supported 
by the devices.  
• Dynamical NAPT does not support applications where the initiator is outside. 
Peer-to-peer services, like VoIP, cannot function in an NAPT environment. 
• The P2P applications are forced to deploy different architecture with external 
proxy. This leads some further centralisation of services and leaving the P2P 
principles. 
• The behaviour of NAPT varies dramatically from one implementation to 
another. It is very difficult for the applications to predict or expose the 
precise behaviour of NAPT, which may exist in between. 
• Robust security in IP environments typically operates on an end-to-end 
model, where both ends include additional information in the packet to detect 
manipulation of the packets. NAPT changes the IP and TCP/UDP header 
values. If the security protocol protects against the manipulation the IP and 
TCP/UDP header, the NAPT device translation will be treated as an attack. It 
is not possible to use protection of IP and TCP/UDP in an NAPT 
environment. 
• NAPT have no inherent failover. NAPT in an active in-band mechanism that 
cannot fail into a safe operating fallback mode. When a NAPT goes offline, 
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all traffic through the device is dropped. An NAPT device is a single point of 
failure  
• NAPT sit on the data path and attempt to process every packet. Obviously, 
there are issues regarding the bandwidth scaling. 
• With NAPT there is no clear, coherent, and stable concept of network 
identity. From the outside, these NAPT-filtered interior devices are visible 
only as transient entities. 
• Policy-based mechanisms based on network identity, like Policy Quality of 
Service [QoS]), cannot work through NAPT. 
• Normal forms of IP mobility are broken when any element behind the NAPT 
attempts to roam beyond its local private domain. Solutions are possible, 
generally involving specific NAPT-related alterations to the behaviour of the 
Home Agent and the mobile device. 
• NAPT may drop IP fragments in either direction: without complete 
TCP/UDP headers, the NAPT may not have sufficient stored state to 
undertake the correct header translation. 
• NAPT do not support mobility, like Mobile IP 
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A.2.2 IP Security (IPSec) and IKE 
IP Security (IPSec) [20] and IKE/ISAKMP [34, 35] are widely used protocols for 
delivering protection at the IP layer. The IPSec is used in majority of mobile solution, like 
Mobile IP, and therefore, it is important for this topic. The relevant properties are highlighted 
here. There are two version, thus IKEv2 [34] and IKEv1 [35]. The IKEv1 is the most used 
version having implementation in all OS. The IKEv2 can be considered as consolidation of 
additional RFCs in the IKEv1. There are less implementations of IKEv2 at this point. This 
section concentrates in IKEv1, since the author describes practical properties of existing 
implementation. 
The IPSec implementations are also popular as Virtual Private Networks (VPN) or Layer 
3 VPN. The expression VPN is far more general and it is not correct to use it as a synonym 
for IPSec. The VPN defines the possibility of overlaying networks on virtual basis. They can 
be realized with various technologies, like MPLS [43], VPLS [44, 46], VLANS [46], IPSec 
[20] etc. 
A.2.2.1 IP Security Overview 
IPSec (IP Security) is a protocol for protection at IP layer, which can include different 
transport protocols and different algorithms. It is standardised by IETF in [20]. IPSec is a 
peer-to-peer protocol, thus the communication participants have the same administrative right 
and duties. The features delivered by the protocols are: 
• data integrity 
• access control (authentication and authorisation) 
• optional data authentication 
• optional confidentially 
• replay protection  
IPSec is not a single protocol but a suite (collection) of security protocols for security. 
The architecture is defined in RFC 4301 [20] as follows: 
• Security protocols- Authentication header (AH [19]) and Encapsulation 
Security Protocol (ESP [21]) 
• Key management – IKE [34, 35] and Oeklay [27] 
• Algorithms for encryption and authentication, like 3DES [24] 
The relation and interaction between the IPSec protocols is complex and the different 
standards cannot be considered independently of each other. An understanding of the general 
protocols can be achieved only through understanding the interaction between the different 
elements. IPSec has the rum as complex protocol, although with approximately one dozen 
RFCs, it is quite compact. For example, SIP [50] includes more then fifty RFCs. The reason 
for this notorious image of IPSec is probably the compactness and short additional 
explanation in RFC texts. 
The exchanges packets can be protected in two ways – Authentication Header (AH) and 
Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP). The differences are that AH protects the IP header 
and does not deliver confidentiality. The ESP is achieves confidentiality through encryption 
and does not protects the outer IP header. The ESP and AH require pre configured secure 
keys. They can be delivered through the ISAKMP protocol or can be configured manually. 
The ISAKMP is the common way for delivery the key material for ESP and AH. 
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Both the ESP and AH protocols can be used in transport and tunnel modes. In transport 
mode, the ESP/AH header is between network layer (IP) and transport layer (TCP/UDP). The 
data following after the ESP/AH header is protected. In tunnel mode, the original IP packet is 
encapsulated in the ESP/AH. A new outer IP header is generated. They are two IP headers 
outer and inner in tunnel mode. The outer is called gateway IP address. The gateway provides 
the cryptographic functions and (de) encapsulates the packets. The inner IP is the end host, 
which do not need any IPSec functionality in this way.  
A.2.2.2 Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) 
The ESP protocol [21] uses block cipher, like AES in CBC [22] mode of operation, to 
encrypt the content. The integrity protection is optimal thought truncated HMAC with MD5 
or SHA1. The key in HMAC achieves authentication of the packet. Sequence number is used 
for reply protection.  
 
The ESP header is presented in the Figure 12.9. The Security Parameter Index (SPI) field 
is the unique connection indication. Using the SPI field, the packet is matched to the right 
session. The SPI number are part of the IPSec database, called SAD. In the SAD all 
parameter are contained which are required for the decryption and processing of the packet, 
as explained in A.2.2.4. The second field sequence number indicates the sequence of the sent 
packet. It is used for protection against replay attacks and described in chapter A.2.2.7. The 
payload data follows, for example the TCP header with the application data. The padding is 
added to achieve the requisite data length for use with block encryption algorithms. The last 
field is the authentication field with truncated HMAC (Authentication Data). The HAMC is 
12 bytes. The size of ESP header varies due to the padding and encryption algorithm. It is 
usually between 80 and 120 bytes. 
 
The ESP is used in tunnel and transport modes. The protected areas in both tunnel and 
transport mode are shown in Figure 12.10. In tunnel mode, the original IP header is protected 
and cannot be read by intermediate authorities, for example NAPT. The outer header is not 
protected, so it can be read and manipulated. This is a very practical advantage of ESP when 
used in NAPT environments.  
Figure 12.9: ESP Header 
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A.2.2.3 Authentication Header (AH) protocol 
The AH protocol [19] achieves data authentication, reply and integrity protection of the 
packet. Unlike the ESP, it does not provide confidentiality. The header information is very 
similar to the ESP header and it is presented in Figure 12.12. The Figure 12.11 presents the 
AH in transport and tunnel mode. 
The AH is not delivering confidentiality and have problem with intermediate NAPT. 
Probably because of that, AH is not very popular. The AH and ESP protocols can be used 
together to increase integrity protection, although this is not implemented by the vendors in 
practice.  
A.2.2.4 Security Policy Database (SPD) and Security Association Database (SAD) 
The IPSec implementations have at least two databases according to the RFC [20] - 
Security Policy Database (SPD) and the Security Association Database (SAD). The databases 
are defined to assure implementation compatibility between the deployments.  
The SPD includes the static policy definition, which IP traffic requires to be protected. 
The policy entry gives all necessary parameters for protecting traffic: tunnel mode or 
transport mode, ESP or AH, encryption protocols, destination address, port and protocol of 
the traffic etc. The selectors are combination of: destination and source protocols, port and IP 
address. A policy example follows: 
 
selector: destination IP address 192.168.1.0/24 protocol: any, source IP 192.168.10.0/24 
ESP mode tunnel with CBC AES encryption,SHA1 for integrity protection, ESP lifetime 3600 sec 
destination IP: 64.3.3.2  
key delivery: isakmp 
ISAKMP main mode, authentication certificates, SA life time IKE 24 hours,  
 
The different implementations will have different syntax and some of the parameters can 
be hidden (not configurable). The SPD are pre-configured by the applications. Every SPD is 
linked to an outbound Security Association (SA). If no SA exists then one is created as 
needed. We are not discussing all parameters here, since they are deeply defined in the 
RFC2401 [20].  
Security Association Database (SAD) contains all values relevant for an active 
connection. The values relevant for one connection are set in IPSec SAs. There are two types 
of inbound and outbound IPSec SAs, corresponding to incoming and outgoing packets. The 
following major parameters are included in SAD for one SA entry: 
Authentication Data (Variable)
ReservedNext header
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Figure 12.12: AH header 
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• Security Parameter Index (SPI). This is the unique identifier for the SA. 
• Sequence Number is the packet number. 
• Anti-Replay Window – it is the size of the anti-replay window.  
• The list of packets already received within the window, usually also 
implemented in the SAD. 
• SA lifetime is validity time from a cryptographically point of view, thus the 
period of time in which it can be used.  
• Packet counter for all packets proceeded thought this SA. This is necessary in 
order to process the SA life time in bytes.  
• Mode of operation can be tunnel or transport 
• Protection algorithm describes the exact ESP or AH algorithm, such as 
3DES_CBC etc. 
• Path MTU - The observed maximum MTU, which can be used in this 
connection. 
• Destination and source IP Address, Destination and source protocols and port 
• In tunnel mode, the inner IP addresses (local IP and remote IP) protocol and 
port 
The implementations can include supplementary parameters, such as compression 
algorithms, decryption errors etc. depending on their requirements 
A.2.2.5 Packet processing  
At the outbound processing, the packet is matched in the SPD database using the 
selectors. If there is a match, the packet must be protected using the parameters defined in the 
SA. If there is no active SA, a new SA is established. This establishment is usually done with 
ISAKMP negotiation see A.2.2.6. After the encapsulation, the new packet is forwarded to the 
routing engine. 
For incoming packets, the unique SPI values are used to select an actual active SA in the 
SAD. The packet is decrypted according the IPSec SA. Then it is forwarded to the routing 
engine.  
A.2.2.6 Internet Key Exchange 
The IKE protocol is used for delivering the Key material to ESP or AH. It achieves also 
authentication and negotiation of the protection algorithms.  
Before describing the protocol, let us clarify the RFC terminology. The popular Diffie-
Hellman [53] algorithm gives the mathematical background for key generation in an 
unsecured environment. It is used in the OAKLEY [27] algorithm for key negotiation and 
generation with a computer working with discrete arithmetic. The IKEv1 [35] protocol is a 
framework defining the packet format for OAKLEY. The ISAKMP [36] is the concrete 
packet protocol for the negotiation of IPSec SA parameters based on the IKEv1 framework. 
The ISAKMP is the exact definition for use with IPSec, and IKEv1 is definition that is more 
abstract. The IKEv2 [34] unites the IKEv1 and ISAKMP in one protocol. For this reason, the 
author speaks for IKEv2 or ISAKMP based in IKEv1. In this chapter, we provide an 
overview of ISAKMP without presenting the mathematical backgrounds, which can be found 
in [53]. 
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The ISAKMP was originally defined as a general peer-to-peer key exchange and 
management protocol. It was not dedicated only to ESP/AH but also other protocols. 
Unfortunately, it was only implemented in IPSec (ESP/AH). The ISAKMP is a high quality 
security protocol, divided into different phases – Phase 1 and Phase 2. The negotiation is 
done using UDP protocol on port 500 or 4500. 
A.2.2.6.1 Phase 1 and ISAKMP SA 
The first phase (Phase 1) in the ISAKMP negotiation targets establishes a secure channel 
for commutation. This includes mutual authentication, security algorithms negotiation, key 
material exchange etc. The result of phase 1 negotiation is ISAKMP Security Association 
(SA). The ISAKMP SA includes the parameters as authentication methods, life time of the 
SA, session key, called Shared Key ID, encryption methods, IDs of the participants etc. The 
communication in the following phase 2 is always protected by the negotiation in the phase 1 
key. It is important to stress that the ISAKMP SA is not the same as IPSec SA discussed in 
A.2.2.4. Unfortunately, the names are very similar, but these are different entries with 
different scopes and targets. 
The ISAKMP policy contains the parameters for the negotiation, such as authentication, 
encryption, lifetime, remote IP, ID etc. A general example of ISAKMP policy is shown in the 
following paragraph;  the specific implementation can certainly include different additional 
parameters. 
 
ISAKMP Policy: remote peer 63.4.2.3, encryption AES CBC or 3DES CBC, HMAC MD5, diffie-
hellman group 2 or 3, lifetime max 24h, authentication pre-shared secret or RSA-Signature, remote ID 
FQDN, local ID IP adrs. 
 
The main principles of the negotiation are that initiator suggests list of supported and 
acceptable algorithms and the responder chooses one of them. Both participants have an 
influence over the algorithms and values for the ISAKMP SA. ISAKMP is a peer to peer 
protocol, where the both participants authenticate mutually. For the authentication, the 
ISAKMP defines:  
• Shared secret. Both participants share a certain secret and knowledge of the 
secret is sufficient for authentication. The shared secret is manually pre-
configured by the administrators at the hosts. The method does not scale in 
large installation and has a low security level. 
• Public/Private Key. The participants authenticate using public and private 
keys. This is a much better alternative than a shared secret. The main 
advantage is the simplicity and there is no requirement for a supplementary 
PKI in order to start the implementation (certificates are not used). The main 
shortcoming is that public key pre-distribution of the peers is needed. The 
initiator must have the public key of the responder in order to authenticate it 
and vice versa. The public keys must be known in advance, which can be 
difficult in environments with many participants. The certificates are not 
used. 
• Signatures. The participants authenticate mutually using signatures. 
Certificates x509v3 [26] are involved for this purpose,. The peer signs a hash 
on the exchanged messages and sends it to the opposite site. The public key 
for verifying the signature is part of the certificate sent during the 
negotiation, so no pre-distribution is required. The use of certificates requires 
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The main difficulty when using signatures 
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is the need for a PKI infrastructure. The main advantage is the large-scale 
potentials at high security level deployments. This is probably the most 
popular use of ISAKMP authentication. 
The ISAMKP delivers a secure key for the encryption of further exchanges in phase 2. 
The key exchange is carried out using the famous Diffie-Hellman algorithm [53]. To 
facilitate the Diffie-Hellman, exchange sets of public prime numbers and elliptic curve 
polynomial are predefined [36]. The predefined parameters are gathered in group. There are 
currently four groups. The public values are exchanged during the negotiation and protected 
through signed hash.  
There are two modes of exchange in the ISAKMP: Main Mode and Aggressive mode. 
The Main mode protects the ID of the peers and requires at least 6 messages. The Aggressive 
Mode consists of only 3 messages and does not protect the peers IDs. The exact negotiation 
and key derivation does not contribute directly to the mobile environment. It is described in 
detail in [36, 34]. 
A.2.2.6.2 ISAKMP Phase 2 
Phase 2 negotiates the parameter for security protocol, which practically is ESP or AH. It 
is called Quick Mode when negotiating ESP and AH. The word Quick Mode is quasi 
synonym for ISAKMP Phase 2 and explained here. Additionally, there is Config Mode 
explained in chapter A.2.2.10.8. 
The Quick Mode creates IPSec SA with the parameters required by ESP/AH protocol. 
The IPSec SA is unidirectional. There are two SAs – inbound and outbound for one bi-
directional connection. The phase 2 negotiation is protected by the session key generated in 
phase 1. There can be multiple phase 2 negotiations on the top of single phase 1. Thus, many 
IPSec SA can be negotiated, typically one for every network segment. 
A.2.2.6.3 Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) 
The Perfect Forward Secrecy is a property of the key generation in which one key should 
not be a derivate of any other key. When a session key or private key is compromised at some 
time point, then the following (previous) session keys must not be compromised because of 
that. In the context of IPSec: if an attacker breaks one dedicated IPSec session key, then only 
this session must be compromised. The following and previous IPSec sessions remain secure. 
The same can be interpreted for the private key of the participants: even if the private key is 
compromised, then the negotiated session keys must be secure. The use of PFS is strongly 
recommended. IPSec achieves PFS using several mechanisms: 
• There is Diffie-Hellman exchange in every quick mode negotiation, so if PFS 
feature is active then a KE payload is included in every Quick Mode.  
• The public key is used to sign a hash value of the key material and never the 
key itself.  
• The phase 1 must be deleted every time a phase 2 is finished in order to 
protect the identities. 
A.2.2.6.4 Replay attacks protection 
Both protocols ESP and AH deliver replay protection involving sequence numbers in the 
ESP/AH header. The sequence number increases monotone with every packet. The receiver 
checks if this sequence number has already been received and if so, it is discarded.  
A window of acceptance is defined to handle the potential disorder of sequence numbers. 
The window defines the maximum and minimal sequence numbers, which are acceptable. 
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The window size is a constant number, typically 32. With every new received packet the 
window is moved, so the sequence number received is always at the right corner of the 
window. The host ensures that the packets in the window are received just once. 
A.2.2.7 PMTU Discovery  
The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) and Path MTU Discovery [52] are very 
important for packet processing. They define the maximum packet size on certain interfaces 
and certain IP paths. Some applications prefer sending single fragments and deliver the 
packets fast in this way. This type of applications set the DF bit flag of the IP packet, so the 
forwarding instances should not fragment the packet.  
IPSec adds a supplementary header to the original packet. If the unencrypted packet 
already has the maximum size, defined as MTU, then the encrypted packed cannot be 
forwarded in one fragment. The packet must be encrypted, fragmented and then forwarded. If 
the DF bit in IP header is set then the IPSec gateway should answer the sender with ICMP 
notification fragmentation needed. This leads to some problems for IPSec.  
Let us regard the case using IPSec between two gateways running in tunnel mode. This is 
a very common deployment. The IPSec gateway receives ICMP notification fragmentation 
needed. The gateway is only an encryption node and it must forword the notification the end 
host. The ICMP packet is a reaction to certain traffic generated by the end hosts. The replay 
packet is sent to the gateway, because it is the sender of the protected packet. The gateway 
should forward the ICMP notice to the sender - end host. The end host IP is not included in 
the notification, since the intermediate router does not know that the packet is tunnelled etc. 
The gateway can only guess the originator or forward the packet to all hosts included in the 
IPSec SA. Both possibilities are not optimal.  
The big security issue with PMTU in IPSec is that the notification sender could be an 
attacker. The IPSec gateway forwards an unauthenticated packet to the protected host in order 
to fulfil the PMTU requirements. This gives the possibility for DoS attacks on the end host. 
Another possibility is that the intermediate attacker can decrease the MTU size of minimal 
value, so that the connection becomes useless for the participants. In order to reduce these 
vulnerabilities the IPSec gateways using tunnel mode must inspect the ICMP packets and 
consider the local security policies. Blocking all ICMP “fragmentation needed” is not an 
option, since this ignores basic Internet principles. This can lead to disconnection see 6.2. 
The simple calculation of the MTU size in IPSec connection is also problematic since the 
ESP header has a variable length. The length depends on the added padding and it is variable 
for every packet. The value of the calculation of the MTU size must consider the maximum 
added padding. 
The PMTU [52] is generally a highly problematic feature on the Internet and not only for 
the IPSec. On the one hand, it is definitely needed in heterogeneous environments. On the 
other hand, it is a security thread and very difficult to handle. Some of the firewalls and 
NAPT routers drop the ICMP fragmentation needed notifications. The result is that most of 
the implementation inclusive IPSec set the MTU size to a sufficiently low value. The value is 
usually an empirical derivate. This causes the unreasonable dropping of some packets and 
ineffective use of the network resources. The throughput of router is measured in packets per 
seconds and not in Bytes per seconds - better one big packet then two small. 
A.2.2.8 Original implementations and ideas 
There are quite different IPSec deployments described in the original RFC documents 
[20, 54] and the current implementations. In this chapter, the original implementation ideas 
are described. Later on in chapter A.2.2.11, the actual current implementations are presented.  
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The packets are protected according the SPD/SA policy independent, whether the peer 
host is currently online or not. There is no delivery proof mechanism. The higher layer 
protocols such as TCP must ensure the presence of the host. The protection should be part of 
the kernel engine, so-called “Bump-in-the-stack implementations”. This is transparent for the 
application and no action initiation is required. Properties such as IP, dns, winds assignment, 
load sharing, routing information announcement, backup are of the scope of IPSec standards. 
Furthermore, transparent layer 3 connectivity is assumed, thus not NAPT intermediate 
device.  
 
The main deployments of IPSec are shown in Figure 12.13 and defined as:  
• Transport mode protection for IP communication between two hosts with 
fixed IP addresses.  
• If the hosts do not have cryptographic possibilities, then a dedicated gateway 
can do this in so-called tunnel mode. The IP addresses of the host involved 
are also static. The connection is gateway to gateway. 
• For using dynamic routing protocols, load sharing etc the implementation of 
GRE over IPSec in transport mode is recommended. The online status of the 
hosts is checked by the routing protocols. If one of the participants becomes 
unreachable, certain actions are taken, for example using an alternative way. 
The GRE is a very simple encapsulation and usually implemented as virtual 
interface. When the host becomes unreachable, the virtual interface can be 
tied down and the host can use the alternative lower metric/preferences 
connections.  
A.2.2.9 IPSec in conjunction with NAPT 
NAPT is a big issue for IPSec. This follows on from the fact that the ISAKMP and IPSec 
protocols try to protect the packets from manipulation by intermediate devices. NAPT is 
actually an intermediate device and manipulates the packet. The NAPT manipulation is an 
attack from a security perspective. The protocols cannot distinguish between “good” NAPT 
manipulation and “bad” attacker manipulation. Without going into deep sophisticated details, 
here are the following characteristics: 
• AH protocols cannot be used with NAPT, since AH protects the IP header. 
• ESP can be used in tunnel mode with NAPT devices when these support so-
called “IPSec Pass through” functionality. Additionally, the ISAKMP phase 
Figure 12.13: IPSec implementations 
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1 negotiation must not use ID payloads with IP addresses, since they are not 
correct.  
• ESP in transport mode cannot be used since the IP manipulation causes 
incorrect checksum calculation in the TCP and UDP header. The TCP/UDP 
packets are dropped after decryption, whilst the device is verifying the 
checksum. For this reason, the checksum must be set to zero (do not care) by 
the sender according RFC [55].  
• ESP transport mode is problematic. Even the end host ignores the incorrect 
checksum and the NAPT device supports “IPSec pass thought” feature, the 
ESP connection in transport mode will not work. The IPSec receiver host 
cannot distinguish between the TCP/UDP connection and connections from 
different hosts behind the same NAPT device (single public IP address). The 
scenario is shown in Figure 12.14. Let us consider they are two different 
hosts: A with IP 10.0.0.1 and B with IP 10.0.0.2 in the same private LAN 
segment behind the same NAPT. They send ESP packets to the same 
destination host using the same source and destination port. After decrypting 
the packets, the receiver will see the same source/destination port and IP 
addresses for the two sessions. The receiver cannot differentiate between the 
two hosts. It is not possible to de-multiplex between the connections, since 
there is no unique parameter in the UDP/IP headers. This is a common 
constellation when, for example, L2TP over IPSec [33] is deployed. L2TP 
over IPSec is a very popular connection type, implemented in all Microsoft 
OS. 
• ISAKMP is working, when the NAPT device supports the extended feature 
“multiple ISAKMP IKE session negotiations”. This feature can be part of 
“IPSec Pass through” set. 
• ESP in tunnel mode could incur problems with NAPT. The encapsulated IP 
header (inner herder) includes a private IP address. The private addresses can 
overlap, so two or more hosts can potentially have the same IPs. For 
example: 192.168.0.0/24 is a common address for private DSL routers. The 
receiver cannot differentiate between the hosts after decryption. 
 
There are restricted cases in ESP tunnel mode, which can work in common situations. 
NAPT is very problematic for IPSec and for this reason the NAT-T feature was developed. It 
is described in chapter A.2.2.10.1. 
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Figure 12.14: Transport mode of ESP used with NAPT 
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A.2.2.10 Enhanced IPSec features 
In the recent years, many new features of ESP/ISAKMP have been developed, which 
have responded to the new requirements of industry. The motivation for the features was 
NAPT popularity and remote corporate access. The features were originally proprietary 
solutions, later standardised in IETF. This chapter provides a short overview of the new 
features and then the current IPSec usages are presented. 
A.2.2.10.1 NAT-Traversal (NAT-T) 
The popularity of NAPT requires solution so that IPSec can be used in these 
environments. A NAT-Traversal was developed for ISAKMP and IPSec was [29, 28, 30]. It 
extends the protocols with the following features: 
• Multiple ISAKMP SAa (phase 1) can be established between the same hosts. 
The NAPT device represents to multiple private hosts. The original RFC 
restricts to only one session between two hosts.  
• Source port ISAKMP negotiation can be any port. Originally it was only 
UDP 500 
• The NAT-T support is signalised using vendor-ID payloads. If an NAPT 
device is detached, the transport port is changed from UDP 500 to 4500. 
• The ESP and AH packets are encapsulated in UDP. The NAPT device can 
thread the ESP/AH packet as a standard UDP packet. The UDP header has 
the destination port 4500. The layer structure is shown in Figure 12.15. 
Through decryption, the UDP/TCP checksum of the inner header is 
recalculated or ignored. 
• Messages, called “nat-t-keep-alive”, are used to keep the NAPT binding 
active. As described in chapter A.2.1, the NAPT translation is deleted after a 
certain period of inactivity (idle timeout). In order to keep the translation 
active, the NAT-T implements keep-alive-updates. This is implemented as 
part of ISAKMP phase 1 with empty messages called “nat-t-keep-alive”. If 
there is an NAPT, at least one of the peers must send packets regularly in 
order the keep the NAPT entry.  
• ISAKMP SA session is active during the whole communication and requires 
some CPU resources to precede the keep-alive messages. 
 
In most of the cases, NAT-T will successfully assist connection establishment. The NAT-
T feature cannot handle all NAPT cases, such as UDP fragmentation cases for example. In 
ISAKMP, the participants can use certificates for authentication. A certificate is usually 
larger than 1500 bytes and the packets will be fragmented. The fragmented UDP packet can 
be dropped by the NAPT device upon which the ISAKMP will fail, see chapter A.2.1.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2 Overview of relevant protocols 234   
 
A.2.2.10.2 Dead Peer Detection 
IPSec is IP layer security protocol. The IP protocol does not handle host status 
information, i.e. whether it is reachable or not. Originally, IPSec was designed as a 
connectionless protocol - the receiver can be online or offline. With the spreading of the 
tunnel mode, a new feature known as Dead-Peer-Detection (DPD) [57] was introduced. This 
feature detects whether the peer is reachable. It is based on ISKMP phase 1 messages. The 
DPD feature support is announced using the vendor ID payloads. The receiver of the DPD 
message must reply and in this way assure its presence. The IPSec SA is deleted if there is no 
reply to the DPD request. 
A.2.2.10.3 Reverse Route Injection 
The IDs in ISAKMP Quick mode of are commonly used to announce an IP address or 
networks to the opposite peer. The common example is the use of ESP tunnel mode, where 
the IP network parameters of the initiator are not known to the responder in advance. The 
responder serves many initiators with unknown public IP addresses. In order to set a proper 
routing entry, the initiators IP address must be extracted from the ISAKMP negotiation and 
added to the routing table. This is called “reverse route injection”. The feature sets the quick 
mode ID as a directly connected network in the routing table of the gateway. The route entry 
is usually redistributed in the backbone. 
A.2.2.10.4  Idle Timeout 
If any IPSec packets are received at certain times then the session is deleted. This new 
feature was introduced by all vendors, because the duration of the communication was used 
for billing. The customers are paying on a time basis for using the IPSec resources. Another 
motivation is to reduce the “dead/zombie” sessions and keep the memory free. 
A.2.2.10.5 ISAKMP(IKE) Pass through  
A solution to the NAPT problem was also developed by the device vendors. It was 
created in parallel to the NAT-T described in A.2.2.10.1, so both of them currently co-exist. 
The target was to solve the problem on the intermediate NAPT device, without changing the 
original IPSec standard. When an NAPT router is between the hosts during ISAKMP 
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negotiation it requires some mechanism to map the return ISAKMP messages to the correct 
inside host. If two hosts behind the NAPT device negotiate with the same destination peer, 
the retuned packets have the same source, destination port and IP address. De-multiplexing at 
the NAPT device was not possible, since there is no unique parameter. The IKE pass-through 
uses the cookie in the ISAKMP header to map the packets in the right connection. 
A.2.2.10.6 IPSec Pass through 
The NAPT vendor solution for the ESP header was developed and called “IPSec Pass 
through”, similar to “IKE Pass through”. The idea was to find a unique identifier for de-
multiplexing the return packet. The ESP header includes the SPI value, which is unique and 
can be used for this purpose. The problem is that the SPI number is negotiated in the 
ISAKMP quick mode phase, which is encrypted and inaccessible to the NAPT device. The 
solution is based on the assumption that send-received packets are coming in very short 
intervals after the ISAKMP establishment. The NAPT router waits for input and output ESP 
traffic and creates the mapping on the fly during the first ESP packets. There are inbound and 
outbound SPI, so traffic is needed in both directions. A critical point of this algorithm is that 
it does not always work. The parallel establishment of multiple connections means that it is 
not possible to pick up the correct SPI. In a small office this feature will assist connection 
establishment, but it will not be helpful in large-scale environments. 
A.2.2.10.7 Not interrupted mode 
A new IPSec SA must be renegotiated before the session lifetime expires. An overlap of 
two IPSec SA with the same SPD is permitted, in order to ensure that packets are not dropped 
during the negotiation of the new session. The old and new IPSec SA can coexist and handle 
packets encrypted with the new and old key. No packet losses are achieved during the 
reestablishment. 
A.2.2.10.8 Phase 2 Conf mode (Easy VPN) 
The idea of Easy VPN was to use ESP in tunnel mode for client to server communication. 
The VPN gateway (server) assigns a private IP address and DNS/WINS to the VPN client. A 
draft called Conf Mode [32] was specified to enable this. The IPSec client negotiates phase 1 
with its public IP address. The client starts then Conf Mode and receives the corporate IP 
address/parameter etc. After it, the Quick mode is established with the new private IP 
parameter. The Conf mode is an expired draft, which has never turned in RFC. Although it 
has not standardised, it is used in most of the IPSec client software. In practical terms, the 
biggest installations of IPSec for remote workers use this draft, like Cisco VPN. 
A.2.2.10.9 Extended Authentication (X-Auth) 
The X-Auth [31] gives the option of user authentication with username/password 
supplementary to the phase 1 authentication. There are two authentications, one in phase 1 
and one in X-Auth with username and password. Typically, the user authenticates himself 
using username/password and the computer with a certificate. This is also an expired draft, 
which, because of its controversy, never became RFC. The X-Auth is very popular in the 
IPSec software for remote workers, like Cisco VPN. 
A.2.2.11 Practical IPSec deployments  
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The IPSec deployments have changed a lot from the original ideas described in chapter 
A.2.2.8. There are two main deployments (Figure 12.16): corporate access to remote workers 
(single PC) and the connection of small offices.  
There are two main alternatives for the remote access: (1) tunnel mode with support of 
NAT-T, X-Auth, Config mode. Cisco VPN client is one of the leading representatives. (2) 
The modern clients are using “L2TP over IPSEC” with NAT-T support [33] (Figure 12.16). 
The main deployment is the Microsoft VPN Client part of all Microsoft OS (Mobile, 2000, 
2003, XP, Vista).  
 
The second usage of IPSec is for connecting small LANs to a main office through the 
Internet, where tunnel mode with NAT-T is used see Figure 12.16. 
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